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Abstract 
This thesis examines a number of closely connected counter-terrorist executive mechanisms 
in the United Kingdom (UK) and the manner in which they are administered, in order to 
evaluate the implications of the mechanisms for, and ultimately their compatibility with, the 
right to a fair trial under international human rights law (IHRL). More specifically, this study 
critically analyses Control Orders, Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures 
(TPIMs), and Temporary Exclusion Orders (TEOs). For reasons made clear in this thesis, 
these mechanisms are termed ‘counter-terrorist hybrid orders’ and are collectively analysed 
as such. As the study identifies a number of issues pertaining to the current design and 
administration of these mechanisms that can adversely affect the right to a fair trial, the 
thesis argues that they should be substantially reformed to make them more consistent with 
IHRL fair trial standards.  
Moreover, the thesis examines how these mechanisms, as they are currently designed and 
administered, have been accepted in a legal system with a recognised and long-established 
attachment to upholding high human rights standards. Having identified, generated and 
analysed a substantial body of research to perform this task, the thesis argues that the 
acceptance of the mechanisms as they are currently administered may have occurred as a 
result of the establishment of a state of ‘perpetual quasi-emergency’. This denotes a 
particular legal phenomenon in which the UK has responded to an evolving legal problem, 
namely, how to deal with terror suspects who cannot be prosecuted, deported, or indefinitely 
detained, in a manner that, whilst being grounded in law, actually resembles the behaviour of 
States enduring ‘prolonged emergencies’. The thesis asserts that the state of perpetual 
quasi-emergency, which creates the space necessary for the acceptance of these 
mechanisms, was established and is preserved by a number of legal and extra-legal factors. 
As such, some of the research, analysis and methods used to evaluate the phenomena in 
this study represents an original contribution to knowledge. 
This study encompasses a variety of approaches in order to examine a particular type of 
counter-terrorist power, the implications of these mechanisms for the right to a fair trial under 
IHRL, and the relationships between these issues and wider society. The study requires 
traditional doctrinal analysis when exploring what the right to a fair trial in the context of 
national security entails, and in order to examine the various counter-terrorist hybrid order 
regimes in light of this framework. When assessing what factors may play a role in the 
establishment and preservation of the state of perpetual quasi-emergency, the study 
necessitates methods which are less doctrinal and more socio-legal in nature. 
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Chapter 1. Preliminary Matters 
1.1 Rationale and Background to the Study 
This thesis examines the development, implementation and administration of what are 
termed ‘counter-terrorist hybrid orders’, namely, Control Orders, Terrorism Prevention and 
Investigation Measures (TPIMs), and Temporary Exclusion Orders (TEOs), in order to 
evaluate the implications of the mechanisms for, and ultimately their compatibility with, the 
right to a fair trial under international human rights law (IHRL). This thesis argues that the 
design and administration of these mechanisms should be reformed as the current 
framework operates at the margins of IHRL, and that this has in fact adversely affected 
certain fair trial guarantees in a manner akin to that normally witnessed in States enduring a 
prolonged emergency. As such, this study analyses what factors may have contributed to 
the establishment and preservation in the UK of what this thesis argues is a state of 
‘perpetual quasi-emergency’. 
Before turning to these issues, it is important to acknowledge that the UK provides a 
particularly compelling legal, historical and socio-political environment for the foundation of a 
doctoral research project which focusses on matters of counter-terrorism and the right to a 
fair trial under IHRL. This opening section briefly explores this background, demonstrating in 
the process how the scope and aims of this study are justified. 
The first reason for the focus of this study concerns the unique historical experience the UK 
has in countering terrorism. The roots of some of the most controversial issues in 
contemporary counter-terrorism policies can be traced back to the British Government’s 
struggle in the 20th century to contain and defeat Northern Irish-related domestic terrorism. 
One of the most notorious counter-terrorist policies employed by the British Government was 
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the use of certain interrogation methods, known as the ‘Five Techniques’,1 against Irish 
Republican Army (IRA) suspects during ‘the Troubles’. The European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) held that these methods fell short of the torture threshold under Article 3 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), but instead amounted to inhuman and 
degrading treatment.2 This judgment has had repercussions in the so-called ‘War on Terror’ 
waged by the United States of America (USA), where certain officials relied upon the 
decision to argue that ‘Enhanced Interrogation Techniques’ did not amount to torture.3 
Moreover, a recent high-profile public inquiry in the UK found that certain members of the 
British Armed Forces had applied the ‘Five Techniques’ during the course of detainee 
interrogation in the Iraq War,4 despite the fact they had been banned decades earlier.5  
For the purposes of this study however, many aspects of recent counter-terrorism practices 
in the UK find some of their roots in the same domestic conflict, namely, the use of executive 
detention and exclusion orders which significantly restricted the liberty of terror suspects.6 
Firstly, the preventative arrest and detention of terrorist suspects in Northern Ireland, widely 
referred to as ‘internment’, was an extremely controversial executive measure exercised 
during the worst periods of the conflict. During the 1970s, several thousand individuals, 
                                                          
1
 These methods entailed wall-standing, hooding, subjection to noise, deprivation of sleep, and 
deprivation of food and drink. 
2
 Ireland v. UK (App. no. 5310/71) ECtHR, 18 January 1978; European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Rome, 4 November 1950; in force 3 September 1953) 
ETS No. 5 (the ‘ECHR’). 
3
 See the correspondence by inter alia the Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Yoo, Assistant 
Attorney General Jay S. Bybee, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and President George W. 
Bush (the ‘Torture Memos’). In particular see Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the 
President from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, Regarding Standards of Conduct for 
Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (1 August 2002). 
4
 The Report of the Baha Mousa Inquiry HC (2011) 1452-I. 
5
 In Ireland v. UK (n. 2), the ECtHR noted: ‘At the hearing…the United Kingdom Attorney-General 
made the following declaration: “The Government of the United Kingdom have considered the 
question of the use of the ‘five techniques’ with very great care and with particular regard to Article 
3…of the Convention. They now give this unqualified undertaking, that the ‘five techniques’ will not in 
any circumstances be reintroduced as an aid to interrogation”.’ (para 102). 
6
 The Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation (IRTL) has remarked: ‘Preventative restraints for 
counter-terrorism purposes had precursors in a series of colonial and wartime measures providing for 
executive detention, in the power to intern IRA suspects which remained on the statute book until the 
end of the 20
th
 century, and in the exclusion order regime’. See D. Anderson, ‘Control Orders in 2011: 
Final Report of the Independent Reviewer on the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005’ (March 2012) 
para 2.3. 
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predominantly Catholic nationalists, were arrested and detained without charge. In Operation 
Demetrius in August 1971, 342 IRA suspects were interned, all of whom were Irish 
nationalists. On several occasions during the Troubles, the British Government declared a 
state of emergency and derogated from (i.e. temporarily suspended) certain aspects of its 
international obligations in order to detain terrorist suspects indefinitely.7 
Secondly, a variety of executive exclusionary powers, known as Exclusion Orders, were 
imposed on terrorist suspects through a succession of complex temporary laws, beginning 
with the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1974, which was renewed and 
amended until its eventual repeal in 1998.8 Crucially, the Home Secretary could exclude 
terror suspects from entering the UK and could remove such individuals from Great Britain.9 
In 1976, a similar exclusionary power was conferred upon the Secretary of State for 
Northern Ireland in respect of Northern Irish territory.10 Terrorist suspects could also be 
excluded from the UK altogether.11 Moreover, any individuals who breached the terms of 
their Exclusion Order could face a substantial prison sentence.12 As such, by the time of the 
attacks against the USA on 11 September 2001 (9/11), and the purportedly heightened 
threat from international terrorism that has endured ever since, the UK had amassed much 
experience in matters of counter-terrorism. 
The second reason for the focus of this study relates to the UK’s historical and enduring 
global influence over the development of the right to a fair trial. This is partly due to the 
pervasiveness of the common law, but also because of a number of major legislative 
developments. The conceptual origins of the right to a fair trial are often traced back to 
Clauses 39 and 40 of Magna Carta 1215 which provided the foundations of habeas corpus 
                                                          
7
 Several complaints were heard by the ECtHR which considered the legality of the UK’s derogations. 
See Brannigan and McBride v. UK (App. nos. 14553/89; 14554/89) ECtHR, 25 May 1993. 
8
 See the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Acts in 1976, 1984 and 1989, and the 
Prevention of Terrorism (Additional Powers) Act 1996. Certain aspects of the legislation were 
permanently implemented with the Terrorism Act 2000. 
9
 Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1974, ss. 5-6. 
10
 Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1976, s. 6(1). 
11
 Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989, s. 7(1). 
12
 Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1974, s. 3(8). 
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and access to justice.13 Even though the rights enshrined in Magna Carta were only granted 
to noblemen, and despite the King’s commitment to the Charter fading soon after, its 
enactment nevertheless represented the first time that the English monarch had limited his 
power and granted rights to justice by law.14 It would, however, be several centuries before 
the writ of habeas corpus was fully codified in law with the Habeas Corpus Act 1679. 
Ten years later, the Bill of Rights 1689 represented a significant milestone in the shaping of 
the contemporary notion of the right to a fair trial. Although most associated with 
parliamentary matters, Articles 10 and 11 of the Bill provided respectively that excessive 
bails and fines should not be imposed, and cruel and unusual punishments should not be 
inflicted; and that jurors ought to be duly impanelled and returned. Furthermore, the Act of 
Settlement 1701 established that High Court judges and Lords Justice of Appeal would hold 
office during good behaviour and could only be removed pursuant to an appropriate and 
formal mechanism.  
The UK’s IHRL obligations, including the right to a fair trial, are primarily set out in the 
ECHR, the drafting of which was heavily influenced by British lawyers such as David 
Maxwell Fyfe. Crucially, Fyfe served as a rapporteur on the International Juridical Section of 
the European Movement which was tasked with preparing the initial draft of the ECHR 
although, ultimately, this did not contain a provision that ‘in any way resembles the fair trial 
guarantees’ set out in Article 6 of the ECHR.15 Instead, a Committee of Experts prepared a 
fair trial provision, and the final draft of Article 6 was based upon a draft text proposed by the 
UK.16 The UK’s commitment to the first binding international human rights instrument was 
                                                          
13
 Although originally listing 63 clauses, only four clauses of Magna Carta 1215 remain in effect today, 
two of which concern habeas corpus and access to justice.  
14
 Several scholars published books to coincide with the 800
th
 anniversary of Magna Carta. See F. 
Klug, A Magna Carta for All Humanity: Homing in on Human Rights (Routledge, 2015); R. Griffiths-
Jones & M. Hill (eds) Magna Carta, Religion and the Rule of Law (CUP, 2015). 
15
 W. Schabas, The European Convention on Human Rights: A Commentary (OUP, 2015) 55 & 267. 
16
 ibid, 266-270. 
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further reinforced when it became the first State to ratify the ECHR on 8 March 1951.17 
Similarly, the UK demonstrated important leadership in the drafting of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).18 The UK was one of eight members of the 
Drafting Committee of the Commission on Human Rights which began to draft the ICCPR in 
June 1947, whose discussions were in turn partly based on a draft convention provided by 
the UK.19 
Several decades later, the ECHR was incorporated into UK domestic law via the Human 
Rights Act (HRA) 1998 in accordance with the Labour Party’s 1997 manifesto pledge to 
‘Bring Rights Home’.20 With this landmark legislation, public authorities are prohibited from 
acting in a way that is incompatible with Convention rights and, crucially, individuals in the 
UK can enforce their Convention rights in the domestic courts rather than having to apply to 
the ECtHR or rely upon a concoction of common law principles and statutory rights spanning 
several centuries.21  
Despite the strong and enduring influence the UK has manifested over the development of 
the right to a fair trial at the international level, there was great concern amongst human 
rights advocates that these commitments might wane after 9/11. Although the right to a fair 
trial represents ‘a cardinal requirement of the rule of law’ according to one of the most senior 
judges in recent years,22 the effect that 9/11 has had upon human rights protection in the UK 
cannot be understated. The gradual deterioration of many fair trial guarantees and the 
apparent acquiescence of the courts and public has been a major cause for concern, and is 
one of the central issues of this study.  
                                                          
17
 Council of Europe, Chart of signatures and ratifications of Treaty 005: Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms at https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-
/conventions/treaty/005/signatures?p_auth=pNwJKz3Q.  
18
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (GA Res. 2200A XXI, 16 December 1966; in 
force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (the ‘ICCPR’). 
19
 M. J. Bossuyt, Guide to the ‘Travaux Préparatoires’ of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987) xix. 
20
 Labour Party, Bringing Rights Home: Labour’s Plans to Incorporate the European Convention on 
Human Rights into UK Law (London, Labour Party, 1996). 
21
 See, respectively, HRA 1998, ss. 6 & 3. 
22
 T. Bingham, The Rule of Law (Penguin, 2011) 90. 
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In that regard, the third reason why the UK offers a particularly interesting environment for 
this study relates to the diverging approaches that the governments of the USA and UK took 
to combating terrorism in the aftermath of 9/11, whilst having to contend with their IHRL 
obligations. 
The Bush Administration’s counter-terrorism policy was grounded in a war paradigm, 
massively restricting or even rejecting the applicability of human rights norms for certain 
categories of people. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, and for the first time on 16 
September 2001, the Bush Administration quickly construed the subsequent counter-terrorist 
campaign into what became known as the ‘War on Terror’.23 Soon after, President George 
Bush declared that the ‘War on Terror’ had begun and would not end until every terrorist 
group in the world had been defeated.24 In essence, the USA maintained that this ‘war’ was 
a genuine armed conflict under international humanitarian law (IHL), that IHL would therefore 
govern the conflict, and that the USA’s IHRL obligations would not apply extraterritorially.25  
Although the UK did not ultimately pursue this approach after 9/11, it initially seemed that 
prominent British politicians were attempting to align the UK’s position with that of the USA. 
When asked about the existence of a ‘war on terrorism’ on 16 September 2001, the Prime 
                                                          
23
 President Bush remarked in a question and answer session: ‘This crusade, this war on terrorism is 
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February 2002; US Department of Defense, Military Commission Order No. 1, 21 March 2002; Military 
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Minister, Tony Blair, appeared to agree with President Bush, stating that ‘[w]hatever the 
technical or legal issues about a declaration of war, the fact is we are at war with terrorism’.26 
However, the war-grounded approach that had taken root in American political and legal 
discourse just days after 9/11 did not endure in the UK. Notwithstanding an active and 
leading role in the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and alleged complicity in the American-
led extraordinary rendition programme,27 initial rhetoric grounded in war swiftly reverted back 
to rhetoric grounded in law, which entailed respect for the rule of law and the UK’s IHRL 
obligations.28  
This was reinforced in 2006 with the publication of the UK’s general counter-terrorism 
strategy, CONTEST,29 which unambiguously stated that criminal prosecution was the UK 
Government’s ‘preferred way of disrupting terrorist activity’.30 This strongly echoed the 
overarching findings of the Diplock Report, conducted in the early years of the Troubles in an 
attempt to find ways to deal with terrorism more effectively than resorting to internment, 
which concluded that criminal prosecution enjoyed primacy.31 In that respect, as is well 
known, the UK has often implemented bold, innovative and controversial counter-terrorism 
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laws that have influenced other domestic legal systems around the world, not least of all in 
common law countries such as Canada, New Zealand and Australia.32 
For example, as the USA chose to indefinitely detain ‘unlawful combatants’ under the guise 
of IHL, most notoriously at Guantánamo Bay, the UK provided for its own version of 
indefinite detention, by means of law enforcement, at Belmarsh Prison in London. With Part 
4 of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act (ATCS) Act 2001, the UK had found its 
answer to the vexing problem of having to deal with terrorist suspects who could not be 
deported due to the principle of non-refoulement who, at the same time, could not be 
prosecuted due to evidentiary concerns. The House of Lords held that this violated Article 5 
in conjunction with Article 14 of the ECHR, and issued a declaration of incompatibility under 
section 4 of the HRA 1998 in respect of the regime.33  
Accordingly, the British Government responded to the concerns of the Law Lords and 
implemented the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) 2005 which allowed any individual, 
crucially including British citizens, to be served with a Control Order. The Control Order 
mechanism, later replaced by the TPIM regime,34 was a specifically tailored curfew 
mechanism that restricted the liberty of designated individuals in several ways and could 
impose specific conditions upon them. The implementation and evolution of these executive 
preventative mechanisms, or, as they are termed in this thesis, ‘counter-terrorist hybrid 
orders’, provides the focus for this study.  
Following the terrorist attacks in London on 7 July 2005 (7/7), the UK again demonstrated its 
apparent resistance to the war paradigm, despite the Prime Minister’s unnerving claim that 
the ‘rules of the game’ were changing in regards to the legal obstacles that prevented the 
                                                          
32
 For example, the UK’s definition of terrorism under s. 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000 was particularly 
influential in countries that did not have specific terrorism legislation at the time of 9/11. See K. 
Roach, ‘The Post 9/11 Migration of Britain’s Terrorism Act 2000’ in S. Choudhry (ed) The Migration of 
Constitutional Ideas (CUP, 2006); K. Roach, ‘Sources and Trends in Post-9/11 Anti-Terrorism Laws’ 
in B. J Goold & L. Lazarus (eds), Security and Human Rights (Hart Publishing, 2007); K. Roach, ‘The 
Migration and Derivation of Counter-Terrorism’ in G. Lennon & C. Walker (eds) Routledge Handbook 
of Law and Terrorism (Routledge, 2015). 
33
 A and others v. SSHD [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 AC 68 (‘A v. SSHD’ or the ‘Belmarsh case’). 
34
 Terrorism Prevention and Investigations Measures Act 2011. 
9 
 
deportation of terrorist suspects and hate preachers.35 Politicians, academics, lawyers and 
human rights advocates questioned what ‘rules’ were going to change, and what impact this 
was going to have upon the respect for and protection of human rights in the UK. Some, 
such as Lord Lester, a Liberal Democrat peer, feared that Tony Blair was referring to the 
rules within IHRL, ‘including the UN Convention Against Torture and the Human Rights 
Act’.36 
However, seeking to dispense with any doubt as to how the UK viewed the threat from 
terrorism, the then Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), Sir Ken MacDonald, unequivocally 
stated in 2007: 
London is not a battlefield. Those innocents who were murdered on July 7 
2005 were not victims of war. And the men who killed them were not… 
‘soldiers’…They were criminals…On the streets of London, there is no 
such thing as a ‘war on terror’, just as there can be no such thing as a ‘war 
on drugs’. The fight against terrorism on the streets of Britain is not a war. 
It is the prevention of crime, the enforcement of our laws and the winning 
of justice for those damaged by their infringement.37 
Speaking in a similar vein soon after, Tony McNulty, a Home Office Minister, stated in 2008 
that ‘prosecution is – first, second and third – the government’s preferred approach when 
dealing with suspected terrorists’.38 
These calm and measured responses grounded in the language of the criminal law stand in 
stark contrast to the reaction espoused by senior American officials in the wake of 9/11. 
Accordingly, in the aftermath of the 7/7 terrorist attacks, the British Government opted to, at 
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least in principle, abide by its obligations under IHRL and resort to law enforcement as the 
primary means by which to confront terrorism. 
In addition to the implications of the 2004 Belmarsh judgment, the roots of many of the 
contemporary concerns with the right to a fair trial in the context of national security pre-date 
9/11. In particular, when so-called ‘secret trials’ are concerned, the origins of much 
contemporary practice can be traced back to the landmark Chahal v. UK judgment in 1996.39 
Although the case is more renowned for the issue of non-refoulement and Article 3 of the 
ECHR, it also considered Article 5(4) regarding an individual’s right to access court. The 
Grand Chamber of the ECtHR held that, due to the shortcomings of the Home Office 
advisory panel and lack of procedural guarantees that an individual enjoyed, the panel could 
not be considered a court for the purposes of Article 5(4).40 
Following the Chahal decision in 1996, the UK government passed the Special Immigration 
Appeals Commission (SIAC) Act 1997 in an attempt to remedy the European Court’s critical 
judgment. The new model of proceedings envisaged under the SIAC Act represented the 
first manifestation of what are widely termed closed material procedures (CMP). In these 
proceedings, the individual might not be fully informed of the accusations, evidence or 
complete judgment, is excluded from closed sessions, and is not permitted any contact with 
their security-cleared lawyer once that lawyer has been served with the closed evidence. 
When the implications and consequences of both the Chahal and Belmarsh judgments are 
considered together, contemporary counter-terrorism practice in the UK provides a 
compelling focal point for further investigation. The implementation of counter-terrorist hybrid 
orders, as demonstrated by the now obsolete Control Order regime, and presently by TPIMs 
and TEOs, can carry harsh restrictions and obligations akin to or, arguably, worse than some 
forms of criminal punishment. However, the mechanisms are deliberately implemented and 
reviewed in the civil courts, thus denying the individual the more stringent fair trial 
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guarantees attached to criminal proceedings whilst, at the same time, criminal sanctions can 
be imposed for any breach of the attached conditions. Moreover, when the mechanisms are 
reviewed by the courts, they can be heard under CMP, adding further complexity and 
epitomising the domination of national security interests that impose troubling restrictions 
upon fair trial rights usually taken for granted in proceedings concerning serious criminal-
related behaviour.  
As such, the implementation and administration of counter-terrorist hybrid orders presents 
unique challenges. When each aspect is considered in isolation, the implications for the right 
to a fair trial are significant, but, when analysed collectively, the consequences for the right 
to a fair trial are potentially drastic. This thesis seeks to explore how, when all factors are 
considered together, the implementation and administration of counter-terrorist hybrid orders 
has affected the right to a fair trial. Furthermore, given the legal, historical and socio-political 
background to the study, the thesis seeks to explore how these developments have been 
allowed to take place. As such, the thesis challenges the assumption made since the onset 
of the ‘War on Terror’ that the UK has committed to a framework of law enforcement which 
upholds high human rights standards. Instead, the thesis argues that, in response to the 
initial challenges generated by the Chahal and Belmarsh judgments, the UK has behaved in 
a manner that, whilst grounded in law, actually resembles the behaviour of States enduring 
prolonged emergencies. Ultimately, the thesis argues that the UK’s approach to these 
particular issues denotes a state of ‘perpetual quasi-emergency’, which has created the 
space necessary for these consequences to materialise. 
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1.2 Aims of the Study 
Against the background set out above, this thesis aims to provide a critical analysis of some 
of the most contentious developments in recent counter-terrorism practice in the UK which 
implicate the right to a fair trial.  
In particular, the thesis aims: 
i. To explore the extent to which, if at all, the implementation and administration of 
counter-terrorist hybrid orders have adversely affected the right to a fair trial in the 
UK. 
The thesis explores the development, implementation and administration of counter-terrorist 
hybrid orders, with a view to ascertaining whether, and if so, the extent to which, the use of 
these mechanisms has adversely affected the right to a fair trial in the UK. The use of such 
measures undoubtedly carries the potential to affect the right to a fair trial in a number of 
ways. Firstly, the conditions which may be attached to counter-terrorist hybrid orders can be 
akin to criminal punishment, whilst a breach of those conditions leads to the possibility of 
criminal sanctions, raising questions over the substantive fairness of the mechanisms. 
Secondly, the manner in which the mechanisms are adjudicated upon, i.e. in civil 
proceedings which can be heard in camera and ex parte, raises questions over the 
procedural fairness of the processes for implementing and challenging the mechanisms. As 
such, the thesis will discuss the history and application of the measures in question, and 
critically reflect on how those measures have affected the right to a fair trial.  
Before analysing the effects of counter-terrorist hybrid orders upon the right to a fair trial, it 
will first be necessary to outline the scope and limitations of the relevant norms in the context 
of national security. As such, the thesis provides an assessment of how IHRL responds to 
threats and emergency situations, and the circumstances in which the restriction or 
suspension of certain fair trial guarantees may be necessary in order to accommodate 
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national security concerns. In addition, as will be explained in Chapter 2, under IHRL States 
are given various degrees of flexibility to respond to threats and acts of terrorism. The thesis 
therefore also explores how States may derogate from certain aspects of their IHRL 
obligations pertaining to the right to a fair trial. 
ii. Assuming that certain aspects of counter-terrorist hybrid orders have adversely 
affected the right to a fair trial to some extent, to critically analyse why this has 
occurred, including analysis of both legal and extra-legal factors. 
On the assumption that certain aspects pertaining to the implementation and administration 
of counter-terrorist hybrid orders have adversely affected the right to a fair trial under IHRL to 
some extent, the second aim of the thesis is to ascertain how this has been possible. In 
other words, the thesis examines the various legal and extra-legal factors which have 
contributed to the introduction and acceptance of measures which are challenging the right 
to a fair trial. The thesis will analyse why the protection of the right to a fair trial, and the 
protection of human rights more broadly, has become a lower priority for the UK in the 
struggle against terrorism. Although traditional explanations have centred on the need to 
strike a balance between security and liberty, the thesis will argue that analysis must go 
beyond this narrow legal scrutiny and the metaphorical discourse of balance.  
iii. To identify viable avenues through which the UK (and other States facing a 
terrorist threat) may reconcile their obligations with regard to effective counter-
terrorism policies and their human rights obligations pertaining to fair trial 
standards. 
The final aim of the thesis is to provide recommendations, if necessary, as to ways in which 
the current practice relating to counter-terrorist hybrid orders could be brought in line with the 
UK’s IHRL obligations. These recommendations will be specific to the procedures relating to 
counter-terrorist hybrid orders which constitute the specific focus of this thesis, but will also 
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have broader relevance insofar as some of the recommendations have the potential to find 
application in the context of the UK’s wider counter-terrorism approach. Furthermore, given 
how influential the UK’s domestic legal system has been and continues to be in common law 
States and also more recently in Europe in matters of counter-terrorism, some of these 
recommendations will be relevant to other States that have implemented, or are considering 
implementing, similar executive mechanisms or court procedures resembling CMP.  
 
1.3 Research Questions 
Set against the background and aims of the study discussed above, the present study will 
assess whether, and to what extent, the current design of the legal procedures concerning 
the imposition of counter-terrorist hybrid orders, and their administration in practice, 
represent an erosion of established fair trial standards. The study will then proceed to 
examine the legal and extra-legal factors that may have created the space necessary for 
such a progressive erosion to take place, with a view to making recommendations, if 
necessary, as to ways in which the practice in this area can be brought in line with the UK’s 
human rights commitments. 
In order to answer this question, the following discrete research questions will need to be 
addressed:  
1. What are the international standards pertaining to the right to a fair trial which are 
particularly relevant in proceedings involving national security concerns? 
2. To what extent, and in what circumstances, can fair trial guarantees lawfully be 
restricted, or partly suspended in accordance with IHRL in response to national security 
concerns? 
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3. What is the nature (criminal v. civil / administrative) of the proceedings concerning 
counter-terrorist hybrid orders, and what are the implications of this characterisation? 
4. What aspects pertaining to the design, implementation and administration of counter-
terrorist hybrid orders are not in line with internationally recognised fair trial standards, 
particularly those enshrined in Article 6 ECHR and the jurisprudence of the ECtHR? 
5. If counter-terrorist hybrid orders are adversely affecting the right to a fair trial, what are 
the legal and extra-legal factors that have helped to facilitate the adoption and 
progressive expansion of these mechanisms? 
6. If counter-terrorist hybrid orders are adversely affecting the right to a fair trial, how can 
the UK reform current practice to ensure that it complies with its obligations under IHRL?  
 
1.4 Literature Review 
This section reviews scholarly discussion which has made a significant contribution to 
knowledge regarding the themes covered in this thesis. A comprehensive literature review of 
the academic literature addressing the sum of challenges encountered in the post-9/11 legal 
environment is evidently beyond the scope of this thesis. It is, however, important to 
acknowledge and engage with some of the most important themes which have remained 
prevalent and have consistently framed the legal discussion regarding counter-terrorism and 
the right to a fair trial over the past two decades.  
The review is divided into three parts. First, the review addresses academic scholarship 
which has explored the nexus between terrorism, human rights and emergencies. This part 
considers how scholars have addressed the post-9/11 legal environment which has, whether 
directly or indirectly, created space for human rights norms to be threatened. The second 
part of the review specifically focusses upon the doctrinal debate on the right to a fair trial in 
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the context of counter-terrorism powers and provides an overview of how legal scholars 
have discussed the various challenges to the right to a fair trial. This part also explores the 
academic discussion regarding the legal and extra-legal factors that may have contributed to 
the weakening of fair trial guarantees in the years since 9/11. The third part of the review 
considers how scholars have critiqued the specific approaches and methods of the UK in 
countering terrorism. This part reviews how scholars have analysed the counter-terrorist 
experience in Northern Ireland, and the more contemporary innovative approaches to 
combat international terrorism. 
1.4.1 Terrorism, Human Rights and Emergencies 
Acts of terrorism and counter-terrorist responses are met with such political, media and 
academic hyperbole that the entire terrorist phenomenon, collectively construed, is 
constantly framed as one of the most significant challenges to the protection of human rights 
in the 21st century. Academic commentary discussing the post-9/11 legal environment and 
the consequent threat to IHRL and the rule of law in general terms has been abundant.41 
Particularly in the aftermath of 9/11, the threat from international terrorism was deemed to be 
so serious that political leaders often dramatically framed terrorism as an ‘existential threat’ 
to democracy.42 Chiefly in the USA, a specific discourse was quickly adopted and 
institutionalised after 9/11, ultimately reflected in the ‘Global War on Terror’ paradigm.43 
Legal opinion on the characterisation of the conflict has been mostly critical of the claim that 
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the ‘War on Terror’ amounted to a genuine armed conflict under international law,44 although 
some scholars, predominantly based in the USA, have defended the position.45 The use of 
detention and the treatment of detainees since 9/11 has attracted a considerable amount of 
academic commentary.46 
Regarding the purported ‘existential’ threat of terrorism to democracy, legal scholars have 
typically not acceded to such hyperbolic terminology. Having said that, one comparable legal 
dimension can be identified with reference to states of emergency in international law and 
derogations from IHRL obligations.47 The prevailing legal discussion has generally centred 
on how regional courts and international monitoring bodies have interpreted and applied the 
notion of a ‘public emergency’ insofar as there must exist, inter alia, a threat to the life of the 
nation.  
The problems and implications of states of emergency for the respect and protection of IHRL 
have been identified and discussed at length by many academics.48 For example, some 
have noted that many of the most serious human rights abuses occur during public 
emergencies, ‘when states employ extraordinary powers to address threats to public 
order’.49 One of the leading and most comprehensive books on these issues, co-authored by 
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Oren Gross and Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, discusses the history, theory and application of states 
of emergency.50 The authors contend that a number of general models of emergency powers 
exist: the ‘Business as Usual’ model, models of accommodation, and the ‘Extra-Legal 
Measures’ model. Of these, the most relevant for the purposes of this study are the various 
models of accommodation which, according to the authors, insist upon ‘the maintenance of a 
legal emergency system so that legal mechanisms and rules control the measures 
implemented by the authorities in response to a crisis’.51 This study seeks to build upon this 
kind of scholarship by exploring certain contemporary counter-terrorist powers which appear 
to challenge the accustomed models of accommodation under IHRL. 
Additionally, scholars have expressed concerns about the dominance of the executive, the 
passivity of the legislature and the deferential nature of the judiciary when states of 
emergency are declared, with international monitoring bodies often being left to provide the 
sole measures of quasi-judicial scrutiny.52 For example, despite agreeing that executive 
action ought to be subjected to oversight in terrorism-related emergencies, Fiona de Londras 
and Fergal Davis have differed in what they consider to be the most effective means of doing 
so; Davis arguing that the legislature and popular democratic processes must be relied 
upon, de Londras placing her confidence in the judiciary to intervene.53 As this study 
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examines, the deferential nature of the judiciary to the executive in matters of national 
security can have drastic implications for IHRL.  
It is also imperative to acknowledge that the manner in which States respond to acts of 
terrorism outside of emergency situations carries the potential to restrict, and in some cases 
violate, human rights. Critical literature regarding the effects of British counter-terrorism 
legislation on the enjoyment of human rights is broad, abundant and endlessly required with 
the constant supply of new and innovative counter-terrorism legislation.54 Equally, scholars 
and parliamentary committees, not just from the UK, have often raised concerns about the 
habit of legislatures passing counter-terrorism legislation with great speed, which can 
undermine democratic accountability and unduly enhance the power of the executive.55 
1.4.2 The Right to a Fair Trial in the Context of National Security 
The apparent conflicts that arise between the protection of human rights and security in 
matters of counter-terrorism have attracted academic debate prior to and ever since the 
onset of the ‘War on Terror’.56 The right to a fair trial in emotionally charged terrorism trials 
has faced particular and unique challenges even prior to 9/11.57 Many academics have 
analysed how counter-terrorism responses can fundamentally challenge the basic tenets of 
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the right to a fair trial recognised and protected under IHRL instruments.58 In particular, much 
attention has been devoted to the increasing secrecy of terrorism trials that entail national 
security concerns.59  
Several authors have attempted to identify the minimum standards and non-derogable 
elements of the right that apply in times of emergency by drawing upon other international 
obligations that States will retain.60 Others have explored more broadly how States may 
lawfully respond to emergency situations by utilising ‘claw-back’ clauses, or derogating from 
their IHRL obligations.61 For example, Andrew Ashworth has hypothesised what derogations 
from Article 6 of the ECHR might be conceivable if a government moved from a ‘justice 
model’ to a ‘security model’ in the criminal process.62 Ashworth theorised eight changes that 
could be implemented pursuant to a derogation concerning the right to a fair trial: the 
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reversal of the burden of proof; the authorisation of self-incrimination; the demand for speedy 
trials; the constraining of legal aid; the admission of hearsay evidence; the admission of 
unlawfully obtained evidence; the presumption of dangerousness and granting of long 
indeterminate sentences; and the political authorisation of prisoner release.63 Ashworth 
concludes that five of the Article 6 guarantees ‘could only be modified if a derogation were 
entered under Article 15 (duty to answer questions, very speedy trials, withdrawal of legal 
aid, presumption of dangerousness, release authorised only by Home Secretary), whereas 
the other three could be modified more easily because their boundaries appear to be more 
flexible’.64 
Looking more closely at the argument that some human rights guarantees have diminished 
since 9/11, much legal, philosophical and political commentary has been shaped around the 
apparent trade-off and proper balancing of civil liberties and the interests of national 
security.65 At one extreme, Alan Dershowitz famously advocated the use of torture warrants 
in 2003, indicative of a potential shift away from human rights interests in favour of national 
security concerns in the ‘War on Terror’.66 In a similar vein, Michael Ignatieff suggested that 
‘to claim that there are no lesser evil choices to be made is to take refuge in the illusion that 
the threat of terrorism is exaggerated’.67  
Some scholars have found this metaphorical language of balancing and trade-offs to be 
problematic.68 For example, Daniel Moeckli has suggested that the balancing metaphor is 
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not a helpful device in framing the relationship between liberty and security, arguing that to 
reduce the relationship to a balancing exercise is a simplistic notion which may obscure the 
real interests and issues at stake.69 Ronald Dworkin has contended that the balancing 
metaphor is ‘deeply misleading because it assumes that we should decide which human 
rights to recognise through a kind of cost-benefit analysis’, which, according to him, would be 
tantamount to declaring that there are no such things as human rights.70 David Luban has 
gone as far to argue that ‘the whole conversation about “trade-offs” conceals persistent 
fallacies’.71 
Some legal scholars have engaged with wider socio-political issues when considering what 
factors may have contributed to the erosion of high human rights standards after 9/11. For 
example, Fiona de Londras notes the truism that ‘in times of crisis and fear, panic can play 
an important and corrosive role in our levels of commitment to liberty and human rights, 
especially the rights of those considered to be “other”.’72 De Londras contends that: 
On its face, the aftermath of 11 September 2001 had all the ‘vital 
ingredients’ for panic-related repression: a serious but unquantifiable risk, 
widespread and deeply felt fear, an impulse towards ‘security’, an ‘othered’ 
enemy, a security-conscious populace and a cadre of moral entrepreneurs 
ready to make the case that increasing their powers would also increase 
‘our’ security.73 
Although De Londras’ observations concern the issue of detention in the ‘War on Terror’, 
they may be relevant to the aims and research questions of this study in light of the objective 
to take a critical and socio-legal approach to the study of certain counter-terrorism issues. As 
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such, this thesis builds upon this kind of scholarship by exploring how the progressive 
erosion of fair trial guarantees may have been allowed to occur in recent years. 
1.4.3 The United Kingdom’s Response to Terrorism 
As already mentioned, this literature review is not intended to be exhaustive, and many 
aspects of this section in particular will be explored and analysed further in Chapters 3 and 
4. As alluded to earlier, the UK provides a compelling environment for a study into matters of 
counter-terrorism and human rights. Particularly in the midst of the Troubles in Northern 
Ireland, the British Government developed a vast array of counter-terrorist powers which 
have attracted a wealth of commentary ever since.74 In particular, scholars have analysed 
and critiqued measures which have ramifications still today, not least of all the use of the 
‘Five Techniques’,75 internment,76 exclusion orders,77 and the ‘Diplock Courts’.78 However, 
the more ‘distant forerunners’ of some aspects of contemporary counter-terrorism practice 
can be traced even further back,79 including measures of reporting and exclusion under the 
Prevention of Violence (Temporary Provisions) Act 1939, and the Civil Authorities (Special 
Powers) Act (Northern Ireland) 1922. 
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In light of the commitment from successive Governments to prioritise criminal prosecution as 
the most effective and desirable avenue to disrupt the activities of terrorists,80 academics 
have commented extensively on this apparent retreat from executive action and the 
challenges that this can raise.81 Nevertheless, from a more theoretical criminal justice and 
counter-terrorist perspective, some scholars have explored the unsettling shift in recent 
years from ‘post-crime’ penal sanctions to the prioritisation of ‘pre-crime’ preventive action.82 
Scholars have explored the historical origins of the preventive State, although the use of civil 
preventive orders really came into being in the 1990s.83 Whilst this shift to preventive action 
was perhaps manifested most publicly with Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (ASBOs),84 which 
may be seen as the ‘talisman of civil preventive orders’,85 it is also seen with other executive 
powers such as sex offender orders,86 Serious Crime Prevention Orders,87 and Violent 
Offender Orders.88  
                                                          
80
 See Chapter 1, section 1.1, text accompanying ns. 28-38. 
81
 Walker, ‘Terrorism Prosecution in the United Kingdom’ (n.31); Jackson, ‘Vicious and Virtuous 
Cycles in Prosecuting Terrorism’ (n. 31); Walker, ‘Prosecuting Terrorism: The Old Bailey Versus 
Belmarsh’ (n. 31). 
82
 See A. Ashworth, L. Zedner & P. Tomlin (eds) Prevention and the Limits of the Criminal Law (OUP, 
2013) in particular ch 5, D. Dyzenhaus, ‘Preventive Justice and the Rule-of-Law Project’; A. Ashworth 
& L. Zedner, Preventive Justice (OUP, 2014); IComJ, ‘Assessing Damage, Urging Action’ (n. 44) in 
particular ch 5 ‘Preventive Mechanism’; J. McCulloch & S. Pickering, ‘Pre-Crime and Counter-
Terrorism: Imagining Future Crime in the “War on Terror”’ (2009) 49 British Journal of Criminology 
628; L. Zedner, ‘Pre-Crime and Post-Criminology’ (2007) 11 Theoretical Criminology 261; L. Zedner, 
'Preventive Justice or Pre-Punishment? The Case of Control Orders' (2007) 60 CLP 174. 
83
 Ashworth & Zedner, Preventive Justice (n. 82) ch 2 ‘The Historical Origins of the Preventive State’. 
84
 Crime and Disorder Act 1998, Part I. 
85
 Ashworth & Zedner, Preventive Justice (n. 82) 78. See also R. Matthews, H. Easton, D. Briggs & K. 
Pease, Assessing the Use and Impact of Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (The Polity Press, 2007); S. 
Macdonald, ‘ASBOs and Control Orders: Two Recurring Themes, Two Apparent Contradictions’ 
(2007) 60 Parliamentary Affairs 601; A. Ashworth, ‘Social Control and “Anti-Social Behaviour”: The 
Subversion of Human Rights?’ (2004) 120 LQR 263. 
86
 Sexual Offences Act 2003, Part II. In respect of one of these types of orders, Sexual Offences 
Prevention Orders (SOPOs), similar powers were contained in the Sexual Offenders Act 1997, Part I. 
See S. Shute, ‘The Sexual Offences Act 2003: (4) New Civil Preventative Orders – Sexual Offences 
Prevention Orders; Foreign Travel Orders; Risk of Sexual Harm Orders’ (2004) Crim. LR 417. 
87
 Serious Crime Act 2007, Part I. See Home Office, New Powers Against Organised and Financial 
Crime (Cm 6875, 2006). 
88
 Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, Part VII. See Home Office, Rebalancing the Criminal 
Justice System in Favour of the Law-Abiding Majority: Cutting Crime, Reducing Reoffending and 
Protecting the Public (Home Office, July 2006). 
25 
 
However, it is also starkly and increasingly demonstrated in contemporary counter-terrorism 
policy, not least of all with asset-freezing powers in the UK,89 as well as Control Orders 
(2005-2011), TPIMs (2011-) and TEOs (2015-) which this thesis focusses upon. Although 
this thesis is principally concerned with counter-terrorism issues in the UK, other States have 
adopted powers and policies which appear to replicate or draw inspiration from the UK 
experience.90 Moreover, the UN asset-freezing system has filtered down to States and has 
been a significant issue in Europe.91 
As already mentioned, the three mechanisms that this thesis focusses on (i.e. Control 
Orders, TPIMs and TEOs) can impose severe obligations and restrictions upon individuals 
through the civil courts, and thus without the safeguards provided in a criminal trial, but with 
criminal sanctions attached nonetheless if the individual breaches the conditions. It is for 
these reasons, amongst others, that the mechanisms are described as ‘counter-terrorist 
hybrid orders’ for the purposes of this thesis.92 For example, scholars have validly argued 
that ‘hybrid’ in this context denotes a measure or law containing elements or characteristics 
of two previously distinct legal entities;93 the combination of preventative detention and 
surveillance;94 and the blurring of executive and judicial functions.95 
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Although David Bonner’s book, Executive Measures, Terrorism and National Security: Have 
the Rules of the Game Changed?, marks an invaluable contribution to knowledge on the 
history, usage and implications of executive mechanisms such as Control Orders, the 
situation has clearly developed since the time of its publication in 2007.96 Following the more 
recent introduction of TPIMs and TEOs, and the progressive expansion of CMP into other 
areas of law, this study seeks to challenge the author’s assertion that the only ‘rules of the 
game’ that have changed since 9/11 relate to the amount of deference shown by the 
judiciary to the executive which have, according to Bonner, changed for the benefit of all in 
democratic society.97 
Elsewhere, Helen Fenwick and Gavin Phillipson have noted how pre-emptive measures, 
such as Control Orders, make it likely that human rights will be violated, which places 
governments in the position of deciding between three options: asserting that human rights 
are inapplicable; derogating from obligations; or finding a way of diluting the standards 
upheld by the rights.98 This thesis will explore this argument in greater detail, and analyse 
how the UK has attempted to justify some of the counter-terrorist measures it has adopted in 
recent years which pertain to the right to a fair trial, and whether these measures accord with 
the constraints of IHRL, if indeed at all. 
In this regard, the progressive expansion of CMP in trials involving national security 
concerns has proven controversial in the sense that some of the most fundamental elements 
of the right to a fair trial have been significantly challenged.99 This was first demonstrated in 
1997 with the establishment of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission, and since the 
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enactment of the Justice and Security Act 2013, in any civil proceedings, allowing for trials 
that carry national security concerns to be heard in camera and ex parte. 
These developments give rise to ‘parallel systems of questionable justice’, in which pre-
emptive and often draconian powers are placed within the civil rather than the criminal 
process and are asserted to be preventive rather punitive.100 However, some scholars have 
argued that traditional criminal prosecution has made a comeback in counter-terrorism policy 
in recent years.101 For example, Clive Walker argues that there are two principal factors 
which shift priority towards criminal prosecution rather than executive action. Firstly, there is 
the ‘desire for legitimacy and the symbolic assertion of “normal” constitutional values’, and 
secondly, the ‘emergence of home-grown “neighbour terrorism”.’102 This study seeks to 
reflect upon these observations and conduct a more in-depth analysis of three counter-
terrorist mechanisms from the perspective of the right to a fair trial under IHRL. 
 
1.5 Methodology and Thesis Structure 
This section provides an account of what methodological factors have guided, shaped and 
ultimately determined the aims and research questions of this thesis. This section also 
outlines the overall structure of this thesis. 
Methodology can be understood in a number of ways, but ultimately concerns the 
articulation of what approach has been taken whilst conducting research and why such 
choices have been made. In other words, methodology concerns the particular ways in 
which research is carried out and the assumptions and perspectives which underpin an 
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investigation.103 Going further, methodology relates to our understanding of a particular field 
of enquiry which ultimately guides our thinking when addressing that field.104  
As this thesis examines the implications and overall compatibility of counter-terrorist hybrid 
orders with the right to a fair trial, much of its research is rooted in traditional doctrinal 
literature reviews. Accordingly, this thesis examines the compatibility of the relevant statutory 
frameworks underpinning the mechanisms, as well as the relevant case law pertaining to the 
administration of the mechanisms, with the right to a fair trial as it stands primarily under 
IHRL. However, in light of the aims of the thesis and overarching research question, this is a 
socio-legal study, as it also examines what legal and extra-legal factors may have influenced 
this outcome. As such, the research questions and aims of the thesis strongly accord with 
the purpose of socio-legal research which is to examine law, legal phenomena and the 
relationships between these issues and wider society.105  
A socio-legal approach ‘embraces disciplines and subjects concerned with law as a social 
institution, with the social effects of law, legal processes, institutions and services and with 
the influence of social, political and economic factors on the law and legal institutions’.106 In 
other words, socio-legal research is about considering law in the context of broader social 
and political theories.107 It has been suggested that the word ‘socio’ in socio-legal studies 
denotes ‘an interface with a context within which the law exists, be that a sociological, 
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historical, economic, geographical or other context’.108 In that regard, socio-legal research 
requires the researcher to draw upon perspectives and methodologies not just fundamental 
to legal research, but also those relating to the humanities and social sciences. Accordingly, 
this thesis employs a variety of research methodologies to address the particular research 
questions and aims outlined above. 
Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 addresses the first two sub-questions of the 
thesis outlined above, by setting out the applicable legal framework pertaining to the right to 
a fair trial in the context of national security. It also attempts to clarify when and how States 
may lawfully limit or suspend certain fair trial guarantees in proceedings when national 
security concerns arise. Accordingly, having identified the applicable legal framework, the 
chapter provides the essential legal context which allows the following chapters to reflect 
more concisely and critically on the implications of counter-terrorist hybrid orders for the right 
to a fair trial in the UK. 
In almost all legal research projects some doctrinal research is required to build the 
necessary foundations for subsequent critical analysis.109 This is particularly pertinent, as 
doctrinal analysis is concerned with the discovery and development of legal principles and its 
research questions take the form of asking what the law is in a particular context.110 As such, 
Chapter 2 provides a predominantly doctrinal and black letter analysis of the right to a fair 
trial in the context of national security, in order to plainly set out the relevant fair trial 
guarantees. To ensure the coherence of the thesis, it is vital to first grasp in a clear and 
unequivocal manner what the scope and standards of the right to a fair trial are, before 
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considering in subsequent chapters if, how, and why it has been adversely affected when 
counter-terrorist hybrid orders are implemented and administered by the courts. 
The chapter first addresses the fundamental issue of how the courts determine the nature of 
proceedings in order to ascertain which specific fair trial guarantees are applicable in any 
particular proceedings. As the analysis of counter-terrorist hybrid orders in Chapter 3 
illustrates, this is a fundamental question as the range of guarantees afforded to individuals 
involved in proceedings varies depending on whether those proceedings are characterised 
as criminal or civil. The chapter then addresses the nature of the right to a fair trial itself, and 
in the process illustrates how the right to a fair trial is inherently limited in certain regards. As 
such, it explores how the right to a fair trial, as a limited right, provides that numerous fair 
trial guarantees are susceptible to restrictions without the need for a State to declare a public 
emergency.  
In that regard, the analysis in Chapter 2 is confined to the common law and IHRL, primarily 
the ECHR, as these collectively shape the applicable legal framework in the UK. As such, 
Chapter 2 involves the interpretation and analysis of the relevant statutory and international 
treaty provisions, as well as the appropriate case law found within the common law and the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR. Whilst the fair trial guarantees espoused under the ECHR 
mostly complement common law jurisprudence, and the UK courts have generally adhered 
to ECtHR jurisprudence, the Chapter will demonstrate how there has been, at times, 
disparity between the two.111 
Going further, the chapter systematically analyses the most important fair trial guarantees 
which are particularly relevant for this thesis, beginning with the maximum set of guarantees 
that are afforded to individuals in criminal trials. It then analyses which of these guarantees 
in criminal proceedings are similarly applicable in civil proceedings, or have otherwise been 
imported by the courts.  
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Additionally, the chapter explores how States may decide to declare a public emergency in 
order to derogate from (i.e. to temporarily suspend) certain aspects of their IHRL obligations. 
In particular, the chapter examines what procedural and substantive obligations a State must 
adhere to for a derogation to be lawful. Finally, the chapter considers how the courts and 
monitoring bodies have scrutinised the declaration of a state of emergency.  
Chapter 3 moves away from the approach in Chapter 2 and engages with the more critically 
oriented third and fourth sub-questions and first aim of the thesis, namely, the 
characterisation of proceedings concerning counter-terrorist hybrid orders and the 
compatibility of the mechanisms with the right to a fair trial. In light of the legal framework set 
out in Chapter 2, the chapter explores the extent to which, if at all, counter-terrorist hybrid 
orders have adversely affected the right to a fair trial. As such, Chapter 3 begins to shift 
away from black-letter analysis which is concerned with what the law is, and instead 
consider the law in its wider context which is inherently less descriptive in nature.112 This 
chapter adopts a predominantly doctrinal approach, insofar as it is entails ‘the careful 
reading and comparison of appellate opinions with a view to identifying ambiguities, 
exposing inconsistencies among cases and lines of cases, developing distinctions, 
reconciling holdings, and otherwise exercising the characteristic skills of legal analysis’.113  
This involves a brief analysis of historical developments, as well as more critical analysis of 
recent policy, statutory provisions and jurisprudence, in light of the applicable legal 
framework examined in Chapter 2. To aid this analysis, it is important to examine statistical 
data on the use of counter-terrorist hybrid orders. Statistics concerning the use of Control 
Orders and TPIMs are easily available and, in the case of TPIMs, regularly revealed by the 
Home Office and commented upon by the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation 
(IRTL). Statistics concerning the use of TEOs were publicly disseminated for the first time in 
early 2017. For the purposes of this study, a freedom of information request was submitted 
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to the Home Office seeking clarification over the nature and amount of TEOs that have been 
implemented against individuals.114  
The Chapter begins with a brief historical analysis of the origins of counter-terrorist hybrid 
orders in order to illustrate how and why the mechanisms came into being. Historical 
analysis is concerned with the recognition of a historical problem or the need for certain 
historical knowledge, and the analysis of information about the problem which shapes our 
current understanding of something.115 The historical analysis in Chapter 3 reveals that 
current and future trends concerning counter-terrorist hybrid orders will continue to be 
shaped by past events to some extent, namely, the judgments of the ECtHR in Chahal v. UK 
and the House of Lords in the Belmarsh case.116 These decisions have resulted in an 
enduring legal problem to which counter-terrorist hybrid orders represent what may be the 
long-term solution, at least in the eyes of subsequent British Governments. 
Chapter 3 then briefly reverts back to a black-letter analysis in order to outline the statutory 
frameworks of the various counter-terrorist hybrid orders. This is essential as it demonstrates 
the clear-cut similarities between the various mechanisms in order to further justify the 
collective analysis of the regimes throughout the study. Moreover, outlining the comparable 
features of the mechanisms is imperative when analysing the effects of the mechanisms 
upon the right to a fair trial in later sections. In that regard, the majority of Chapter 3 critically 
analyses how counter-terrorist hybrid orders have affected the fair trial guarantees analysed 
in Chapter 2. In order to further illustrate the similarities of all counter-terrorist hybrid orders, 
the chapter analyses the common issues affecting all three mechanisms, rather than 
systematically exploring each mechanism in turn.  
                                                          
114
 The request was rejected under s. 22 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 as the material was 
intended for future publication. See Chapter 3, section 3.3.3, text accompanying ns. 624-627. 
115
 C. Busha & S. Harter, Research Methods in Librarianship: Techniques and Interpretations 
(Academic Press, 1980) 91. 
116
 Chahal v. UK (n. 39); A v. SSHD (n. 33). 
33 
 
As such, the chapter analyses how the issue of the nature of proceedings concerning 
counter-terrorist hybrid orders has been approached by the various stakeholders but most 
importantly, how the courts have responded. The chapter then addresses the nature of the 
mechanisms in more detail, but in particular, how the use of CMP has radically altered the 
trial process in matters of national security, and how the unique nature of TEOs raises 
additional challenges. The chapter then evaluates what steps have been taken in the 
attempt to mitigate the perceived unfairness of the mechanisms insofar as the right to a fair 
trial is concerned. 
Chapter 4 engages with the fifth sub-question and second aim of the thesis in order to 
critically analyse what legal and extra-legal factors may have contributed to the 
establishment of what is termed the state of ‘perpetual quasi-emergency’. It is this chapter in 
particular which has proven most challenging from a methodological perspective, raising 
stimulating and thought-provoking questions over the viability of the overarching research 
question, aims of the thesis, and how these would be addressed.  
Chapter 4 fully establishes the thesis as a socio-legal study. It departs from the doctrinal 
analysis undertaken in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, and takes a more external view of the law 
in order to understand and explain the identified effects upon the right to a fair trial. In 
essence, Chapter 4 follows on from statements of law and doctrinal analysis embodied in 
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, with socio-legal analysis to tackle the overarching research 
question.117 In that regard, Chapter 4 marks a leftwards shift on Paul Chynoweth’s matrix of 
legal research, shifting from strict doctrinal methodology to interdisciplinary methodology.118  
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In other words, the study shifts from one of internal enquiry i.e. what the law is, to one of 
external enquiry, i.e. what the law is about.119 In essence, whereas Chapters 2 and 3 are 
concerned with what the right to a fair trial entails in the context of national security and the 
effects of counter-terrorist hybrid orders upon that right, Chapter 4 is concerned with the 
actual position and implications of the mechanisms within society. 
Accordingly, with the more critically oriented research questions and aims of this thesis in 
mind, Chapter 4 adopts more radical methodologies rooted in critical theory.120 Whilst no 
clear single definition of critical theory can be identified, Michel Foucault argued in 1981 that: 
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[A] critique is not a matter of saying that things are not right as they are. It 
is a matter of pointing out on what kinds of assumptions, what kinds of 
familiar, unchallenged, unconsidered modes of thought the practices that 
we accept rest…Criticism is a matter of flushing out that thought and trying 
to change it: to show that things are not as self-evident as one believed, to 
see what is accepted as self-evident will no longer be accepted as such.121 
In the following decades and in various academic disciplines, different interpretations of 
critical theory built upon these ideas, some of which are particularly pertinent to studies 
which address matters of terrorism, counter-terrorism and human rights. In particular, Critical 
Legal Studies (CLS) and Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) share comparable ontological, 
epistemological and methodological commitments, making them potentially useful to socio-
legal studies. The theories share similar commitments in the sense that they are each 
challenges to, and rejections of, the dominant, traditional and orthodox approaches to their 
respective academic fields. According to some of the leading proponents of CTS, all critical 
approaches are rooted in a number of shared concerns and commitments despite the 
various disciplinary backgrounds and approaches to the study of terrorism.122 These entail 
‘scepticism towards accepted knowledge claims and dominant ideas’, the prioritisation of 
primary data, ‘sensitivity towards issues of knowledge and power’, and an ‘ethical 
commitment to human rights, progressive politics and improving the lives of individuals and 
communities’.123 Whilst investigating the factors that may have contributed in some way to 
allowing the erosion of certain fair trial guarantees, it is clear that each of these theories 
have a role to play. 
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In essence, advocates of CLS react against features of the prevailing orthodoxies and 
conservatism in legal scholarship and law schools,124 and against the purpose of law and 
legal institutions in society.125 In other words, the overarching characteristic of CLS is that it 
is both possible and necessary to think differently about the law.126 Specifically, CLS 
scholars reject the dominant tradition of Anglo-American legal scholarship, i.e. doctrinal 
black letter law, and seek to challenge existing institutions and ideas. Furthermore, it is 
argued that law is merely a collection of beliefs and prejudices that legitimise the injustices of 
society. The inherent scepticism of CLS is well-noted by Allan Hutchinson and Patrick 
Monahan: 
Law is not so much a rational enterprise as a vast exercise in 
rationalization. Legal doctrine can be manipulated to justify an almost 
infinite spectrum of possible outcomes…Legal doctrine is nothing more 
than a sophisticated vocabulary and repertoire of manipulative techniques 
for categorising, describing, organizing and comparing: it is not a 
methodology for reaching substantive outcomes.127 
One particularly important assumption of CLS is that law cannot be separated from politics 
and that law exists to support the interests of the wealthy, powerful, or class that forms it. As 
Michael Freeman argued, ‘Law is politics. It does not have an existence outside of 
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ideological battles within society’.128 In that regard, there are few legal issues which attract 
as much debate and disagreement as the inherently political nature of the definition of 
terrorism. The well-known cliché that ‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter’ is 
perhaps the best-known phrase epitomising this issue, whilst the apparent justifications for 
counter-terrorist legislation that infringes civil liberties can be equally contentious. In that 
regard, Jacques Derrida, perceived as the father of the deconstruction movement, remarked 
after 9/11 that ‘the dominant power is the one that manages to impose and, thus, to 
legitimate, indeed to legalize (for it is always a question of law) on a national or world stage, 
the terminology and thus the interpretation that best suits it in a given situation’.129  
Another vital function which CLS scholars maintain is essential to critical theory is that it is 
plainly insufficient to merely provide criticism of the law. Rather, critical theory must pursue 
an ‘alternative’, because without such, ‘critique disintegrates and turns into criticism’.130 
Although CLS has undoubtedly retreated from its peak, the movement nevertheless inspired 
other subgroups of critical theory, not least of all postmodernism, the feminist movement and 
critical race theory. 
When pursuing inter-disciplinary research into counter-terrorism issues, it is also useful to 
consider CTS which provides many valuable insights and reinforces the socio-legal nature of 
this study.131 As a methodological approach unfamiliar to legal scholars, CTS proponents 
reject the orthodox and state-centric tradition of terrorism scholarship, and instead argue that 
knowledge of terrorism can never be isolated from power and context, and that terrorism is a 
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social construct rather than objective fact.132 According to Richard Jackson, CTS can be 
understood ‘as a critical orientation, a sceptical attitude, and a willingness to challenge 
received wisdom and knowledge about terrorism’.133  
The central ontological commitment of CTS is that terrorism and the terrorist label are social 
facts rather than ‘brute’ facts.134 In order words, terrorism is a social construct and the 
decision to attribute the label of ‘terrorism’ to an act of violence is done so not purely based 
on the factual violence itself, but on the observer’s analysis and judgment. Furthermore, the 
ontology of CTS maintains that terrorism amounts to a strategy to achieve a particular 
outcome, which again emphasises the core ontological assumption that terrorism cannot be 
viewed objectively. In terms of its epistemology, CTS scholars maintain that our knowledge 
of terrorism can never be isolated from power and context, and that the creation of 
knowledge about terrorism is a social process which depends on a great many contextual 
factors.135 Furthermore, one epistemological commitment of CTS is to openly consider the 
possibility of State terrorism. CTS is also epistemologically committed to acknowledging a 
researcher’s own limitations and bias, vis-à-vis identity, values and perceptions.  
For socio-legal studies, one attraction of CTS is its openness to disciplinary pluralism. From 
a methodological perspective, ‘CTS scholars are committed to methodological and 
disciplinary pluralism in terrorism research – a willingness to embrace insights and 
perspectives of different academic disciplines, intellectual approaches and schools of 
thought’.136  
In light of the political, religious and ethnic dimensions of the present study and 
contemporary counter-terrorism in general, it may also be apt to consider Critical Race 
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Theory (CRT).137 According to Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic, a number of underlying 
assumptions of CRT can be identified, but chiefly that ‘racism is ordinary, not 
aberrational…the usual way society does business’.138 Critical race theorists in the USA 
assert that ‘both the procedures and the substance of American law, including 
antidiscrimination law, are structured to maintain white privilege’.139 For example, it has been 
argued that seemingly progressive and liberalising court judgments are often deceptive and 
merely create the impression that inequality is being addressed, when in reality the main 
beneficiaries are the dominant white class.140 However, given the fundamental similarities 
with CLS, which is a broader and much more adaptable critical methodological approach in 
comparison to the narrower and more radical nature of CRT, it was decided at an early stage 
not to incorporate CRT in this thesis. 
With the similarities of CLS and CTS in mind, Chapter 4 analyses the notion of the state of 
‘perpetual quasi-emergency’. In light of the findings in Chapters 2 and 3, the chapter asserts 
that the experience of counter-terrorist hybrid orders demonstrates that, whilst grounded in a 
legal framework, the UK is acting in a manner similar to States enduring a ‘prolonged 
emergency’. Moreover, the UK has deteriorated into a state of ‘perpetual quasi-emergency’ 
which has created the space necessary for the adverse effects upon the fair trial guarantees 
identified in Chapter 2 to materialise. By this, it is meant that, in response to a distinct legal 
problem, the UK has not formally declared an emergency but is acting at the margins of 
permissible conduct under IHRL which undermines certain fair trial guarantees. As such, 
Chapter 4 explores what this entails, asserting that such behaviour is only made possible 
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through the culmination of several legal and extra-legal factors which help to establish and 
preserve the state of perpetual quasi-emergency.  
Crucially, however, the chapter asserts that the state of perpetual quasi-emergency could 
not be maintained by legal factors alone, as certain factors have pushed back against the 
Government to reduce the harsh conditions attached to the mechanisms and, more 
importantly for the purposes of this thesis, to gradually improve the fairness of proceedings. 
Rather, a number of factors have helped to reinforce the state of perpetual quasi-
emergency. These extra-legal factors relate to the metaphor of balance between liberty and 
security, and the overwhelming rhetoric of panic, threat and fear which dominates political 
discourse and, as will be shown to a certain extent, has a role to play in the legislative 
process. The critical theories discussed above are pivotal to understanding these extra-legal 
factors, as traditional doctrinal analysis would be inadequate to deal with these issues. 
Specifically with this final extra-legal factor in mind, Chapter 4 considers the results of some 
content analysis that was conducted during the latter research stages of this study. In its 
most general sense, ‘content analysis is any technique for making inferences by objectively 
and systematically identifying specified characteristics of messages’.141 In recent years, 
some scholars have conducted content analysis of issues and concepts that are particularly 
relatable to the matters addressed in this thesis. For example, Donald Holbrook et al have 
devised a grading criterion for use when determining whether, and the extent to which, 
discursive content can be considered ‘terroristic’.142 In a different context Eva Herschinger 
has analysed the debates that have taken place before the United Nations (UN) concerning 
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the definition of international terrorism, finding, for example, that ‘terrorism’ is frequently 
framed as an ‘existential crisis’.143  
However, one of the most significant examples of scholarly content analysis which relates to 
the aims and themes of this thesis can be found in Ipek Demirsu’s recent monograph, 
Counter-Terrorism and the Prospects of Human Rights,144 in which the author scrutinises the 
enactment of recent counter-terrorist legislation in Turkey and the UK. In the UK, Demirsu 
analyses the parliamentary debates pertaining to the enactment of the ATCS Act 2001, the 
Terrorism Act 2006 and the TPIM Act 2011. Despite the significant historical, legal and 
political differences between Turkey and the UK, Demirsu concludes that similar rhetoric 
featured in the parliamentary debates leading to the enactment of counter-terrorism laws in 
both countries.145 
Drawing inspiration from these contributions, the content analysis in this particular study 
examines two parliamentary stages behind the enactment of four key Acts of Parliament, 
three of which underpin the counter-terrorist hybrid order regimes analysed in Chapter 3. 
These are the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) 2005, the Terrorism Prevention and 
Investigation Measures (TPIM) Act 2011, the Counter-Terrorism and Security (CTS) Act 
2015 and the Justice and Security Act (JSA) 2013. The research was conducted via the 
specialist software, Nvivo, in the attempt to assess what role, if any, the rhetoric of panic, 
threat and fear may have played in the legislative processes leading to the adoption of the 
four relevant statutes.  
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Since the objective of this particular analysis was to examine the ‘official representation of 
issues pertaining to national security and human rights’,146 the research was focussed on the 
parliamentary debates and committee stages of the four Bills. In addition to the 
methodological justification for this analysis, which will be discussed further below and also 
in Chapter 4, these sources have one particular advantage. These debates can be easily 
read via Hansard which is publicly accessible over the internet, which provides a permanent 
and unedited archive of parliamentary proceedings.147 This helps to ensure democratic 
accountability,148 and from a methodological perspective, other researchers are able to 
conduct identical or similar research to verify the findings and analysis conducted by a 
researcher. Moreover, as parliamentary debates are permanently archived and are clearly 
pivotal to the law-making process, the analysis of these debates would accord strongly with 
the purpose of CTS, which as explained earlier, prioritises primary data and shows a 
‘sensitivity’ towards issues of power, amongst other things.149 
In order to ensure consistency and narrow down the scope of the research for practical 
purposes, the content analysis was confined to the second readings and committee stages 
of each Bill in both Houses of Parliament. Whilst the other stages of the legislative process 
as well as pre-legislative and post-legislative scrutiny are undoubtedly valuable for ensuring 
good quality legislation,150 for example with the consideration of draft Bills, white papers, 
public consultation and committee reports, the second readings and committee stages are 
arguably more significant especially when counter-terrorism powers are at stake.  
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In that regard, the second readings and committee stage are arguably the most crucial 
stages of the legislative process leading to the creation of counter-terrorist hybrid orders for 
a number of reasons. First of all, as counter-terrorism legislation is often fast-tracked or semi 
fast-tracked through Parliament, therefore limiting or entirely circumventing some of the 
earlier preparatory and pre-legislative stages altogether,151 it may be difficult to conduct 
meaningful and consistent content analysis of these earlier stages. Even if an examination of 
these stages would generate some useful research, the second readings and committee 
stages of Bills are arguably more significant and deserving of further analysis for other 
reasons.  
As parliamentarians often, but not always, vote on a proposed Bill immediately after debating 
its content in the second and third readings, either allowing a Bill to progress or to defeat it, 
readings hold an obvious political and constitutional significance. However, the second 
reading stands out from the first and third readings for a number of reasons. From a practical 
perspective, the second reading is the first opportunity for parliamentarians to debate the key 
principles of the Bill, as the first reading is usually a formality with no debate actually taking 
place.152 In addition, the third reading stage of a Bill is of limited significance, as the contents 
of a Bill are usually already settled and only the House of Lords can make minor 
amendments at this stage.153 In that respect, statistics show that the House of Lords spends 
more time on second readings than any other reading.154 Secondly, owing to the clear 
political significance of the second readings, this may in fact be the only stage of the 
legislative process that much of the public observe owing to the media attention that the 
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readings attract. As such, the second reading stage represents a particularly opportune 
moment for the rhetoric of panic, threat and fear to feature.  
Although the committee stage of a Bill perhaps lacks the direct political significance and 
media attention that readings can attract, they are usually longer and more decisive than 
readings when drafting the final clauses of a proposed Bill.155 It is at this stage where a 
detailed examination of a Bill occurs and, if the Bill originates in the House of Commons, 
experts and interest groups can present evidence to the House.156 Moreover, if the Bill is 
fast-tracked, the committee stage may represent the best opportunity for meaningful scrutiny 
and for amendments to be made. Therefore, the committee stage retains a clear political 
significance that other stages may lack. 
Lastly, when analysing the debates, particular attention was shown to the contributions of 
certain parliamentarians, in particular Government Ministers. These parliamentarians are 
also members of the executive and are, therefore, symbols of the law-making ability of the 
sovereign.157 The executive also control timetabling issues,158 allowing them to shape the 
speed and tone of the debate. However, at the same time, the contributions of Opposition 
shadow ministers are also particularly valuable, as these can demonstrate consensus 
between parties.159 As one scholar has observed, albeit in a different jurisdiction, bi-
partisanship can play a part in eroding legislative scrutiny.160 
Having established the parameters of the research, the content analysis focussed upon the 
results of certain word frequency and text searches conducted via the Nvivo Query function. 
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The particular search parameters and reasons for these are noted in Chapter 4,161 whilst a 
short explanation and evidence of the research is provided in Appendix II.  
Finally, Chapter 5 evaluates the overall thesis and concludes. Bearing in mind the third aim 
and sixth sub-question of the thesis, the chapter makes a number of recommendations in 
light of the analysis and findings of the study that may be of relevance not just for the UK, 
but also for other States. The chapter then considers what short-term and long-term 
developments may be of relevance to the thesis, or might otherwise necessitate further 
research, before offering some final remarks.  
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Chapter 2. The Right to a Fair Trial in Proceedings with 
National Security Concerns: Guarantees, Limitations and 
Derogations 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines and critically analyses the fundamental elements of the right to a fair 
trial with a particular focus on those guarantees that are most relevant for the purposes of 
counter-terrorist hybrid orders.162 The chapter also examines a further means by which 
certain fair trial guarantees can be limited in the context of national security, namely, the 
possibility for States to derogate from some aspects of their IHRL obligations in response to 
a state of emergency. 
Following this introduction, the chapter addresses a number of important preliminary issues. 
First, it briefly outlines the guarantees pertaining to the right to a fair trial under IHRL and 
analyses how the courts determine the nature of a trial in order to ascertain which fair trial 
guarantees are applicable in any particular proceedings. The chapter then addresses the 
nature of the right to a fair trial itself, and in the process, explores how the inherent 
limitations of the right to a fair trial play out in proceedings entailing national security 
concerns. The chapter then systematically analyses the most important fair trial guarantees 
that are particularly relevant for this thesis, beginning with the maximum set of guarantees 
afforded to individuals in criminal trials. Following this, the chapter analyses which of these 
guarantees are similarly applicable in civil proceedings, or have otherwise been imported by 
the courts. Finally, the chapter explores how certain guarantees of the right to a fair trial can 
be derogated from in times of emergency, before some brief conclusions are made.  
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Therefore, the chapter does not provide a comprehensive overview of the right to a fair 
trial,163 rather, it analyses the extent and the manner in which these fair trial guarantees 
under IHRL are applicable in proceedings entailing national security concerns. As such, 
having identified and analysed the applicable legal framework, the chapter provides the 
necessary legal context which allows the following chapters to reflect more meticulously on 
how the right to a fair trial has been affected, and to what extent.  
Where appropriate, and bearing in mind the UK’s influence over the evolution of the right to 
a fair trial, the chapter draws upon the most important common law developments which 
have helped to shape the contours of the right, as it is currently understood at the 
international level. It also analyses how the key IHRL instruments have codified the right to a 
fair trial and provided for a set of minimum guarantees. Attention is focussed upon the two 
most comprehensive IHRL treaties containing specific fair trial guarantees that bind the UK: 
primarily the ECHR,164 but also the ICCPR.165 Where relevant, the increasingly important 
protections enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (EU)166 
and two EU Directives pertaining to the right to a fair trial are also considered,167 although 
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the significance of these protections in the UK may soon diminish given the result of the 
2016 Referendum on the UK’s membership of the EU.  
 
2.2 The Determination of the Civil or Criminal Nature of Proceedings 
The domestic courts in England and Wales have generally held that the classification of 
proceedings is less important than the question of what protections are required for a fair 
hearing. For example, in International Transport Roth GmbH v. SSHD, Simon LJ questioned 
if, rather than determining if proceedings were civil or criminal, it was not simpler ‘to address 
the question as to whether the protections are indeed necessary to achieve a fair trial of 
whatever may be the issue’.168 In the same case, Parker LJ held that Article 6 of the ECHR 
should be given a ‘flexible interpretation’, and that there should be a ‘sliding scale’ ranging 
between trivial civil wrongs and the most serious crimes, following which, ‘the more serious 
the allegation or charge, the more astute should the courts be to ensure that the trial process 
is a fair one’.169 In other words, the domestic courts have insisted that the demands of 
fairness vary in each case and that the gravity and complexity of a case impact on what 
fairness requires.170 
However, under IHRL, distinguishing between civil and criminal proceedings is a much more 
important task. The range of fair trial guarantees afforded to individuals involved in judicial 
proceedings varies depending on whether those proceedings are ‘criminal’ or ‘civil’ in nature, 
i.e. whether they are concerned with the determination of a ‘criminal charge’, or whether the 
proceedings concern the determination of an individual’s ‘civil rights and obligations’.171 The 
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distinction is significant, because stronger and more detailed guarantees apply in criminal 
proceedings. As such, the right to a fair trial under IHRL encapsulates ‘various guarantees 
with different scopes of application’.172 This is particularly relevant for the purposes of this 
study, as counter-terrorist hybrid orders appear to blur the distinction between the civil and 
the criminal law. 
In essence, States are given greater flexibility in disputes involving civil rights than they are 
with criminal matters in the application of the right to a fair trial. For example, the ECtHR has 
held that ‘the requirements inherent in the concept of “fair hearing” are not necessarily the 
same in cases concerning the determination of civil rights and obligations as they are in 
cases concerning the determination of a criminal charge’.173 In this regard, the Court pointed 
out that due to the distinction of guarantees applicable in civil and criminal trials, ‘the 
contracting States have greater latitude when dealing with civil cases concerning civil rights 
and obligations than they have when dealing with criminal cases’.174 
In setting out the guarantees which apply to each type of proceedings, the relevant 
provisions of the ECHR and the ICCPR are framed in a very similar fashion, first providing a 
number of general guarantees which are applicable to both types of proceedings,175 before 
providing for additional guarantees in subsequent clauses for individuals facing criminal 
charges.176  
Both Article 6(1) of the ECHR and Article 14(1) of the ICCPR provide that, in the 
determination of an individual’s civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against 
them, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial 
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tribunal.177 Representing the only expressly qualified provision of the right to a fair trial, both 
Article 6(1) of the ECHR and Article 14(1) of the ICCPR provide that judgments should be 
public, but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of a trial in the interests of, 
inter alia, public order or national security in a democratic society.  
The additional guarantees under Article 6(2) and (3) of the ECHR and Article 14(2) and (3) of 
the ICCPR only apply to criminal proceedings. These clauses provide for the rights to be 
presumed innocent;178 to be informed promptly of the nature of the charges in a language 
which the defendant understands;179 to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation 
of the defence;180 to defend oneself in person or through legal assistance of choice or, if the 
defendant does not have sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free 
when the interests of justice so require;181 to examine or to have examined on one’s behalf 
the witnesses used against oneself, and to obtain the attendance and examination of 
witnesses under the same conditions;182 and to have the free assistance of an interpreter.183 
Article 14(3) of the ICCPR goes slightly further than the ECHR and expressly guarantees the 
right to be tried without undue delay,184 and the right not to be compelled to testify against 
oneself or to confess guilt.185 Additionally, both the ECHR and the ICCPR provide for the 
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prohibition of retroactive punishment (the prohibition of ex post facto law).186 Finally, the 
ICCPR guarantees the right not to be tried twice for the same crime (the principle of non bis 
in idem or double jeopardy).187  
Whilst proceedings concerning the determination of terrorism-related charges are 
undoubtedly ‘criminal’ in nature and thus attract the full range of protections and guarantees 
envisaged in the provisions just outlined, the task of determining the nature of other 
proceedings relating to terrorist activities not involving the determination of ‘criminal charges’ 
can prove more challenging. For the purposes of this study, one of the crucial questions is 
the correct characterisation of proceedings concerning counter-terrorist hybrid orders; that is, 
whether the proceedings leading to, or concerning the appeal against, the imposition of 
counter-terrorist hybrid orders are either ‘criminal’ or ‘civil’ in nature.188  
The provisions of Article 6(1) of the ECHR do not provide any guidance on the issue of 
determining whether the proceedings are criminal or civil. As such, the ECtHR has had to 
address the question in a number of cases and has developed extensive jurisprudence. In 
some cases, identifying whether proceedings involve the determination of civil rights and 
obligations or a criminal charge can be extremely problematic. For example, States may 
classify certain proceedings as disciplinary in nature, as for instance in relation to military 
indiscipline, despite carrying objectives which are similar to the general goal of the criminal 
law.189 Additionally, States may decriminalise certain conduct with the purported aim of 
serving the interests of individuals and advancing the proper administration of justice, but 
these attempts may undermine the object and purpose of the ECHR.190 
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The leading case on this overarching issue, Engel v. The Netherlands, decided by the 
European Court in 1976, laid down the test for establishing whether proceedings amount to 
the determination of a criminal charge.191 The case concerned five enlisted soldiers who 
were subjected to various penalties for indiscipline and subordination. The offences were 
classified as a disciplinary matter under Dutch law. However, the ECtHR laid down a three-
stage test for determining whether proceedings amount to the determination of a criminal 
charge, in turn addressing the domestic classification of the offence, the nature of the 
offence and the nature and degree of severity of the penalty.192 Although in Engel the ECtHR 
was confronted with military disciplinary law and ‘offences’ committed by the applicants, the 
three-stage test is applicable beyond the narrow setting of the distinction between military 
disciplinary proceedings and criminal proceedings. Rather, as jurisprudence reveals, the 
three-stage test is vital when drawing the distinction between proceedings which are 
criminal, and those proceedings which are disciplinary, administrative, or otherwise invoke 
the civil limb of the right to a fair trial. 
2.2.1 The Domestic Classification of the Proceedings 
The first Engel criterion concerns the determination of whether the domestic provision 
defining the offence, or more generally the proscribed conduct in question, belongs to the 
criminal law.193 If the domestic law characterises something as falling within the criminal law, 
then the matter of whether the relevant proceedings import the maximum fair trial 
guarantees under Article 6 is straightforward, regardless of the severity of the penalty.194 The 
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situation is somewhat more complex when the legal classification in the domestic system is 
ambiguous or when the classification is subject to various interpretations.195  
Even so, the Court has insisted that the domestic classification of the conduct at issue is 
merely a starting point, as the State’s classification will be examined in light of comparable 
standards in other contracting States.196 As such, the ECtHR has made it clear that the 
classification of the proceedings under national law is indicative at best, whereas the nature 
of the offence or conduct in question is a much more significant factor.197 The Court will thus 
sometimes look beyond the label that a State attaches to certain conduct, and focus more 
upon the true nature of the offence or conduct in question, and the attached penalty or 
sanction. As will become clear later, the second and third criterion are extremely significant 
when determining whether proceedings concerning counter-terrorist hybrid orders should be 
considered as criminal or civil in nature.198 
Before examining these two elements, it is important to note that the second and third 
criterion of the Engel test can be alternative and not necessarily cumulative.199 On the other 
hand, the Court has found that a cumulative approach may be necessary where separate 
analysis of each criterion is inadequate.200 As a result, it is clear that in certain 
circumstances, even when a State classifies a measure as civil in the domestic law, the 
relevant proceedings may import the fair trial guarantees which are reserved for criminal 
trials due to the nature and severity of the penalty.201 
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2.2.2 The Nature of the Offence 
The second Engel criterion concerns the nature of the offence or the conduct in question.202 
Amongst other things, the ECtHR has attached significant weight to whether the conduct in 
question could be committed by any member of the public, or only by a particular group or 
profession which would indicate it amounted to a disciplinary matter, and therefore outside 
the scope of Article 6.203  
For example, when a journalist was found guilty for breach of privilege after publishing a 
defamatory article criticising two MPs, the ECtHR noted that the alleged offence ‘potentially 
affects the whole population since it applies whether the alleged offender is a Member of the 
House or not and irrespective of where in Malta the publication of the defamatory libel takes 
place’.204 Elsewhere, when a journalist was issued with a fine for disclosing documents 
concerning a defamation case at a press conference, the ECtHR found that since the 
alleged offence ‘potentially affects the whole population, the offence it defines, and to which 
it attaches a punitive sanction, is a “criminal” one for the purposes of the second criterion’.205 
Similarly, in a case of careless driving, the Court noted that the offence was potentially 
committable by all citizens in their capacity as road users.206  
In addition, the Court may reflect on comparable practices in other Member States of the 
Council of Europe (CoE). For example, the ECtHR has found that a law sanctioning 
improper statements made to a court by people taking part in judicial proceedings was a 
common practice amongst European States, as such rules were necessary for a court to 
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‘ensure the proper and orderly functioning of its own proceedings’.207 Finally, and crucially 
for the purposes of this thesis, the Court may also consider whether the proceedings in 
question are brought by a ‘public authority under statutory powers of enforcement’, as 
transpired for example, when an individual refused to pay a tax to a local council.208  
2.2.3 The Nature and Degree of Severity of the Penalty 
The third Engel criterion concerns the ‘degree of severity of the penalty that the person 
concerned risks incurring’.209 This has perhaps proven the most important and the most 
difficult of the three elements. Even if the offence or proscribed conduct is found not to be 
criminal in nature, the nature and degree of severity of the penalty may bring the matter into 
the criminal sphere.210 For example, the Court has attached significant weight to whether the 
penalty carries a punitive or deterrent purpose.211   
Additionally, the Court has held on numerous occasions that the nature and severity of a 
penalty is determined by reference to the maximum penalty which the law provides.212 At the 
most extreme end of the spectrum of possible penalties, the ECtHR has found that in 
instances involving the deprivation of liberty, the nature and degree of severity of the penalty 
is such as to amount to criminal proceedings. In Engel, the Court held: 
In a society subscribing to the rule of law, there belong to the ‘criminal’ 
sphere deprivations of liberty liable to be imposed as a punishment, except 
those which by their nature, duration or manner of execution cannot be 
appreciably detrimental.213 
                                                          
207
 Ravnsborg v. Sweden (n. 195) para 34. 
208
 Benham v. UK (n. 200) para 56. 
209
 Engel v. The Netherlands (n. 189) para 82. 
210
 Ravnsborg v. Sweden (n. 195) para 35. 
211
 Öztürk v. The Federal Republic of Germany (n. 190) para 53; Bendenoun v. France (n. 200) para 
47. 
212
 See for example Ezeh and Connors v. UK (n. 200) para 120; Campbell and Fell v. UK (App. nos. 
7819/77; 7878/77) ECtHR, 28 June 1984, para 72; Weber v. Switzerland (n. 197) para 34. 
213
 Engel v. The Netherlands (n. 189) para 82. The applicants faced confinement to a disciplinary unit 
for several months. The Court found that this made the measures fall within criminal proceedings. 
56 
 
Thus, the Court has found in the following circumstances, amongst others, that the 
proceedings were criminal in nature: the potential loss of a remission of sentence amounting 
to three years following misconduct in prison;214 additional sentences of 40 days and 7 days 
for two prisoners following their misconduct;215 a maximum penalty of 60 days imprisonment 
for an editor of a satirical magazine who published an article criticising two MPs;216 a 
maximum penalty of three months’ imprisonment for an individual who failed to pay a 
community charge;217 and the possibility of one years imprisonment for the directors of a 
company in the event of non-payment of a fine.218 
Apart from instances involving the deprivation of liberty, the ECtHR has considered other 
ways in which the nature and the severity of the penalty can bring the proceedings within the 
criminal sphere. For example, the Court has found that a fine imposed upon individuals for 
minor traffic offences was deterrent and punitive in nature and thus the penalty could be 
considered to be criminal;219 and that banning individuals from taking up certain government 
positions in accordance with the policy of lustration was significantly serious enough to be 
considered a deterrent and punitive penalty.220  
As such, if the offence or conduct in question carried a maximum penalty of lengthy 
imprisonment, it would be difficult to reject that the proceedings carry a ‘criminal’ aspect to it 
for the purpose of ascertaining which fair trial guarantees apply. Bearing in mind the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
However, the Court noted that three or four days light arrest would not amount to the deprivation of 
liberty (paras 61 & 85). 
214
 Campbell and Fell v. UK (n. 212) para 72. According to the ECtHR: ‘The maximum penalties which 
could have been imposed on him included forfeiture of all of the remission of sentence available to 
him at the time of the Board’s award (slightly less than three years), forfeiture of certain privileges for 
an unlimited time and, for each offence, exclusion from associated work, stoppage of earnings and 
cellular confinement for a maximum of 56 days’. 
215
 Ezeh and Connors v. UK (n. 200) para 128. The maximum number of additional days which could 
be awarded to each applicant by the governor was 42 for each offence. 
216
 Demicoli v. Malta (n. 197) para 34. For an alleged breach of privilege, the maximum possible 
penalty was 60 days imprisonment or a fine of 500 Maltese Lira. 
217
 Benham v. UK (n. 200) para 56. 
218
 Garyfallou AEBE v. Greece (n. 200) paras 33-34. The applicant company faced a maximum 
financial penalty three times what it was actually fined, and in the event of non-payment, the seizure 
of company assets and the detention of company directors for up to one year. 
219
 Öztürk v. The Federal Republic of Germany (n. 190) para 53. 
220
 Matyjek v. Poland (App. no. 38184/03) ECtHR, Admissibility Decision, 30 May 2006. 
57 
 
discussion in this section, the next chapter will discuss how the practice of the UK courts is 
arguably inconsistent with the ECHR when it comes to classifying proceedings concerning 
the implementation of counter-terrorist hybrid orders, as the maximum penalties which can 
be imposed against individuals for breaching the conditions attached to the mechanisms 
might point towards them being treated as criminal proceedings. 
 
2.3 Limitation Clauses 
Before this chapter analyses the specific guarantees of the right to a fair trial in depth, it is 
important to note that the right to fair trial occupies a particularly odd position when it comes 
to determining the nature of the right itself. On the one hand, the right to a fair trial has been 
considered by some to be absolute when considered as a whole.221 However, the ECtHR 
has been less emphatic, suggesting that ‘Article 6 does not enshrine an absolute right’.222  
What is more certain however is that some of the constituent guarantees of the right to a fair 
trial are not in themselves absolute and may in fact be restricted in certain circumstances. In 
that sense, the right to a fair trial might be best described as a ‘limited right’, as some fair 
trial guarantees can be limited pursuant to public good objectives or to protect the rights of 
others. Crucially, as already noted, the only fair trial guarantee which is expressly qualified 
concerns the publicity of proceedings.223 Nevertheless, although Article 6 of the ECHR does 
not contain a specific ‘claw-back’ clause,224 in contrast with other provisions concerning 
‘qualified rights’,225 the fact that other fair trial guarantees are inherently qualified and may be 
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balanced against other interests is uncontroversial and has been recognised by the ECtHR 
in a number of cases.226  
For example, Lord Bingham held in Brown v. Stott that ‘the jurisprudence of the European 
court very clearly establishes that while the overall fairness of a criminal trial cannot be 
compromised, the constituent rights comprised, whether expressly or implicitly, within article 
6 are not themselves absolute’.227 Furthermore, Lord Bingham recognised that ‘limited 
qualification of these rights is acceptable if reasonably directed by national authorities 
towards a clear and proper public objective and if representing no greater qualification than 
the situation calls for’.228 By way of example, and as will be considered in depth later, the 
ECtHR has noted that the right to the disclosure of evidence may be restricted due to the 
interests of national security, the need to safeguard secret methods of investigation, or to 
protect witnesses, which may be balanced against the defendant’s right to full disclosure.229 
The ECtHR has also found that the right to access a court in civil trials is not absolute, since 
the right of access by its very nature calls for regulation by the State, which may vary in time 
and in place according to the needs and resources of the community and of individuals.230  
As with any limitation, the ECtHR jurisprudence makes it clear that for an interference not to 
constitute a breach of a right, it has to satisfy three basic requirements; namely that it must 
be ‘prescribed by law’, pursue a ‘legitimate aim’, and be ‘necessary in a democratic 
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society’.231 For example, in Tinnelly and Sons v. UK, which concerned a dispute over a 
tendering process and alleged religious and political discrimination, the ECtHR held that a 
limitation upon the right to access a court will not be compatible with Article 6(1) ‘if it does 
not pursue a legitimate aim and if there is not a reasonable relationship of proportionality 
between the means employed and the aim sought to be achieved’.232  
Although not expressly stated in Article 6 of the ECHR or Article 14 of the ICCPR, the first 
condition in order to legally restrict the enjoyment of a right is that the interference with the 
right must be ‘prescribed by law’.233 In establishing whether this first requirement has been 
satisfied, the ECtHR has insisted that, in addition to there being a specific law which 
authorises the interference, the law must be adequately accessible, and it must be 
sufficiently precise to enable the individual to predict its applicability.234 
The second condition in order to legally restrict the enjoyment of a right is that the 
interference with the right must pursue a legitimate aim.235 As already alluded to, the ECHR 
and the ICCPR both expressly provide in similar terms that the press and public may be 
excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order, national security, 
in the interest of the private lives of the parties, or to the extent strictly required where 
publicity would prejudice the interests of justice.236 This is, however, the extent to which the 
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right to a fair trial expressly provides for restrictions with a number of legitimate aims 
proscribed. 
Inherent to the second condition, the limiting measures must be rationally connected to the 
achievement of the objective being pursued, based upon objective considerations.237 In 
other words, the measures must advance and work towards the objective being pursued, 
such as safeguarding national security. For example, in certain disciplinary proceedings, the 
ECtHR has held that national security and public order considerations do allow proceedings 
to be heard in camera.238 Similarly, as noted earlier, the ECtHR has found that the disclosure 
of evidence can be restricted in criminal trials in the interests of national security, the need to 
safeguard secret methods of investigation or to protect witnesses.239 
Perhaps the most troublesome of the three conditions which must be satisfied in order to 
lawfully restrict the enjoyment of a right is that the interference must be ‘necessary in a 
democratic society’.240 Although, again, this requirement is not expressly contained within 
the provisions of the right to a fair trial,241 the ECtHR has insisted that any measures which 
restrict the rights of the defence should be ‘strictly necessary’ and that if a less restrictive 
measure can suffice then that measure should be applied.242 Moreover, the third condition is 
expressly contained within the provisions of ‘qualified rights’, and as such, the ECtHR has 
amassed much jurisprudence on the matter. In ascertaining whether a restriction is 
necessary, the ECtHR has insisted that the interference must correspond to a pressing 
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social need.243 Accordingly, when evaluating the pressing social need at stake, the Court 
has asserted that the interference must be proportionate to the legitimate aim being 
pursued.244 Finally, States are granted a margin of appreciation when the Court assesses 
whether a restriction upon a fair trial guarantee is necessary, although this has mostly arisen 
in cases concerning access to court.245 However, the Court has also emphasised that such 
limitations must not restrict the exercise of the right in such a way or to such extent that the 
very essence of the right is impaired.246 Finally, restrictions upon the right to a fair trial must 
also be non-discriminatory.247 
 
2.4 Substantive Fair Trial Guarantees 
2.4.1 The Fairness of Proceedings 
Although the notion of ‘fairness’ represents an obviously overarching requirement of the right 
to a fair trial, the various courts have never offered a decisive definition of the concept. 
Rather, under the common law, the general concept of ‘fairness’ encapsulates a flexible 
standard.248 Lord Mustill in the House of Lords has remarked that the standards of fairness 
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are not immutable and change over time, both in their application and in particular cases.249 
More recently, Lord Bingham reiterated the flexibility of the concept and suggested that 
‘fairness is a constantly evolving concept…it is important to recognise that standards and 
perceptions of fairness may change, not only from one century to another but also, 
sometimes, from one decade to another’.250 This arguably reflects the approach of the UK 
domestic courts towards the classification of proceedings, which is deemed a less important 
issue than the question of what protections are required to ensure a fair hearing overall. The 
ECtHR has also emphasised that ‘what constitutes a fair trial cannot be the subject of a 
single unvarying rule but must depend on the circumstances of the particular case’.251 
As such, to get a better understanding of what the requirement of ‘fairness’ entails in all 
proceedings, it is useful to look more closely at the common law which has provided an 
abundance of jurisprudence, not least of all regarding the principle of natural justice.252 
Additionally, it is important to note that the concept of ‘fairness’ and the principle of natural 
justice have been pivotal to proceedings in the UK for centuries, and in any case, long 
before the drafting of the ECHR. 
The principle of natural justice is itself an umbrella concept, encapsulating further principles 
such as the rule against bias, meaning that nobody can be a judge in their own cause (nemo 
judex in causa sua), and the right to be heard (audi alteram partem).253 Of these two rules, 
the most significant for the purposes of this study concerns the right to be heard. In Kanda v. 
Government of the Federation of Malaya, which concerned the dismissal proceedings of a 
police officer, Lord Denning in the Privy Council held that the right to be heard was one of 
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the essential characteristics of natural justice, but one which demanded additional 
complementing guarantees.254 In the oft-cited passage, Lord Denning expanded: 
If the right to be heard is to be a real right which is worth anything, it must 
carry with it a right in the accused man to know the case which is made 
against him. He must know what evidence has been given and what 
statements have been made affecting him: and then he must be given a 
fair opportunity to correct or contradict them…It follows, of course, that the 
judge or whoever has to adjudicate must not hear evidence or receive 
representations from one side behind the back of the other.255 
On the principle of natural justice more broadly, in Re: K, a wardship case which involved 
material not disclosed to the parties, Upjohn LJ held that: 
[A] person or other properly interested party must have the right to see all 
the information put before the judge, to comment on it, to challenge it and if 
needs be to combat it, and to try to establish by contrary evidence that it is 
wrong. It cannot be withheld from him in whole or in part. If it is so withheld 
and yet the judge takes such information into account in reaching his 
conclusion without disclosure to those parties who are properly and 
naturally vitally concerned, the proceedings cannot be described as 
judicial.256 
As such, the principle of natural justice and the right to be heard in particular must entail the 
right to confront one’s accuser, to know the charges, and to confront the witnesses which the 
other party call upon.257 
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The ECtHR has enthusiastically expounded the importance of the right to a fair trial and 
stressed that the right holds such a prominent place in democratic society that Article 6(1) 
cannot be interpreted restrictively,258 and more importantly, that the right to a fair trial under 
Article 6 is an unqualified right.259 Having said that, the ECtHR has been generally unwilling 
to dictate what form proceedings must take in contracting States in order to be considered 
fair. Rather, the Court has repeatedly asserted that contracting States enjoy a wide 
discretion in the form of proceedings implemented in domestic courts, and the Court will not 
indicate those means but instead determine whether the result called for by the Convention 
has been achieved.260  
Despite what appears to be a lack of certainty over what the concept of ‘fairness’ entails, the 
ECtHR has, however, insisted that proceedings as a whole must be fair in order to satisfy 
the requirements of Article 6(1).261 In that regard, a defect which occurs during the 
proceedings may be remedied at a later stage, as for example, in an appeal.262 However, a 
critical incident such as the denial of access to a lawyer in pre-trial detention may be 
decisive when determining if an individual’s right to a fair trial has been violated.263 
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2.4.2 The Right to a Public Hearing 
The right to a public hearing is the first express guarantee pertaining to the right to a fair trial 
under Article 6(1) of the ECHR.264 In a manner which is comparable to the development of 
the overarching concept of ‘fairness’, the common law has been extremely influential in 
shaping what the right to a public hearing entails. As such, to get a better understanding of 
what the requirement of a ‘public hearing’ entails, it is useful to look more closely at the 
common law which has, again, provided an abundance of jurisprudence. In this respect, 
underlying the right to a public hearing is the principle of ‘open justice’ which essentially 
provides that court proceedings and the judgment must, in general, be public and available 
to all.  
The principle of open justice was notably discussed in Scott v. Scott, where the House of 
Lords considered a divorce process in which the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division 
had made an order for the suit to be heard in camera.265 After the suit had concluded, the 
wife disseminated the transcript of the hearing to three people in an attempt to defend her 
reputation.266 The House of Lords held that the order for the in camera hearing was unlawful, 
and that even if such an order was valid, it did not prevent the lawful dissemination of the 
transcript of the hearing.  
Lord Shaw’s damning judgment of the in camera hearing is still today often cited in trials 
involving matters of national security and secrecy. Lord Shaw held that the entire process 
was ‘a violation of that publicity in the administration of justice which is one of the surest 
guarantees of our liberties, and an attack upon the very foundations of public and private 
security’, confessing that the whole proceeding shocked him.267 
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However, Lord Shaw’s opinion is most notable for his references to the writings of the 
philosopher Jeremy Bentham and the historian Henry Hallam. Lord Shaw first quoted 
Bentham who wrote that ‘[i]n the darkness of secrecy, sinister interest and evil in every 
shape have full swing. Only in proportion as publicity has place can any of the checks 
applicable to judicial injustice operate. Where there is no publicity there is no justice’.268 
Going further, he added that ‘publicity is the very soul of justice. It is the keenest spur to 
exertion and the surest of all guards against improbity. It keeps the judge himself while trying 
under trial’.269 Following these references, Lord Shaw quoted Hallam who wrote that ‘civil 
liberty in this kingdom has two distinct guarantees; the open administration of justice 
according to known laws truly interpreted, and fair constructions of evidence; and the right of 
Parliament, without let or interruption, to inquire into, and obtain redress of, public 
grievances’.270 Finally, Lord Shaw added that if the in camera order was allowed to stand 
and contempt of court was found, then it would ‘be open for judges to remove their 
proceedings from the light and to silence for ever the voice of the critic, and hide the 
knowledge of the truth. Such an impairment of right would be intolerable in a free country, 
and I do not think it has any warrant in our law’.271 
In Attorney General v. Leveller Magazine, Lord Diplock held that open justice had two 
aspects; first, that proceedings ‘should be held in open court to which the press and public 
are admitted’ and that in criminal cases ‘all evidence communicated to the court is 
communicated publicly’, and secondly, that nothing should be done to discourage the wide 
and accurate public reporting of proceedings.272 The importance of the principle of open 
justice was also stressed by Lord Woolf in R v. Legal Aid Board, Ex parte Kaim Todner (A 
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Firm).273 Lord Woolf identified a number of reasons why proceedings should be subjected to 
the full glare of a public hearing: it deters inappropriate behaviour by the court; it maintains 
the public’s confidence in the administration of justice; it enables the public to know that 
justice is being administered impartially; it can result in evidence becoming available which 
would not be the case behind closed doors or with anonymous parties; and it makes 
uninformed and inaccurate comment about court proceedings less likely.274 
Expanding upon the first of Lord Woolf’s reasons in Ex Parte Guardian Newspapers, Brooke 
LJ held on behalf of the Court of Appeal:  
Open justice promotes the rule of law. Citizens of all ranks in a democracy 
must be subject to transparent legal restraint, especially those holding 
judicial or executive offices. Publicity, whether in the courts, the press or 
both, is a powerful deterrent to abuse of power and improper behaviour.275 
Another important aspect of the principle of open justice is the legal maxim that not only 
must justice be done but it must also be seen to be done. For example, in R v. Sussex 
Justices ex parte McCarthy, which concerned a charge of dangerous driving in which the 
clerk to the justices was also employed by a solicitors firm bringing a compensation claim 
against the driver, Lord Hewart held that ‘it is not merely of some importance but is of 
fundamental importance that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and 
undoubtedly be seen to be done’.276 More recently, the maxim was pivotal to the House of 
Lords’ unprecedented decision to set aside the order of an earlier bench of the House of 
Lords which granted the request for Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet to be extradited to 
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Spain.277 It was argued, and accepted by the second House of Lords bench, that Lord 
Hoffmann’s links to Amnesty International raised concerns as to the impartiality of the first 
bench, which would damage the public confidence in the integrity of the administration of 
justice.278  
The ECtHR has reinforced the importance of a public trial, emphasising that the ‘public 
character of court hearings constitutes a fundamental principle enshrined in paragraph 1 of 
Article 6’.279 For example, in Diennet v. France, the Court held that publicity ‘protects litigants 
against the administration of justice in secret with no public scrutiny; it is also one of the 
means whereby confidence in the courts can be maintained’.280 Furthermore, the Court 
found that ‘by rendering the administration of justice transparent, publicity contributes to the 
achievement of the aim of Article 6 para. 1…namely a fair trial, the guarantee of which is one 
of the fundamental principles of any democratic society, within the meaning of the 
Convention’.281 
However, as alluded to earlier, the right to a public hearing is the only fair trial guarantee 
which is expressly recognised as being subject to limitations.282 Of particular relevance for 
the purpose of this study is the fact that Article 6(1) ECHR and Article 14(1) ICCPR allow the 
public to be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of inter alia national security 
in a democratic society.283  
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For example, in B and P v. UK, which concerned a dispute about child custody in which the 
press and public were excluded, the ECtHR acknowledged that the requirement to hold a 
public hearing is subject to exceptions.284 The Court held: 
This is apparent from the text of Art 6(1) itself… Moreover, it is established 
in the Court’s case-law that, even in a criminal law context where there is a 
high expectation of publicity, it may on occasion be necessary under Art 6 
to limit the open and public nature of proceedings in order, for example, to 
protect the safety or privacy of witnesses or to promote the free exchange 
of information and opinion in the pursuit of justice.285 
In the same passage, the Court referred to a number of previous judgments on the matter. In 
Doorson v. The Netherlands which concerned anonymous witnesses in a drug trafficking 
case, the ECtHR found in that case that ‘principles of fair trial also require that in appropriate 
cases the interests of the defence are balanced against those of witnesses or victims called 
upon to testify’.286 The Court also cited Jasper v. UK which similarly concerned drug 
trafficking, in which the ECtHR held that ‘in any criminal proceedings there may be 
competing interests, such as national security or the need to protect witnesses at risk of 
reprisals or keep secret police methods of investigation of crime, which must be weighed 
against the rights of the accused’.287 
Thus, it is evident that the general entitlement to a public hearing can be subject to 
exceptions.288 Trials dealing with alleged terrorism offences or terrorist threats have the 
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obvious potential to affect a variety of issues which may necessitate restricting the right to a 
public hearing. The need to protect witnesses or undercover agents are just two examples 
when the overarching concern of national security could legitimately restrict the right to a 
public hearing. 
Although the requirement that judgments should generally be publicly available undoubtedly 
helps to ensure transparency and inspire confidence in the judicial system, the provisions in 
Article 6 of the ECHR and Article 14 of the ICCPR do not address what is required in the 
actual court judgments. However, individuals are entitled to another closely related fair trial 
guarantee, the right to a ‘reasoned judgment’, which assists in the desired objective of the 
court to ensure the proper administration of justice.289 In essence, the courts are required to 
provide sufficient reasons for their decisions.290 However, the extent of this duty may vary 
according to the nature of the decision and circumstances of the case,291 which does not 
require a detailed answer to every argument.292  
2.4.3 The Equality of Arms and the Right to an Adversarial Trial 
Although not being specifically guaranteed in the text of Article 6 of the ECHR or Article 14 of 
the ICCPR, the equality of arms represents one of the most significant aspects of the right to 
a fair trial in criminal proceedings. Similarly, although not being expressly guaranteed in 
either treaty, the equality of arms closely overlaps with the right to an adversarial trial in 
criminal proceedings which is a trial characteristic most prevalent in common law systems. 
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The European Commission of Human Rights (ECmHR) first took the initiative in expanding 
the rights afforded to the accused in this regard in Ofner and Hopfinger v. Austria.293 The 
ECmHR found that ‘what is generally called the “equality of arms”, that is the procedural 
equality of the accused with the public prosecutor, is an inherent element of a “fair trial”.’294 
The ECtHR confirmed the approach of the ECmHR in subsequent criminal cases, holding 
that the ‘principle of equality of arms…is only one feature of the wider concept of fair trial by 
an independent and impartial tribunal’.295  
In terms of what the equality of arms actually entails, the ECtHR has held that the principle 
implies that ‘each party must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present his case under 
conditions that do not place him at a substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis his opponent’.296 
The similarities and overlaps between the right to an adversarial trial and the equality of 
arms are clearly apparent. Under the common law, the right to an adversarial trial has been 
safeguarded for centuries. For example, in Randall v The Queen, which concerned a theft 
trial and the conduct of the prosecution counsel, Lord Bingham who delivered the judgment 
on behalf of the Privy Council stated that: 
A contested criminal trial on indictment is adversarial in character…The 
adversarial format of the criminal trial is indeed directed to ensuring a fair 
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opportunity for the prosecution to establish guilt and a fair opportunity for 
the defendant to advance his defence.297 
Just as the ECtHR has emphasised that the equality of arms is an integral aspect of the right 
to a fair trial, the Court has also stressed the importance of adversarial proceedings, holding 
that ‘independently of whether the case is a civil, criminal or disciplinary one, the right to 
adversarial proceedings has to be complied with’.298 Moreover, the ECtHR has clarified what 
the right to an adversarial trial entails, holding that in criminal cases, both the ‘prosecution 
and defence must be given the opportunity to have knowledge of and comment on the 
observations filed and the evidence adduced by the other party’.299 
However, the rights to the equality of arms and an adversarial trial have been found to be 
subject to restrictions and the ECtHR has had to deal with this on a number of occasions. 
The right to be informed of the allegations and to access evidence are particular aspects of 
the right to a fair trial which have been especially problematic in terrorism trials and when 
matters of national security are concerned. One of the leading cases on the matter, Rowe 
and Davis v. UK, concerned the convictions of three men, known as the ‘M25 Three’ due to 
the locations of the crimes.300 The trio appealed to the ECtHR alleging violations of Article 
6(1), 6(3)(b) and 6(3)(d) due to the non-disclosure of certain evidence at their trial. The Court 
effectively summarised the combined guarantees of the equality of arms and the right to an 
adversarial trial: 
It is a fundamental aspect of the right to a fair trial that criminal 
proceedings…should be adversarial and that there should be equality of 
arms between the prosecution and defence. The right to an adversarial trial 
                                                          
297
 Randall v. The Queen [2002] UKPC 19 (Privy Council). 
298
 Vanjak v. Croatia (App. no. 29889/04) ECtHR, 14 January 2010, para 52. 
299
 Brandstetter v. Austria (App. nos. 11170/84; 12876/87; 13468/87) ECtHR, 2 August 1991, para 67. 
See also Vanjak v. Croatia (n. 298) para 52. The HRC has made similar comments. See HRC, 
General Comment No. 32 (n. 172) para 13; Jansen-Gielen v. The Netherlands, HRC (Com. no. 
846/1999, 71
st
 session, 3 April 2001) UN Doc. CCPR/C/71/D/846/1999, para 8.2; Äärelä and 
Näkkäläjärvi v. Finland, HRC (Com. no. 779/1997, 73
rd
 session, 24 October 2001) UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/73/D/779/1997, para 7.4. 
300
 Rowe and Davis v. UK (n. 230). 
73 
 
means, in a criminal case, that both prosecution and defence must be 
given the opportunity to have knowledge of and comment on the 
observations filed and the evidence adduced by the other party…In 
addition Article 6 § 1 requires, as indeed does English law…that the 
prosecution authorities disclose to the defence all material evidence in their 
possession for or against the accused.301 
Nevertheless, the Court then qualified this general requirement by stating that the 
entitlement to disclosure is not an absolute right. Rather, ‘in any criminal proceedings there 
may be competing interests, such as national security or the need to protect witnesses at 
risk of reprisals or keep secret police methods of investigation of crime, which must be 
weighed against the rights of the accused’.302 Going further, the Court noted that ‘in some 
cases it may be necessary to withhold certain evidence from the defence so as to preserve 
the fundamental rights of another individual or to safeguard an important public interest’.303 
However, the Court added the requirement that ‘only such measures restricting the rights of 
the defence which are strictly necessary are permissible’ under Article 6(1), and that ‘in order 
to ensure that the accused receives a fair trial, any difficulties caused to the defence by a 
limitation on its rights must be sufficiently counterbalanced by the procedures followed by the 
judicial authorities’.304 
The United Nations (UN) Human Rights Committee (HRC) has reinforced some of these 
important principles in a General Comment.305 For example, the HRC stated that the right to 
equality before courts and tribunals guaranteed the equality of arms and that the parties to 
proceedings are treated without any discrimination.306 According to the Committee, this 
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means that ‘the same procedural rights are to be provided to all the parties unless 
distinctions are based on law and can be justified on objective and reasonable grounds, not 
entailing actual disadvantage or other unfairness to the defendant’.307 Going further, the 
Committee noted that there would be no equality of arms if, for example, only the prosecutor 
was allowed to appeal a decision.308  
 
2.5 Further Fair Trial Guarantees in Criminal Proceedings 
In addition to the range of guarantees analysed above, an individual facing a criminal charge 
is entitled to the presumption of innocence,309 and to an array of further minimum fair trial 
guarantees.310 Taken collectively, these represent the maximum guarantees pertaining to 
the right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the ECHR and Article 14 of the ICCPR. In regards to 
the presumption of innocence and the additional guarantees under Articles 6(2) and 6(3) of 
the ECHR, the Court has maintained that these are aspects of the right to a fair trial as set 
out under Article 6(1) of the ECHR.311 Accordingly, the Court examines any alleged violation 
of Articles 6(2) and (3) together with Article 6(1) of the ECHR.312 This is an important 
consideration insofar as the overarching guarantee of ‘fairness’ in criminal trials under Article 
6(1) of the ECHR also encapsulates the additional criminal trial guarantees under these 
provisions. 
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2.5.1 The Right to be Presumed Innocent 
The presumption of innocence is framed in almost identical terms in the ECHR and 
ICCPR.313 The HRC has stressed the importance and the absolute nature of this guarantee, 
stating that ‘deviating from fundamental principles of fair trial, including the presumption of 
innocence, is prohibited at all times’.314 In addition to the challenges the guarantee raise in 
ordinary criminal trials, the presumption of innocence is most vulnerable in trials concerning 
atrocities or other emotive crimes, not least of all where allegations of terrorism or other 
serious national security concerns arise.315  
The presumption of innocence guarantees that the onus lies upon the prosecution to prove 
all the elements of the offence.316 As such, the presumption of innocence will be violated 
where the burden of proof is shifted from the prosecution to the defence.317 In common law 
countries, this is widely accepted as requiring that the State proves the guilt of the accused 
beyond all reasonable doubt.318 The ECHR does not require this however, but rather, that 
guilt can only be found ‘on the basis of direct or indirect evidence sufficiently strong in the 
eyes of the law to establish…guilt’.319  
The presumption of innocence finds its origins in a variety of historical sources, not least of 
all in the common law.320 Perhaps the most famous judicial assertion of the principle was in 
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Woolmington v. DPP which concerned a murder trial and the trial judge’s misdirection over 
the burden of proof.321 Delivering the lead judgment in the House of Lords, Viscount Sankey 
LC held that it was a ‘golden thread’ running through the English criminal law that it was the 
‘duty of the prosecution to prove the prisoner's guilt’.322 Furthermore, it was held that ‘no 
matter what the charge or where the trial, the principle that the prosecution must prove the 
guilt of the prisoner is part of the common law of England and no attempt to whittle it down 
can be entertained’.323 Additionally, in Mancini v. DPP, which concerned a murder trial and a 
plea of self-defence, Viscount Simon LC acknowledged Woolmington v. DPP and held that 
the prosecution must prove the charge beyond all reasonable doubt, adding that a prisoner 
should have the benefit should a reasonable doubt exist.324 In a Privy Council case, Haw 
Tua Tau v. Public Prosecutor, in which a statutory provision allowed a court to draw 
inferences from a defendant’s failure to give evidence, it was held that the right to be 
presumed innocent under Article 6(2) of the ECHR was an ‘undoubted fundamental rule of 
natural justice’.325 
In the particular context of terrorism trials, in Heaney and McGuinness v. Ireland, the two 
applicants were arrested on suspicion of terrorism offences and, despite being informed of 
their right to remain silent, were then questioned under compulsory powers.326 The 
individuals claimed that the powers violated their rights to silence and against self-
incrimination and that the presumption of innocence had been inverted. The ECtHR found 
that there had been a violation of Article 6(1) and Article 6(2) as the Irish government could 
not justify the action which challenged the right to silence and against self-incrimination. 
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The ECtHR has also stressed the importance of the presumption of innocence, in regards to 
how the court must approach the proceedings and also in relation to the conduct of public 
officials. Regarding the conduct of judges, which is subjected to greater scrutiny,327 the Court 
has stressed that: 
When carrying out their duties, the members of a court should not start 
with the preconceived idea that the accused has committed the offence 
charged; the burden of proof is on the prosecution, and any doubt should 
benefit the accused.328 
Insofar as the conduct of public officials is concerned, in Allenet de Ribemont v. France 
which concerned a murder trial, a senior Government Minister and two senior police officers 
made public pronouncements of guilt about the accused before charges had even been 
issued.329 Crucially, the ECtHR held that ‘the presumption of innocence may be infringed not 
only by a judge or court but also by other public authorities’.330 The Court found that there 
was a violation of Article 6(2) as the statements by the officials ‘encouraged the public to 
believe him guilty’ and secondly, they had ‘prejudged the assessment of the facts by the 
competent judicial authority’.331  
In Gridin v. Russia, the HRC considered the conduct of the media, prosecutors and 
investigators in a rape and murder trial. The applicant alleged inter alia that the head of the 
police publicly stated he was sure the applicant was the murderer, which was broadcast on 
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television.332 Furthermore, the applicant claimed that the investigator had pronounced his 
guilt in public meetings before the court hearing, and had called upon the public to send 
prosecutors to the trial.333 The HRC stated that the Russian authorities had failed ‘to exercise 
the restraint’ required by Article 14(2) of the ICCPR and were thus found to have violated the 
individual’s right to the presumption of innocence.334 
The HRC have expanded upon the right in General Comment 32, although in an 
unfortunately short excerpt. In addition to the ‘duty for all public authorities to refrain from 
prejudging the outcome of a trial’, the HRC also stressed that ‘defendants should normally 
not be shackled or kept in cages during trials or otherwise presented to the court in a 
manner indicating that they might be dangerous’.335 More broadly on the role of the media 
when reporting terrorism trials, the HRC has suggested that ‘the media should avoid news 
coverage undermining the presumption of innocence’.336 
2.5.2 The Right to be Informed of the Accusation 
The right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the charges is codified in 
both the ECHR and ICCPR and carries many similarities with the guarantee of disclosure 
insofar as the equality of arms is concerned.337 Additionally, the right carries many 
similarities with the right of an individual who has been arrested to be informed of the 
reasons for his arrest under Article 5(4) of the ECHR.338 However, in a criminal trial, the 
obligation goes further, and must be assessed in light of the more general right to a fair 
hearing under Article 6(1) ECHR.339 For example, in Nielsen v. Denmark, the ECmHR held 
that the information given to an individual in a criminal trial must be ‘more specific and more 
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detailed’ than that which must be given upon arrest.340 In essence, the accused must be 
presented with enough detail of the allegations so as to put them in a position to be able to 
begin formulating a defence. 
The ECtHR has deliberated on this fundamental issue on many occasions. For example, in 
Péllisier and Sassi v. France, which concerned the liquidation of a company and allegations 
of fraud, the Court held that ‘the provision of full, detailed information concerning the charges 
against a defendant, and consequently the legal characterisation that the court might adopt 
in the matter, is an essential prerequisite for ensuring that the proceedings are fair’.341  
In Mattoccia v. Italy, which concerned the alleged rape of a mentally disabled child, the 
ECtHR criticised the Italian prosecutor’s conduct in only providing vague details to the 
applicant before the trial commenced which were then contradicted during actual 
proceedings.342 The Court noted that ‘the accused must be made aware “promptly” and “in 
detail” of the cause of the accusation, that is, the material facts alleged against him which 
are at the basis of the accusation, and of the nature of the accusation, namely, the legal 
qualification of these material facts’.343 The Court then added that the applicant must be 
‘provided with sufficient information as is necessary to understand fully the extent of the 
charges against him with a view to preparing an adequate defence’.344 The HRC has made 
similar remarks to this effect, stating that the ‘right to be informed of the charge “promptly” 
requires that information be given as soon as the person concerned is formally charged with 
a criminal offence under domestic law, or the individual is publicly named as such’.345 
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2.5.3 The Right to be Present and to Legal Assistance 
The rights of the accused to be present at trial, to defend oneself in person and to have legal 
assistance in criminal proceedings are framed in similar terms in both the ECHR and the 
ICCPR.346 Although the specific articles also concern other fair trial guarantees, these are 
two of the most relevant for the purposes of counter-terrorist hybrid orders.  
Firstly, there is a general common law rule that an accused must be allowed to be present in 
a criminal trial.347 In R v. Lee Kun, a defendant who could not understand English was 
handed a death sentence after being convicted of murder.348 During the trial, he was not 
provided with interpretation or a translation of any documents. Lord Reading CJ held that: 
[t]he reason why the accused should be present at the trial is that he may 
hear the case made against him and have the opportunity, having heard it, 
of answering it. The presence of the accused means not merely that he 
must be physically in attendance, but also that he must be capable of 
understanding the nature of the proceedings.349 
Equally, it is generally the case that no part of a criminal trial should take place if the 
accused is absent.350 For example, in R v. Preston, the defendants and their lawyers were 
excluded from court when the prosecution revealed that a telephone interception had taken 
place.351 The House of Lords held it had not been necessary to exclude the defendants and 
solicitors from court as their presence would not have been detrimental to the public interest 
or the safety of informants.  
The ECtHR has echoed these important principles. In Ekbatani v. Sweden, which concerned 
a dispute after the applicant failed a driving test, the Court noted that ‘it flows from the notion 
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of a fair trial that a person charged with a criminal offence should, as a general principle, be 
entitled to be present at the trial hearing’.352 Closely linked to the general right to be present 
is the right to take part and to participate in court. For example, in Stanford v. UK which 
concerned a raft of serious offences, the Court held that Article 6 ‘read as a whole, 
guarantees the right of an accused to participate effectively in a criminal trial’ which generally 
includes inter alia, ‘not only his right to be present, but also to hear and follow the 
proceedings. Such rights are implicit in the very notion of an adversarial procedure’.353  
However, as with many fair trial guarantees, the right to be present at trial and to defend 
oneself in person is not absolute. It is widely accepted that a defendant can be excluded if 
he is voluntarily absent, for instance due to a hunger strike,354 or if a defendant is disruptive 
during the course of proceedings. Defendants may also be excluded from appeal 
proceedings concerning serious criminal conduct in certain circumstances, pursuant to the 
objectives of preventing crime or disorder, or protecting witnesses and victims.355 The HRC 
has again made similar comments on this important principle, stating that proceedings in the 
absence of the accused ‘may in some circumstances be permissible in the interest of the 
proper administration of justice, i.e. when accused persons, although informed of the 
proceedings sufficiently in advance, decline to exercise their right to be present’.356  
The possibility of holding criminal trials in absentia altogether is, however, more 
controversial. The ECtHR has accepted that criminal trials may be held in absentia if efforts 
have been made to inform the accused and the accused retains the right to re-trial.357 
Similarly, the HRC has noted that proceedings in absentia may be permissible if ‘all due 
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steps have been taken to inform accused persons of the charges and to notify them of the 
proceedings’.358 
Whereas the right to legal assistance in civil trials hinges upon the right of access to court 
being an effective right in practice,359 the right is guaranteed in criminal cases and is codified 
in both the ICCPR and the ECHR. The provision of legal counsel is essential to ensure an 
individual can participate in a criminal trial. In this regard, the HRC has said that the 
provision or lack of legal assistance ‘often determines whether or not a person can access 
the relevant proceedings or participate in them in a meaningful way’.360 However, the right to 
legal assistance is a particularly problematic aspect of the right to a fair trial when matters of 
national security are concerned.361 For example, the ECtHR has found that the right to legal 
advice can be restricted if there are compelling reasons to delay access, such as ‘an urgent 
need to avert serious adverse consequences for life, liberty or physical integrity’, which gives 
rise to a State’s obligations under Articles 2, 3 and 5(1) of the ECHR.362 
2.5.4 The Right to Examine Witnesses 
The right to examine witnesses, which is codified in both the ECHR and ICCPR, further 
ensures that the accused can participate in a criminal trial in a meaningful way.363 Although it 
is an essential element of the equality of arms, the right goes further in criminal trials. In the 
common law, it is clear that the right of the accused to see and to know the identity of his 
accusers should only be denied in rare or exceptional circumstances. For example, in R v. 
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Taylor and Crabb, the Court of Appeal held that in a murder trial, a schoolgirl who was 
providing evidence could remain anonymous to the defendants.364 
The ECtHR has found the right to a fair trial to have been violated in circumstances when the 
accused was not given an opportunity to examine witnesses. For example, in Unterpertinger 
v. Austria, which concerned domestic violence and allegations of assault, the applicant’s 
conviction was ‘mainly’ based upon statements made to the police by the alleged victims 
which he could not challenge in trial.365 Accordingly, the Court held that there had been a 
violation of Article 6, taken together with the principles contained within Article 6(3)(d) of the 
ECHR. In Kostovski v. The Netherlands, which concerned an armed robbery and the hearing 
of evidence from anonymous witnesses due to the fear of reprisals from organised criminal 
gangs, the Court held that there had been a violation of Article 6, taken together with Article 
6(3)(d).366 In Lüdi v. Switzerland, which concerned a drugs trafficking case and evidence 
adduced by an undercover agent which could not be challenged, the Court held that there 
had been a violation of Article 6(3)(d) in conjunction with Article 6(1).367  
However, as is now a familiar trend, the ECtHR has made it clear that the right to examine 
witnesses is not absolute. For example, in Engel v. The Netherlands, the Court held that the 
right to examine witnesses ‘does not require the attendance and examination of every 
witness on the accused's behalf’.368 Rather, the steps taken by the court must ensure that 
the equality of arms is respected.369  
The admissibility of ‘hearsay’ evidence has particularly exposed the differences between the 
common law and the jurisprudence of the ECtHR when it comes to evaluating the impact of 
restrictions of individual guarantees upon the more general right to a fair trial. In R v. 
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Horncastle,370 the Supreme Court rejected the argument that English law on hearsay 
evidence violated Article 6 of the ECHR, which is much more restrictive vis-à-vis the 
admissibility of such evidence.371 Subsequently, in Al-Khawaja v. UK, the ECtHR appeared 
to retreat from its previous decisions, backing the common law position by holding that 
convictions based solely or decisively on the evidence of absent witnesses whom the 
defendant could not examine or have examined, would not automatically violate Article 6.372 
However, the Court added that hearsay evidence may result in the rights of the defence 
being restricted to an extent that is incompatible with Article 6,373 and that the question is 
whether there are ‘sufficient counterbalancing factors in place, including measures that 
permit a fair and proper assessment of the reliability’ of the evidence.374 
The HRC has made similar comments on the right of the accused to examine witnesses, 
stating that the right to examine witnesses is ‘an application of the principle of equality of 
arms’ and that the guarantee ‘is important for ensuring an effective defence by the accused 
and their counsel’.375 However, the Committee then added that there is not ‘an unlimited 
right to obtain the attendance of any witness requested by the accused or their counsel, but 
only a right to have witnesses admitted that are relevant for the defence, and to be given a 
proper opportunity to question and challenge witnesses against them at some stage of the 
proceedings’.376 
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2.6 Fair Trial Guarantees in Civil Proceedings 
Of the fair trial guarantees discussed in this chapter, only those provided under Article 6(1) 
of the ECHR and Article 14(1) of the ICCPR are also expressly guaranteed in proceedings 
concerning the determination of an individual’s civil rights and obligations, which are in turn 
classified as civil proceedings.377 Even so, as alluded to earlier,378 States are granted greater 
flexibility when implementing fair trial guarantees in civil proceedings than they are with 
criminal proceedings.379 Having said that, the ECtHR has on a number of occasions found 
that certain fair trial guarantees integral to criminal proceedings can also be applicable in 
civil proceedings.  
Chief amongst these is the equality of arms. The ECtHR imported the requirement of the 
equality of arms into civil cases in Dombo Beheer v. The Netherlands which concerned a 
court’s refusal to allow a former managing director of a company to give evidence whilst, at 
the same time, allowing the bank manager of the disputing party to give evidence.380 The 
ECtHR held that ‘for the present case, it is clear that the requirement of “equality of arms”, in 
the sense of a "fair balance” between the parties, applies in principle to [civil]…cases as well 
as to criminal cases’.381  
Nevertheless, it is clear that the principle is not necessarily applied as vigorously in civil trials 
as it is in criminal trials. In criminal trials, where the prosecution has all the machinery and 
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resources of the State behind it, the principle of equality of arms is an essential guarantee in 
order for the accused to defend themselves.382  
Equally, the right to an adversarial trial may be imported into civil proceedings and the 
requirements may in principle be the same as in criminal proceedings.383 Moreover, the 
ECtHR has stressed that ‘the right to a fair – adversarial – trial “means the opportunity to 
have knowledge of and comment on the observations filed or evidence adduced by the other 
party”.’384 However, it is clear that the right to an adversarial trial in civil proceedings is not 
absolute, but ‘its scope may vary depending on the specific features of the case in 
question’.385 
The presumption of innocence may also apply in civil proceedings in certain 
circumstances.386 For example, the guarantee may be applied in professional disciplinary 
proceedings;387 proceedings after an acquittal;388 or a stay of proceedings where a criminal 
prosecution is time-barred but an accused is requested to pay costs.389 
 
2.7 Derogations in Times of Emergency 
In addition to the permissible limitations which are inherent in the right to a fair trial as 
defined under IHRL, States may also restrict certain fair trial guarantees in exceptional 
situations by derogating from some aspects of the right in order to respond to situations of 
national emergency. Under both the ECHR and the ICCPR, States are permitted to 
temporarily suspend certain aspects of their IHRL obligations in emergency situations which 
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threaten the life of the nation.390 Due to the potential implications of a derogation, the 
practice has been described as ‘perhaps the most far-reaching of the permissible techniques 
for unilateral modification of a State’s human rights obligations’.391  
The declaration of a public emergency in order to derogate from certain aspects of a State’s 
obligations under IHRL is one of the most serious and radical decisions a State can make to 
legitimately react to a crisis. Primarily, ‘the derogation articles [in the relevant IHRL treaty] 
embody an uneasy compromise between the protection of individual rights and the 
protection of national needs in times of crisis’.392 Exploring this phenomenon is crucial not 
least for the reason that ‘there is a frequent and perhaps understandable link between states 
of emergency and situations of grave violations of human rights’.393 As such, it is vital to 
reflect upon what exactly a public emergency entails. 
According to Richard Burchill, derogations may be viewed in two contrasting ways: ‘The first 
view is that derogation provisions demonstrate the continued primacy of State sovereignty in 
international human rights law’ as they ‘allow for State interest to prevail over human 
interest’.394 On the other hand, ‘derogation provisions are necessary to ensure States sign 
up to the treaty regime as it is unlikely any State would accept restraints upon the ability to 
act in all circumstances’.395 In this sense, Burchill emphasises that a particular legal path is 
laid out which both respects and limits sovereignty: it is better to commit to the rule of law by 
means of a lawful channel rather than to unilaterally and unconditionally suspend legal 
rights.396 Going further, the power of a State to derogate from IHRL obligations can be so 
drastic that the HRC has stated that ‘[t]he restoration of a state of normalcy where full 
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respect for the Covenant can again be secured must be the predominant objective of a State 
party derogating from the Covenant’.397 
The legal regimes governing derogations contain, expressly or impliedly, a number of 
conditions that must be satisfied in order for a derogation to be permissible under IHRL. 
These concern both procedural and substantive requirements, which have been approached 
and interpreted in different ways by scholars.398 In essence, a State must notify the relevant 
authorities of its derogation, there must be a public emergency which threatens the life of the 
nation, the derogating measures must not go beyond the exigencies of the situation, and the 
measures must not conflict with a State’s other international obligations. 
As a useful point of introduction to what a state of emergency entails, the International 
Commission of Jurists (IComJ) has suggested that there are five international norms 
concerning states of emergency which can be deduced from the three primary IHRL 
instruments that provide the right for contracting Parties to derogate from their obligations:399 
(a) that the emergency ‘threatens the life of the nation’; (b) that the measures taken ‘be 
strictly required by the exigencies of the situation’; (c) that specified rights not be derogated 
from; (d) that derogations not be inconsistent with any other obligation under international 
law; and (e) that prompt reports regarding derogations are made.400 
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Before analysing the requirements which a State must satisfy for a derogation to be lawful, it 
is important to bear in mind a number of issues. Firstly, certain rights under the ECHR and 
ICCPR can never be derogated from.401 For example, common to both instruments, as a jus 
cogens norm, the prohibition of torture and, arguably, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
is non-derogable.  
Insofar as the right to a fair trial is concerned, the ECHR and ICCPR both forbid derogations 
from the prohibition of the application of ex post facto law or punishment in almost identical 
terms.402 Otherwise, within the provisions of the ECHR and the ICCPR, there are no further 
guarantees that bind the UK pertaining to the right to a fair trial which are expressly non-
derogable.403 However, the HRC has emphasised that certain fair trial guarantees not 
expressly mentioned in the derogation provision of the ICCPR cannot be derogated from 
under any circumstances, including those that are ‘explicitly guaranteed under international 
humanitarian law during armed conflict’, such as the fundamental requirements of the right to 
a fair trial.404 Specifically, the HRC has stated that ‘only a court of law may try and convict a 
person for a criminal offence’;405 that the presumption of innocence must be respected;406 
and that the right to take proceedings before a court to enable the court to review the 
lawfulness of detention must not be diminished.407 Additionally, the HRC has emphasised 
that the non-derogable prohibition of torture also includes the prohibition of the use of 
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evidence obtained by torture in trial;408 and that the right to a competent, independent and 
impartial tribunal is also non-derogable.409 Nevertheless, as discussed further below, even 
those rights which are in principle derogable cannot be derogated from in their entirety. 
The measures taken by a State pursuant to a derogation must also not involve discrimination 
solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin.410 Although, in 
contrast to Article 4 of the ICCPR, Article 15 of the ECHR does not expressly state that 
derogations must not be discriminatory, the general prohibition of discrimination in the 
enjoyment of Convention rights is, of course, contained within Article 14 of the ECHR. Even 
so, the fact that a derogation under the ECHR must not be inconsistent with a Contracting 
State’s other international obligations will include a State’s obligations under the ICCPR, 
which expressly prohibits derogations which are discriminatory.  
2.7.1 Notification of the Derogation 
Once a State has opted to derogate from its IHRL obligations, it must inform the appropriate 
treaty institutions in accordance with the relevant treaty provisions.411 As a minimum, a State 
Party derogating from the ECHR must keep the Secretary-General of the CoE fully informed 
of the measures which it has taken and the reasons for this, and it must inform the 
Secretary-General when the measures have ceased to operate.412 
In the context of the ICCPR, the HRC has noted that a State Party resorting to a derogation 
‘must immediately inform the other States parties, through the United Nations Secretary-
General, of the provisions it has derogated from and of the reasons for such measures’.413 
This notification requirement ‘is essential not only for the discharge of the Committee’s 
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functions, in particular in assessing whether the measures taken by the State party were 
strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, but also to permit other States parties to 
monitor compliance with the provisions of the Covenant’.414  
Accordingly, the notification of derogation must be as detailed as possible, in order to ensure 
transparency and allow other contracting States, as well as monitoring bodies, to assess the 
extent of the derogation measures, their necessity and proportionality.415 Furthermore, a 
notice of derogation should include, as a minimum, ‘full information about the measures 
taken and a clear explanation of the reasons for them, with full documentation attached 
regarding their law’.416 
However, in 2015 and 2016, two States notified the CoE of their intention to derogate from 
their respective obligations under the ECHR, initially providing very limited information 
concerning the extent of their derogations. First, following the various terrorist attacks in 
France in 2015,417 the French Government notified the Secretary General of the CoE of its 
intention to derogate from the ECHR pursuant to Article 15, merely stating that some of the 
measures taken by France under the state of emergency ‘may involve a derogation from the 
obligations’ under the ECHR.418 Of the measures subsequently implemented, so-called 
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‘administrative searches’ and ‘Assigned Residence Orders’ have attracted considerable 
scrutiny.419 The state of emergency was eventually allowed to expire in November 2017,420 
after the French Parliament had enacted sweeping counter-terrorism laws which made many 
of the temporary measures permanent, subject to a pledge to review the powers after two 
years.421 Elsewhere, following the attempted coup d’état in Turkey in July 2016, the Turkish 
Government notified the Secretary General of the CoE of its intention to derogate under 
Article 15, merely stating that some measures ‘may involve derogation from the obligations’ 
under the ECHR.422  
Although neither State notified the Secretary General of the CoE which specific articles of 
the ECHR they would be derogating from, both States also notified the Secretary General of 
the UN of their intention to derogate from the ICCPR, but expressly identified which 
particular articles of the ICCPR they intended to derogate from.423 Accordingly, it might be 
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questioned whether either State fully complied with their obligations under the ECHR to 
notify the CoE of their intentions and, in particular, to explain how the measures taken will 
not go beyond the exigencies of the situation. 
2.7.2 A Public Emergency which Threatens the Life of the Nation 
The first substantive requirement in order for a derogation to be lawful is that there must be a 
‘public emergency’ which threatens ‘the life of the nation’.424 The ECmHR and the ECtHR 
have commented on this requirement on numerous occasions, finding that a number of 
characteristics must be shown for an emergency to exist.425  
The first characteristic for a state of emergency to exist is that the occasion must amount to 
an ‘exceptional situation’. In Lawless v. Ireland, which was the first ever judgment issued by 
the ECtHR in 1961, the Court considered the legality of a derogation made by Ireland.426 
Lawless had been a member of the IRA who was arrested on a number of occasions and the 
Court had to consider whether his detention was justified in light of Ireland’s derogation 
under Article 15 of the ECHR. The Court referred to the ‘natural and customary meaning’ of 
the words ‘public emergency threatening the life of the nation’, and stated that they ‘refer to 
an exceptional situation of crisis or emergency’.427 
In 1969, the ECmHR built upon the Lawless judgment in The Greek Case which still stands 
as one of the most important cases on the matter.428 Four States filed applications to the 
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ECmHR in September 1967, alleging that the Greek military government which seized power 
in April 1967 had violated its obligations under the ECHR.429 The ECmHR indicated that 
states of emergency may be seen to have, in particular, four characteristics, the first being 
that the emergency must be actual or imminent, and the fourth being that:  
The crisis or danger must be exceptional, in that the normal measures or 
restrictions, permitted by the Convention for the maintenance of public 
safety, health and order, are plainly inadequate.430 
The second characteristic of a state of emergency, as the ECtHR and ECmHR held in 
Lawless and The Greek Case respectively, is that the exceptional situation must affect the 
whole population, regarding either the entire nation, or the specific area to which the state of 
emergency applies.431 
Finally, according to Lawless and The Greek Case, the third characteristic is that the 
exceptional situation, which affects the whole population, must constitute a threat to the 
organised life of the community.432  
When determining whether a public emergency exists pursuant to these three 
characteristics, States are afforded a wide margin of appreciation which the Court has 
asserted on numerous occasions, beginning with the landmark Ireland v. UK ruling.433 The 
Government of Ireland alleged that that the powers of extrajudicial deprivation of liberty 
applied in Northern Ireland between August 1971 and March 1975 contravened Article 15.434 
The Chamber had no difficulty in finding that ‘the existence of such an emergency is 
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perfectly clear from the facts’, citing the numerous deaths, injuries and property damage 
during the Troubles.435 The Court held: 
It falls in the first place to each Contracting State, with its responsibility for 
‘the life of [its] nation’, to determine whether that life is threatened by a 
‘public emergency’ and, if so, how far it is necessary to go in attempting to 
overcome the emergency. By reason of their direct and continuous contact 
with the pressing needs of the moment, the national authorities are in 
principle in a better position than the international judge to decide both on 
the presence of such an emergency and on the nature and scope of 
derogations necessary to avert it. In this matter, Article 15(1) leaves those 
authorities a wide margin of appreciation.436 
The HRC have arguably been the most critical international institution in scrutinising the 
existence of emergency situations, in the form of its Concluding Observations of periodic 
reports submitted by contracting States under Article 40 of the ICCPR. Whilst the ECtHR 
offers a wide margin of appreciation to States in the determination of the existence of a state 
of emergency, the HRC has insisted that ‘compliance with all aspects of article 4, including 
the determination of whether a state of emergency exists, is a matter in respect of which it 
has final say’.437 For example, the HRC has criticised the prolonged states of emergency in 
existence in Syria;438 Croatia;439 the Netherlands Antilles,440 Yemen;441 and Algeria.442 
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2.7.3 Strictly Required by the Exigencies of the Situation 
The second substantive requirement for a derogation to be valid is that the measures taken 
must not go beyond the ‘exigencies of the situation’.443 Whereas the ECtHR has adopted, for 
the most part, a predominantly deferential approach to the question of whether a state of 
emergency exists, the Court has not shown the same level of deference to this second 
requirement. 
For example, in Ireland v. UK, after granting a wide margin of appreciation to the UK in 
determining the emergency, the Court noted: 
Nevertheless, the States do not enjoy an unlimited power in this respect. 
The Court…is empowered to rule on whether the States have gone beyond 
the ‘extent strictly required by the exigencies’ of the crisis. The domestic 
margin of appreciation is thus accompanied by a European supervision.444 
The most helpful commentary on what the limits of the exigencies may be comes from the 
HRC which stated that ‘this requirement relates to the duration, geographical coverage and 
material scope of the state of emergency and any measures of derogation resorted to 
because of the emergency’.445 In essence, when determining whether the measures taken 
are required by the exigencies of the situation, a State must be able to justify them with 
regard to the specific duration, geographical coverage and material scope of the emergency 
at issue.  
Furthermore, the HRC has insisted that States have a legal obligation to ‘narrow down all 
derogations to those strictly required by the exigencies of the situation [which] establishes 
both for States parties and for the Committee a duty to conduct a careful analysis under 
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each article of the Covenant based on an objective assessment of the actual situation’.446 
Insofar as the geographical constraint of a derogation is concerned, it is apparent that a 
State cannot rely upon a derogation to take action in a region outside of the scope of the 
original derogation.447 As such, the courts will assess the necessity and proportionality of the 
measures when assessing whether action taken is within the ‘exigencies of the situation’. 
2.7.4 Compatibility with the State’s Other International Obligations 
Finally, in order for a derogation to be lawful, the measures taken must not be inconsistent 
with a State’s other international obligations.448 This requirement is, on the one hand, the 
most straightforward requirement to comprehend, but on the other hand, perhaps the most 
far-reaching principle. Firstly, it is evident that in principle, no derogation could be made 
under the ECHR which is inconsistent with any other international treaty that a State has 
signed and ratified.449 
As already mentioned, the HRC has drawn particular attention to the rules of IHL which any 
potential derogation cannot be inconsistent with,450 whereas the Siracusa Principles stress 
the importance of the various Geneva and International Labour Organisation Conventions.451 
The particular emphasis placed upon the rules of IHL clearly reflects the fact that historically, 
many emergencies arise in times of armed conflict, thus triggering the application of IHL.  
Having said that, in light of the recent episodes of terrorist violence in Europe and the 
persistent warnings of future attacks, it is arguable that the threat of armed conflict has been 
superseded by the threat of terrorism as the most obvious or foreseeable example of an 
emergency situation that States may face. As mentioned earlier, scholars have 
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overwhelmingly rejected the suggestion that the ‘War on Terror’, or counter-terrorist 
campaigns in general, can be considered an ‘armed conflict’ which would invoke the rules of 
IHL.452 As such, it will be of greater concern for the courts and monitoring bodies to ensure 
that counter-terrorist measures taken by States pursuant to a derogation under the relevant 
IHRL treaty do not contradict their international obligations under other human rights treaties. 
For States that derogate from the ECHR, this will include the ICCPR, but issues may also 
arise in respect of a State’s obligations under the Convention Against Torture.453  
2.8. Conclusions 
This chapter has sought to briefly outline the legal framework pertaining to the right to a fair 
trial in the context of national security. As the following chapter will demonstrate, a 
methodical assessment of the implications and compatibility of certain legal mechanisms 
with the right to a fair trial from the perspective of IHRL ultimately stems from the 
categorisation of proceedings concerning those mechanisms as criminal or civil. Whilst 
individuals in all proceedings in the UK are entitled to certain common law guarantees which 
are complemented by international human rights instruments, only those individuals facing 
criminal charges will be entitled to the additional guarantees inherent to criminal 
proceedings. Lastly, where a State is unable to exercise the inherent limitations of some fair 
trial guarantees, it may seek to derogate from certain fair trial guarantees. 
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Chapter 3. Counter-Terrorist Hybrid Orders 
3.1 Introduction 
Having discussed the scope of the right to a fair trial in the context of national security in 
Chapter 2, this chapter critically analyses one particular type of counter-terrorist response in 
the UK in light of the applicable legal framework. Specifically, this chapter focusses on the 
emergence of an array of executive orders which, for the purposes of this thesis, have been 
termed ‘counter-terrorist hybrid orders’. These mechanisms consist of Control Orders (2005-
2011), TPIMs (2011-) and TEOs (2015-). Whilst other counter-terrorist and non-terrorism-
related executive powers share some similarities with these mechanisms, as the brief 
discussion of executive ‘hybrid’ powers in the Literature Review alluded to,454 the justification 
for the focus of this thesis and collective analysis of these particular mechanisms is further 
demonstrated in this chapter.  
Firstly, as this chapter demonstrates, these mechanisms share much in common in respect 
of their underlying rationale, legislative frameworks, legal issues that stem from their 
implementation and administration, and the consequences of the mechanisms for a number 
of human rights. One of the most significant issues that unites these particular mechanisms 
is that they are perceived as part of the solution to two enduring and overlapping challenges 
that subsequent UK Governments have had to grapple with in recent years, namely, how to 
deal with terrorist suspects who can be neither deported or prosecuted, nor indefinitely 
detained, but also, how to ensure procedural fairness in proceedings with national security 
concerns. In that respect, whilst Control Orders in the past and TPIMs as they currently 
operate allow for a broader range of restrictions to be imposed against individuals than 
TEOs can, the three mechanisms all raise particular challenges for the right to liberty under 
Article 5 and the right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the ECHR.   
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Secondly, the three mechanisms explored in this thesis are strongly linked as they 
correspond to the changing nature of the perceived terrorist threat and policy objectives of 
subsequent Governments. Whilst Control Orders were introduced in the wake of the House 
of Lords decision in the Belmarsh case,455 TPIMs were intended to serve as a more long-
term and more liberal replacement for the Control Order regime. More recently, as the 
terrorist threat from non-UK citizens appears to have been superseded by the threat posed 
by British citizens or individuals with rights of permanent residence, the introduction of TEOs 
was deemed necessary to restrict the activities of suspected terrorists who travelled abroad 
in some similar ways to Control Orders and TPIMs.  
Thirdly, whilst other counter-terrorist hybrid powers are significant and worthy of analysis, 
most notably asset-freezing powers under the Terrorist Asset-Freezing Etc. Act 2010 and 
the seizure of passports under Schedule 1 to the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, 
these mechanisms are much more narrow in scope and are designed to disrupt very 
particular activities of individuals. For example, the purpose of the asset-freezing regime is 
‘to freeze the assets of individuals and groups thought to be involved in terrorism, whether in 
the UK or abroad, and to deprive them of access to financial resources’.456 It is also 
necessary to limit the scope of this thesis for practical reasons, and for the reasons 
discussed above these selected mechanisms share more in common and relate more to the 
aims and research questions of the thesis than other counter-terrorist powers have the 
potential to. 
In essence, with each of the three mechanisms explored in this thesis, the Secretary of State 
for the Home Department (SSHD) can impose a broad variety of conditions upon an 
individual, both prohibiting conduct and imposing certain obligations. With Control Orders in 
the past, and now with TPIMs and TEOs, the mechanisms can be imposed upon individuals 
pursuant to the aim of protecting members of the public in the UK from a risk of terrorism, 
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through a process in which the affected individual has very limited meaningful knowledge or 
participation. The measures envisaged under each of the mechanisms can be imposed with 
a very low threshold of proof or suspicion and are administered in the civil courts. 
Furthermore, any breach of the conditions attached to a mechanism can be met with criminal 
sanctions. 
Although most public attention and analysis has focussed upon the impact of Control Orders, 
and by extension TPIMs, upon the right to liberty and security due to the possibility of ‘house 
arrest’ and the broad restrictions on an individual’s freedom of movement, the ‘more 
enduring and intricate controversy’ has concerned their implications for the right to a fair 
trial.457 Furthermore, the inherently international nature of the TEO mechanism has added an 
extra layer of complexity and more research is needed in respect of this particular counter-
terrorist hybrid order. This chapter seeks to address these enduring controversies. From the 
perspective of the right to a fair trial, there are a number of overlapping concerns with 
counter-terrorist hybrid orders which necessitate further analysis.  
Firstly, the often severe restrictions and obligations imposed upon individuals can 
significantly affect, restrict or possibly infringe a number of human rights, not least of all the 
prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment;458 the right to liberty and security;459 and the 
four qualified rights pertaining to privacy and family life, beliefs and opinions, expression and 
assembly.460 Questions arise as to whether the serious implications of the imposed 
mechanisms for these rights should necessitate stronger fair trial guarantees. Going further, 
the fact that criminal penalties can be imposed upon individuals for breaching the conditions 
raises serious concerns over fairness, especially when the sole purpose of the criminal 
courts is to consider whether a breach of the conditions attached to the mechanism has 
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occurred or not, rather than to consider the implementation of the mechanism in the first 
place. As such, these concerns relate to the substantive fairness of the mechanisms.  
Secondly, of greater concern for the purposes of this study are the circumstances in which 
counter-terrorist hybrid orders are implemented and administered by the courts, which 
significantly limit the role of the individual in proceedings. When the mechanisms are 
subjected to judicial oversight, they can be heard under CMP, a type of court procedure in 
which hearings can proceed both in camera and ex parte, and involve the appointment of a 
security-cleared lawyer known as a ‘Special Advocate’ to represent the interests of the 
individual. The characterisation of these proceedings as ‘administrative’ and therefore not 
criminal in nature, leading to the apparent circumventing of the additional guarantees which 
Article 6 ECHR requires for criminal trials,461 is a serious cause for concern when ensuring 
the overall fairness of proceedings. As such, these issues relate to the procedural fairness of 
the mechanisms. 
Following this Introduction, the second section discusses the origins of the three counter-
terrorist hybrid orders that this thesis focusses on, analysing the most significant legal 
developments. The third section analyses the mechanisms in more depth, whilst also 
considering how Control Orders were replaced by TPIMs in 2011, which were in turn 
amended in 2015. As such, the third section outlines the statutory frameworks governing the 
three counter-terrorist hybrid orders, and in the process demonstrates the similarities of the 
mechanisms. The fourth section critically analyses the most significant aspects of the 
mechanisms which challenge the right to a fair trial. The fifth section then evaluates what 
steps have been taken in the attempt to improve the procedural fairness of the mechanisms 
before some brief conclusions are made in the sixth section. 
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3.2 The Origins of Counter-Terrorist Hybrid Orders 
3.2.1 The Deportation of Foreigners, Matters of National Security and the Introduction 
of CMP 
As mentioned earlier, the UK has extensive experience responding to threats of domestic 
terrorist violence, and some of the most fundamental features of counter-terrorist hybrid 
orders can be traced back to the conflict in Northern Ireland.462 Other features can be 
identified in more recent civil administrative measures, some of which do not concern 
terrorism or national security.463 For the purposes of this study however, a number of legal 
developments shortly prior to and immediately after 9/11 paved the way for the introduction 
of counter-terrorist hybrid orders. Firstly, in 1997 the British Government introduced CMP in 
immigration proceedings which involved national security concerns, and since then the use 
of CMP has steadily spread to other proceedings which raise similar concerns. Secondly, in 
the aftermath of 9/11, the Government had to decide how it would treat suspected terrorists 
who could be neither prosecuted nor deported. The decision to indefinitely detain non-British 
suspected terrorists in 2001 and the court response that followed led to the creation of 
Control Orders in 2005. Where the two distinct phenomena converge, the foundations of the 
three counter-terrorist hybrid orders that this thesis focusses upon can be identified. 
The reason for the introduction of CMP in the domestic legal system can be traced back to 
1996 with the landmark Chahal v. UK judgment before the ECtHR.464 Chahal was an Indian 
citizen and a Sikh separatist suspected of various terror offences. In 1990, having been 
informed of the Home Secretary’s intention to deport him, Chahal applied for asylum in the 
UK, arguing that he would face persecution and torture in India. Although the case is most 
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well-known for the issue of non-refoulement and Article 3 of the ECHR, it also raised issues 
under Article 5(4) of the Convention regarding an individual’s right upon detention to access 
a court in order to determine the legality of their detention. More specifically, Chahal’s Article 
5(4) complaint concerned the Government’s procedure for determining whether individuals 
posed a threat to national security in deportation cases.  
Under the procedure in force at the relevant time, due to national security concerns, an 
internal Home Office advisory panel, composed of three members, heard the appeal against 
the decision of the Home Secretary.465 An individual before the panel could make written and 
oral representations, call witnesses, and be assisted by a friend.466 However, individuals 
were not entitled to legal representation and were only given an outline of the grounds for 
the notice of intention to deport.467 Furthermore, the panel merely provided non-binding 
advice to the Home Secretary, which was not disclosed to the individual.468 
The Grand Chamber of the ECtHR held that this system was incompatible with Chahal’s 
right to have the lawfulness of his detention decided by a court under Article 5(4) of the 
ECHR.469 Going further, the Court determined that, due to the shortcomings of the advisory 
panel and the lack of procedural guarantees that an individual enjoyed, the panel could not 
be considered a ‘court’ for the purposes of Article 5(4).470  
Ironically, following the intervention of several NGOs, the Grand Chamber inadvertently 
advocated what would become the basis of much of the UK’s approach to sensitive national 
security proceedings in the following years.471 The Court first held that ‘the use of 
confidential material may be unavoidable where national security is at stake’ before adding 
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that ‘this does not mean, however, that the national authorities can be free from effective 
control by the domestic courts whenever they choose to assert that national security and 
terrorism are involved’.472 The Court remarked that ‘in Canada a more effective form of 
judicial control has been developed in cases of this type’ which ‘illustrates that there are 
techniques which can be employed which both accommodate legitimate security concerns 
about the nature and sources of intelligence information and yet accord the individual a 
substantial measure of procedural justice’.473 The Court was specifically referring to the 
practice of appointing a ‘Special Advocate’ in certain immigration cases which raised 
national security concerns. The Grand Chamber expanded: 
[A] Federal Court judge holds an in camera hearing of all the evidence, at 
which the applicant is provided with a statement summarising, as far as 
possible, the case against him or her and has the right to be represented 
and to call evidence. The confidentiality of security material is maintained 
by requiring such evidence to be examined in the absence of both the 
applicant and his or her representative. However…their place is taken by a 
security-cleared counsel instructed by the court, who cross-examines the 
witnesses and generally assists the court to test the strength of the State's 
case. A summary of the evidence obtained by this procedure, with 
necessary deletions, is given to the applicant.474 
With these remarks, the ECtHR had essentially provided the solution to the problem the 
Court had itself pointed out to the British Government. Clearly, the UK wished to retain the 
possibility of deporting individuals who were seen as posing a threat to national security, but, 
at the same time, a transparent review procedure which entailed the complete disclosure of 
all evidence could undermine national security. As David Jenkins effectively summarised, 
the Chahal decision ‘raised two nagging questions that governments in Europe and 
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elsewhere have struggled with ever since’.475 Firstly, States would need to decide how to 
deal with dangerous foreign nationals who could not be deported due to a risk of torture, and 
secondly, States that wished to be able to use and protect sensitive evidence in legal 
proceedings would clearly still need to ensure procedural fairness to the individuals.476 
In response to the findings of the ECtHR, the British Parliament enacted the Special 
Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC) Act 1997. The SIAC Act established the Special 
Immigration Appeals Commission which hears appeals relating to the Immigration Act 1971, 
or more broadly relating to deportation orders made in the interests of national security.477 
Under the SIAC Act 1997, the Lord Chancellor is authorised to make rules applying to the 
proceedings before the Commission.478 Specifically, section 5(3)(a) allows the proceedings 
to take place ‘without the appellant being given full particulars of the reasons for the decision 
which is the subject of his appeal’, and section 5(3)(b) allows proceedings to occur in the 
absence of the individual and his legal representative.479 Of equal importance, section 6(1) 
allows for the appointment of a Special Advocate ‘to represent the interests of an appellant’ 
when the individual and his chosen lawyer are excluded from proceedings.480 With these 
three core provisions, the British Parliament had clearly responded to the ECtHR’s 
speculative remarks in Chahal regarding the Canadian approach to sensitive immigration 
proceedings.481 Ultimately, these provisions would collectively form the foundations of what 
would later be labelled CMP: the ‘Kafkaesque’ situation in which the accused is not fully 
informed of the charges, is not allowed to participate in trial in any meaningful sense, and is 
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not allowed any contact with his Special Advocate once the advocate has been served with 
the closed evidence.482  
The Government’s haste to implement these aspects of the Canadian model was not without 
criticism. For example, the Constitutional Affairs Select Committee observed in 2005 that, 
despite governmental claims that the procedure had been endorsed by the ECtHR in 
Chahal, the Court had not in fact ‘given a ringing endorsement to the use of Special 
Advocates at all’.483 Moreover, the Committee pointed to the ECtHR’s decision in Al Nashif in 
2002 which briefly considered the role of Special Advocates in the SIAC in the UK, where 
the Chamber held: 
Without expressing in the present context an opinion on the conformity of 
the above system with the Convention, the Court notes that, as in the case 
of Chahal cited above, there are means which can be employed which 
both accommodate legitimate national security concerns and yet accord 
the individual a substantial measure of procedural justice.484 
Similarly, in A v. UK in 2009, the facts of which will be examined shortly, the Grand Chamber 
confirmed that the Court had never been required to decide whether or not the Special 
Advocate procedure was compatible with Article 5(4) or Article 6 of the ECHR.485 
In this regard, David Jenkins has forcefully argued that the ECtHR’s unintended 
encouragement of the Canadian model was a misguided demonstration of comparative law. 
This ‘unintentionally provoked a “race-to-the-bottom” by the British and Canadian 
governments’, as each government looked to the other for innovative ways to use sensitive 
evidence and restrict the procedural rights of suspected terrorists in non-criminal 
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proceedings.486 Going further, Jenkins argued that this downward spiral was an attempt to 
rights-proof the Special Advocate system, to find the ‘due process baselines below which 
they could not go’, and to stretch State power.487 
Whilst the Special Advocate system and CMP more generally remains controversial in the 
UK as this chapter will explore, as well as in Canada,488 the use of these proceedings has 
attracted much attention in other common law countries that share similar security concerns, 
not least of all Australia and New Zealand, which have implemented similar procedures 
particularly in immigration settings.489 The use of Special Advocates has received some 
support in these countries,490 as well as in Israel.491 Closer to home, the rules of procedure 
of the European Court of Justice have been recently reformed to allow for in camera 
proceedings if requested by a party.492 As such, the use of CMP and Special Advocates, or 
broadly similar mechanisms, clearly appeals to countries confronted with similar challenges 
i.e. how to deal with sensitive evidence whilst ensuring procedural fairness to the individual 
concerned. 
Despite the establishment of this radical new system of appeal in the UK, the question of 
whether SIAC’s procedures were compatible with the right to a fair trial did not initially face 
serious judicial scrutiny. This was due to the Convention’s well-established principle that 
Article 6 of the ECHR is not applicable to matters concerning the entry and expulsion of 
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foreign nationals, insofar as they are considered not to amount to the determination of an 
individual’s civil rights and obligations or of a criminal charge.493  
3.2.2 The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 and the Attempt to Introduce 
Indefinite Detention 
The second distinctive aspect of counter-terrorist hybrid orders – the restrictions and 
obligations that can be imposed upon an individual suspected of being involved in terrorism 
– can be traced to the immediate reaction of the UK Government after 9/11. In response to 
the attacks, the Government fast-tracked the ATCS Bill through Parliament, allowing the 
House of Commons only 16 hours to debate its content.494 Although the ATCS Act 2001 
covers a broad range of issues such as freezing orders, race hate offences, and weapons of 
mass destruction, it most infamously provided for the possibility of indefinite detention of 
non-British terrorist suspects.495 With Part 4 of the Act which concerned Immigration and 
Asylum, the UK had purportedly found the solution to the enduring problem of having to deal 
with non-British terrorist suspects who could not be deported due to the principle of non-
refoulement, but who at the same time could not be prosecuted due to evidentiary concerns.  
The most important provisions of the ATCS Act on this matter were contained in four 
sections. Section 21 of the Act allowed the SSHD to certify a suspected international terrorist 
if the Secretary reasonably believed the person’s presence in the UK was a risk to national 
security, and reasonably suspected that the person was a terrorist. Section 22 dealt with 
deportation and clearly referred to the Chahal decision as a potential obstacle to the removal 
of individuals. However, the most controversial aspect of the Act was contained in section 23 
which allowed the detention of foreign nationals who were suspected terrorists when their 
                                                          
493
 See for example Maaouia v. France (App. no. 39652/98) ECtHR, 5 October 2000; Urrutikoetxea v. 
France (App. no. 31113/96) ECmHR, 5 December 1996; Bozano v. France (App. no. 9990/82) 
ECmHR, 15 May 1984; Uppal and Singh v. UK (App. no. 8244/78) ECmHR, 2 May 1979. 
494
 A. Tomkins, ‘Legislating Against Terror: The Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001’ (2002) 
PL 205. See also House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, Fast-Track Legislation (n. 55) 
paras 77-80. 
495
 See H. Fenwick, ‘The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001: A Proportionate Response to 
11 September?’ (2002) 65 MLR 724; Elliott, ‘United Kingdom: The “War on Terror”, U.K.-Style – The 
Detention and Deportation of Suspected Terrorists’ (n. 46). 
110 
 
removal or departure from the UK was prevented by law or practical considerations. Finally, 
section 25 allowed individuals to appeal to the SIAC against their certification.  
Due to the severity of the deprivation of liberty that non-British citizens would face, the UK 
formally derogated from its international obligations under Article 5 of the ECHR. This drew 
much attention as it made the UK the only Member State of the CoE to derogate from its 
IHRL obligations because of the threat of terrorism immediately after 9/11.496 The Derogation 
Order was carefully formulated and clearly addressed the requirements for a derogation to 
be lawful.497  
Following the enactment of the ATCS Act 2001, eight foreign nationals were immediately 
detained in December 2001, and a further eight were detained in the following months, 
resulting in a total of 16 foreign nationals who were detained under Part 4.498 By the time the 
regime was eventually repealed in 2005, 17 foreign nationals had been certified as 
suspected international terrorists by the SSHD.499 
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Inevitably, a legal challenge to the regime reached the House of Lords in one of the most 
important cases in its history, in what is popularly called the ‘Belmarsh’ litigation.500 In the 
appeal, none of the nine appellants who were certified under the ATCS Act 2001 had been 
subject of criminal charges. The case concerned the compatibility of section 23 of the Act 
with the right to liberty under Article 5 of the ECHR in conjunction with Article 14 prohibiting 
discrimination.501 
In 2004, a rarely constituted nine-judge bench in the House of Lords held by a majority of 8:1 
that the indefinite detention regime violated Article 5 in conjunction with Article 14 of the 
ECHR.502 The Court issued a declaration of incompatibility under section 4 of the HRA 1998 
in respect of section 23 of the ATCS Act 2001. The majority of the Court followed Lord 
Bingham’s leading judgment and found that the practice was arbitrary and not proportionate 
as required by Article 15 of the ECHR, as the harsh measures could only be implemented 
against non-British citizens and there was no objective justification for such differential 
treatment. Moreover, in 2009, in what was ultimately an inconsequential judgment for the 
Belmarsh detainees as the legislation had since been repealed, the ECtHR affirmed the 
2004 decision of the House of Lords.503  
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For Lord Nicholls, the principal weakness in the government’s position concerned the 
difference in treatment afforded to British and foreign citizens. In his judgment, Lord Nicholls 
held that ‘indefinite imprisonment without charge or trial is anathema in any country which 
observes the rule of law’.504 Going further, Lord Nicholls held that this ‘deprives the detained 
person of the protection a criminal trial is intended to afford’, adding that ‘wholly exceptional 
circumstances must exist before this extreme step can be justified’.505  
For Lord Scott, the derogation was ‘at the extreme end of the severity spectrum’.506 In this 
regard, Lord Scott boldly stated that indefinite imprisonment ‘on grounds that are not 
disclosed and made by a person whose identity cannot be disclosed is the stuff of 
nightmares, associated whether accurately or inaccurately with France before and during the 
Revolution, with Soviet Russia in the Stalinist era and now associated…with the United 
Kingdom’.507 
The lone dissenting opinion came from Lord Walker who argued that Part 4 of the ATCS Act 
2001 was only a small part of the counter-terrorist response, and that the indefinite regime 
was not offensively discriminatory because there were sound rational grounds for different 
treatment.508 He also pointed to the fact that only 17 individuals had been certified under the 
regime which was relevant to the issue of proportionality.509 
From the various opinions of the Law Lords, a number of recurring themes can be identified. 
In addition to the ratio of the case that the measures were arbitrary, disproportionate and 
discriminatory, there was a general consensus that the courts should pay a significant 
amount of deference to the executive regarding the declaration of an emergency.510 For 
example, Lord Walker stressed that safeguarding national security, along with economic 
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policy and the allocation of resources, are the areas that the courts are most reluctant to 
intervene in.511 Lord Walker added that the courts should defer to the executive on matters 
of security risk, but not on the practical effects of the matters in question.512 Lord Rodger 
considered that as the principal ally of the USA, there was good reason for the Government 
to think the UK could be attacked.513 Furthermore, Lord Rodger acknowledged that the 
courts simply do not have the same accessibility of intelligence and expertise that the 
Government can rely upon.514 Although agreeing with the majority that the appeal should be 
allowed, Lord Hoffmann did so for very different reasons and in the process provided the 
most interesting judgment. Crucially, his was the sole opinion to reject that a state of 
emergency existed in the UK.515 However, in line with the jurisprudence of the ECtHR,516 the 
House of Lords stressed that it would be for the courts to decide if the measures taken went 
beyond ‘the exigencies of the situation’.  
Secondly, one frequent analogy pondered by the House of Lords was that indefinite 
detention under the ATCS Act amounted to a three-walled prison as the individuals could 
leave the UK if they chose to.517 Lord Nicholls acknowledged that even though the detainees 
could leave prison immediately if they left the country which amounted to a prison of ‘three 
walls’, this freedom was ‘more theoretical than real’ as the detainees preferred to stay in 
prison than risk ill treatment abroad.518 The analogy is a pertinent one insofar as counter-
terrorist hybrid orders are concerned. As will be discussed in the following sections, what 
followed the indefinite detention regime would create somewhat of a paradox. On the one 
hand, counter-terrorist hybrid orders certainly amount to a less restrictive regime in the 
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sense that an individual is not imprisoned and retains a degree of personal liberty. However, 
on the other hand, counter-terrorist hybrid orders can in some ways still amount to ‘three 
walls’ if an individual is subjected to strict curfews and harsh restrictions over work, travel, 
finance and communication. 
3.2.3 Overcoming the Impasse: The Introduction of Counter-Terrorist Hybrid Orders 
When the House of Lords issued a declaration of incompatibility in respect of Part 4 of the 
ATCS Act 2001, an action rarely undertaken by British courts,519 the Government was not 
legally compelled to repeal the legislation due to the important constitutional principle of 
parliamentary sovereignty. However, such declarations under the HRA 1998 do carry 
significant political force. Accordingly, the British Government was faced yet again with the 
problem of having to deal with non-British terrorist suspects who could be neither deported 
or prosecuted, nor no longer indefinitely detained under the ATCS Act 2001. 
The immediate response in the UK in the form of the Control Order regime represented a 
significant shift in approach in how the UK Government was to respond to the terrorist threat 
posed by individuals who could be neither deported nor prosecuted. Moreover, the 
introduction of Control Orders was just one example of the increasing use of executive 
orders in post-9/11 British counter-terrorist policy.520 However, the Control Order mechanism 
would bring its own unique features to the fore and present new challenges to the right to a 
fair trial. With the harsh conditions which were deliberately imposed outside of the criminal 
justice system, but with the possibility of criminal sanctions for any breach of them, post-9/11 
counter-terrorism in the UK had clearly evolved.  
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Nevertheless, the initial legal dilemma raised by the Belmarsh judgment has clearly endured 
beyond the life of the Control Order regime, as successive British Governments have had to 
tackle persistent national security concerns in circumstances when individuals suspected of 
involvement in terrorism cannot be prosecuted. However, the terrorist threat in the UK has 
also clearly evolved somewhat since the Belmarsh judgment in 2004, as the threat of 
‘homegrown’ terrorism and radicalised British citizens returning from conflict in Syria and Iraq 
has arguably superseded the threat posed by non-British citizens. In that regard, TPIMs and 
TEOs both share several fundamental characteristics with the now obsolete Control Order 
regime. Each mechanism presents similarly serious challenges to the right to a fair trial. As 
the following sections will illustrate, these similarities vindicate their collective analysis in this 
study and the labelling of such mechanisms as counter-terrorist hybrid orders.  
 
3.3 The Statutory Frameworks Governing Counter-Terrorist Hybrid Orders 
3.3.1 Control Orders under the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 
The British Government responded to the concerns of the House of Lords in the Belmarsh 
case and implemented the PTA 2005 which repealed the indefinite detention regime under 
the ATCS Act 2001.521 Taking its place, the PTA 2005 allowed any individual, crucially 
including British citizens, to be served with a Control Order.522 The Bill was fast-tracked 
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through Parliament in just two weeks.523 According to the PTA 2005, a Control Order was ‘an 
order against an individual that imposes obligations on him for purposes connected with 
protecting members of the public from a risk of terrorism’.524 
In essence, a Control Order was a specifically tailored mechanism that restricted, or on 
occasions, deprived individuals of their liberty whilst also restricting their privacy and 
freedoms in several ways. A Control Order could impose restrictions and obligations upon an 
individual from a non-exhaustive ‘menu’ of available options. More precisely, a Control Order 
allowed for 16 specified measures to be imposed upon individuals, including, inter alia, 
restrictions and requirements concerning work;525 communication;526 residence;527 travel;528 
and curfews.529 Control Orders lasted for a maximum of 12 months but could be indefinitely 
renewed if it was deemed necessary to protect the public.530 
The PTA 2005 also allowed for a ‘derogating obligation’ to be imposed upon an individual, 
defined as an obligation which was incompatible with the right to liberty under Article 5 of the 
ECHR.531 In that regard, the PTA 2005 allowed for the imposition of a derogating Control 
Order, in which the obligations imposed were or included ‘derogating obligations’.532 
Although the PTA 2005 allowed for both derogating and non-derogating Control Orders to be 
imposed, no derogating orders were ever made and as such, the sum of jurisprudence, and 
the majority of commentary and analysis has concerned non-derogating Control Orders.  
To impose a non-derogating Control Order upon an individual, the SSHD had to have 
reasonable grounds for suspecting that the individual was or had been involved in terrorism-
related activity, and that the imposition of the Control Order was necessary to protect the 
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public from terrorism.533 Furthermore, the SSHD could only impose a non-derogating Control 
Order if approval had been granted by the High Court, or the urgency of the case required 
the Control Order without prior court approval, or the individual was certified as a suspected 
international terrorist under the ATCS Act 2001.534 The court’s role was then at various 
stages to subject the SSHD’s decisions to the test of whether they were ‘obviously flawed’.535  
When the court considered the SSHD’s application, it could be heard under CMP which 
entailed the hearing being held in the absence of the individual, without any notice of the 
application being provided, and without the opportunity for the individual to provide any 
representations to the court.536 Furthermore, an individual faced with the imposition of a 
Control Order could have a lawyer appointed to represent their interests, known as a Special 
Advocate, although no contact was allowed between the two once the sensitive evidence 
had been presented to the Special Advocate, unless the court granted permission.537 Finally, 
when issuing a judgment, a court could withhold any of its reasons if disclosure would 
conflict with the public interest.538 
With a derogating Control Order, the court’s role was much more pivotal. In order to impose 
a derogating Control Order, the SSHD had to apply to the High Court which had to hold an 
‘immediate preliminary hearing to determine whether to make a control order imposing 
obligations that are or include derogating obligations’.539 If the court determined that a 
derogating Control Order could be imposed against an individual, it then had to ‘give 
directions for the holding of a full hearing to determine whether to confirm the order (with or 
without modifications)’.540 The preliminary hearing for a derogating control order could be 
held in the absence of the individual, without any notice of the application being provided, 
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and without the opportunity for the individual to provide any representations to the court.541 
At the preliminary hearing, the court could make a derogating Control Order if it appeared 
that (a) there was material capable of being relied on by the court as establishing the 
individual was or had been involved in terrorism-related activity; (b) there were reasonable 
grounds for believing that imposing obligations was necessary to protect the public from 
terrorism; (c) the risk was associated with a public emergency which involved a derogation; 
and (d) the obligations imposed include derogating obligations which were of the description 
set out in the designation order.542 At the full hearing, the court could confirm the derogating 
Control Order if it was satisfied on the balance of probabilities, that the individual was or had 
been involved in terrorism; that the obligations were necessary to protect the public; that the 
risk was associated with a public emergency which had been responded to with a 
derogation; and that the obligations to be imposed by the Control Order included derogating 
obligations described in the derogation order.543 
Under the PTA 2005, an individual was guilty of an offence if they inter alia breached a 
condition attached to a Control Order unless they had a ‘reasonable excuse’.544 The 
individual faced a maximum of five years’ imprisonment or a fine, or both.545 In that regard, 
the then IRTL, David Anderson, noted that over the lifetime of the PTA 2005, 14 individuals 
were prosecuted for breaching their obligations.546 However, Anderson noted that the 
outcome of the prosecutions was ‘not encouraging’ for the Government, as there were only 
two convictions which resulted in prison sentences of 20 weeks and 15 months, whilst in six 
cases no evidence was offered as it was considered no longer in the public interest to 
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continue the trial.547 Furthermore, two individuals were acquitted, one person absconded 
before trial, one left the UK voluntarily, and three still awaited trial.548 
Over the course of the life of the PTA 2005, 52 Control Orders were imposed upon 
individuals and all were made against men suspected of involvement in Islamist terrorism.549 
Each Control Order lasted from a few months to more than four-and-a-half years.550  
3.3.2 TPIMs under the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 as 
amended by the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015  
In May 2010, the Conservative Party and the Liberal Democrats formed a new Coalition 
Government, following which, the then Home Secretary, Theresa May, launched a review of 
counter-terrorism and security powers.551 In January 2011, the Findings and Conclusions of 
the Review were published in which a number of recommendations were made concerning 
the Control Order regime. The Review concluded that: 
[t]he current control order regime can and should be repealed. The 
Government will move to a system which will protect the public but will be 
less intrusive, more clearly and tightly defined and more comparable to 
restrictions imposed under other powers in the civil justice system. There 
will be an end to the use of forced relocation and lengthy curfews that 
prevent individuals leading a normal daily life. Under control orders the 
Government could implement any measure deemed necessary provided it 
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was not struck down by a court. Under this regime, the Government will 
specify in greater detail the measures that will and will not be available.552 
As a result, and in light of the desire for more permanent legislation, the TPIM Act 2011 was 
enacted but without the same haste as its predecessor. Rather, it was enacted over a period 
of almost five months, receiving Royal Assent on 14 December 2011. The TPIM Act 
repealed the PTA 2005 and replaced the Control Order regime with TPIMs,553 which are 
defined as ‘requirements, restrictions and other provision which may be made in relation to 
an individual’.554  
As it originally read before certain important amendments were made under the CTS Act 
2015, section 3 of the TPIM Act listed five conditions that the SSHD had to meet in order to 
be able to impose a TPIM upon an individual. The SSHD had to reasonably believe that the 
individual is or has been involved in terrorism-related activity;555 conclude that some or all of 
the terrorism-related activity must be new;556 reasonably consider that the TPIM was 
necessary to protect the public;557 reasonably consider that the TPIM was necessary to 
prevent or restrict the individual’s involvement in terrorism-related activity;558 and finally have 
the permission of the High Court or reasonably consider that the urgency of the case 
requires the TPIM to be imposed without prior permission.559 The court’s role is then to 
subject the SSHD’s decisions to the test of whether they were ‘obviously flawed’.560  
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Similar to a Control Order, when the court considers the Home Secretary’s application to 
impose a TPIM, it can be heard under CMP which involves the proceedings being held in the 
absence of the individual, without any notice of the application being provided, and without 
the opportunity for the individual to provide any representations to the court.561 Furthermore, 
an individual facing the imposition of a TPIM can have a Special Advocate appointed to 
represent their interests, although like the Control Order regime, no communication is 
allowed between the TPIM subject and the Special Advocate once the latter has been 
served with the closed material, unless the court grants permission.562 Finally, when issuing 
a judgment, a court can withhold any of its reasons if disclosure would conflict with the public 
interest.563   
Despite the numerous similarities, there are a number of important differences between the 
TPIM regime when it was first introduced and the Control Order regime.564 Immediately, it is 
important to note the difference in the standards that the SSHD had to meet to impose a 
TPIM, as it originally stood, compared to its predecessor. As mentioned earlier, Control 
Orders could be imposed upon an individual on the basis of ‘reasonable suspicion’. Initially, 
TPIMs could only be imposed by the SSHD on the basis of the higher threshold of 
‘reasonable belief’.565  
A further significant difference between Control Orders and TPIMs is that, whereas Control 
Orders could be repeated on a yearly basis, TPIMs last for a maximum of two years unless 
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new terrorist activity can be identified.566 Furthermore, every TPIM notice is automatically 
subject to a review hearing in which the court reviews the decisions of the SSHD that the 
relevant conditions were met and continue to be met.567  
Going further, unlike the Control Order regime, Schedule 4 to the TPIM Act expressly 
provides that nothing in the rules of court relating to TPIM proceedings or appeal 
proceedings, including rules of disclosure, ‘is be read as requiring the relevant court to act in 
a manner that is inconsistent’ with Article 6 of the ECHR.568 Thus, when TPIMs are 
implemented or reviewed, the courts may be particularly mindful of this provision and the 
need to intervene, if necessary, to ensure procedural fairness and that the requirements of 
Article 6 are met.  
Finally, during the period that a TPIM is in force, the SSHD is obliged to keep under review 
whether conditions C and D are met; that is, that the Secretary reasonably considers the 
TPIM is necessary to protect the public and that the TPIM is necessary to prevent or restrict 
the individual’s involvement in terrorism-related activity.569 
Under the original statutory regime, an individual was guilty of an offence if they breached a 
condition attached to a TPIM unless there was a ‘reasonable excuse’ or the SSHD had given 
permission.570 The individual could face a maximum of five years imprisonment or a fine, or 
both.571 In that regard, the IRTL has noted the various examples of individuals who have 
faced criminal prosecution following a breach, or breaches, of the conditions imposed upon 
them under a TPIM. At the most extreme, one individual, ‘DD’, was charged and prosecuted 
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on a number of occasions for breaching several restrictions, resulting in separate prison 
sentences of 9 months and 15 months.572 
However, in comparison to its predecessor regime, TPIMs have been imposed relatively 
sparingly thus far, and by 2014 it seemed that the mechanism was ‘withering on the vine as 
a counter-terrorism tool of practical utility’.573 This was because, as the Independent 
Reviewer attested in March 2015, only one TPIM remained in force and no new TPIMs had 
been implemented.574 Further still, as of March 2015, before the regime was amended, only 
10 TPIMs had been issued since the introduction of the mechanism.575 
However, with the wide-ranging and comprehensive CTS Act 2015, the TPIM regime was 
seemingly revived when the TPIM Act 2011 was amended in light of the numerous 
recommendations made by the IRTL.576 Under the CTS Act 2015, the power to relocate 
individuals which had been extremely controversial under Control Orders was reintroduced, 
albeit in a slightly less onerous form.577 The CTS Act 2015 also amended the conditions 
which the SSHD must meet in order to impose a TPIM. The Home Secretary is now required 
to be satisfied on the higher standard of ‘the balance of probabilities’ that the individual is, or 
has been, involved in terrorism-related activity, which has in turn been reduced in scope.578 
Additionally, two important changes were made regarding the implications for any breach of 
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a condition. Firstly, the ‘reasonable excuse’ defence was removed from the crime of leaving 
the UK whilst subject to a TPIM, therefore introducing an obvious element of strict liability.579 
Secondly, the maximum custodial sentence for contravening travel measures was raised 
from five to 10 years.580 
Insofar as the raising of the standard of proof is concerned, the IRTL was quick to point out 
that the increase in the threshold only applied to the Home Secretary’s decision to impose a 
TPIM and not to the courts which would continue to apply the lighter judicial-review 
standard.581 The Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR) voiced similar concerns shortly 
before the enactment of the CTS Act 2015. The JCHR welcomed the move to raise the 
threshold but noted that for the change to make a ‘real practical difference’, the TPIM Act 
should be ‘amended to require the court also to consider whether the balance of probabilities 
standard was satisfied, in place of the current, lighter-touch judicial review standard’.582 
Following the enactment of the CTS Act 2015, the number of TPIMs in force initially 
fluctuated between one and three.583 When only one TPIM was in force as of 31 May 
2016,584 the Government faced much criticism for the lack of use of the mechanisms given 
the recent surge in terrorist attacks in France and Germany. For example, Lord Carlile, the 
former IRTL, stated that it was ‘surprising and worrying’ that just one TPIM was in force 
given the situation in Europe.585 However, the use of TPIMs increased somewhat over the 
Summer of 2016 and six were in force as of 31 August 2016, five of which were against 
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British citizens.586 The number of TPIMs in force then rose slightly to seven,587 which 
remained the case for several months before decreasing again to six as of 31 May 2017, 
which remained the case at the time of writing.588  
Finally, in the major counter-terrorism and security powers Review in July 2010, it was also 
concluded that ‘there may be exceptional circumstances’ where additional restrictive 
measures could be necessary, such as a very serious terrorist risk which could not be 
managed by other means.589 Moreover, the Review stated that draft legislation regarding 
these additional measures would be discussed with the Opposition and brought forward if 
and when necessary.590 Accordingly, the Enhanced Terrorism Prevention and Investigation 
Measures (ETPIM) Bill was published on 1 September 2011 and included a much wider 
range of measures in comparison to the ordinary TPIM framework.591 However, no further 
action has been taken and as such, the sum of jurisprudence, and most analysis has 
focussed upon the ordinary TPIM framework, although ETPIMs have received some 
attention.592 
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3.3.3 TEOs under the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015  
With the ongoing Syrian Civil War (2011-) and the surge of the Islamic State in the Levant 
(ISIL) throughout the region, concerns began to mount in 2013 that individuals were leaving 
their countries of origin to engage in hostilities in Iraq and Syria.593 The UN Security Council 
was so alarmed by the prospect of citizens travelling to these countries that in 2014 it called 
upon States to ‘prevent and suppress the recruiting, organizing, transporting or equipping of 
individuals’ who travel abroad to take part in terrorist acts or acquire terrorist training 
amongst other things.594 In the UK, there was increasing concern that many of these 
individuals were attempting to return to the country having been radicalised and trained to 
commit terrorist atrocities.595 As such, the Coalition Government determined that new 
measures were needed for managing the return of these so-called ‘Foreign Terrorist 
Fighters’.596 
Towards the end of the Coalition Government (2010-2015), the CTS Act 2015 was enacted 
after being semi fast-tracked through Parliament.597 Chapter 2 of Part 1 concerns 
‘Temporary Exclusion’ from the UK and states: 
A ‘temporary exclusion order’ is an order which requires an individual not 
to return to the United Kingdom unless – 
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(a) The return is in accordance with a permit to return issued by the 
Secretary of State before the individual began the return, or 
(b) The return is the result of the individual’s deportation to the United 
Kingdom.598 
The process by which the SSHD can impose a TEO is extremely similar to that of a TPIM. 
The Home Secretary must reasonably suspect the individual is, or has been, involved in 
terrorism-related activity outside of the UK;599 reasonably consider that it is necessary to 
protect the public in the UK to impose a TEO;600 reasonably consider the individual is outside 
of the UK;601 be satisfied that the individual has the right of abode in the UK;602 and have the 
permission of the High Court or reasonably consider the urgency of the case requires a TEO 
to be imposed without court authorisation.603 Only if and when an individual is served with a 
TEO must the Secretary inform that individual,604 at which point the TEO comes into force.605 
Similar to the TPIM mechanism, a TEO has a maximum duration of two years unless 
revoked by the SSHD.606 However, further TEOs can be imposed upon the same individual 
without any new evidence being produced.607 In order to give effect to the temporary ban on 
an individual’s return to the UK, when the TEO comes into force, the individual’s passport is 
invalidated.608 
The TEO regime is, however, not merely concerned with the exclusion of individuals from 
the UK. Rather, sections 5 to 9 of the CTS Act 2015 deal with the management of their 
                                                          
598
 CTS Act 2015, s. 2(1). For commentary on TEOs see H. Fenwick, ‘Terrorism Threats and 
Temporary Exclusion Orders: Counter-Terror Rhetoric or Reality?’ (2017) 3 EHRLR 247; H. Fenwick, 
‘Probing Theresa May’s Response to the Recent Terror Attacks’ (2017) 4 EHRLR 341; H. Fenwick, 
‘Responding to the ISIS Threat: Extending Coercive Non-Trial-Based Measures in the Counter-
Terrorism and Security Act 2015’ (2016) International Review of Law, Computers and Technology 1. 
599
 CTS Act 2015, s. 2(3). See further at Chapter 4, section 4.3.1. 
600
 s. 2(4). 
601
 s. 2(5). 
602
 s. 2(6). See Immigration Act 1971, s. 2. 
603
 s. 2(7). See also Schedule 2 to the CTS Act 2015. 
604
 s. 4(1). 
605
 s. 4(3)(a). 
606
 s. 4(3)(b). 
607
 s. 4(8). 
608
 s. 4(9). 
128 
 
return to the UK. In accordance with a ‘Permit to return’, certain obligations may be imposed 
as a precondition before allowing an individual to return. According to the Act: 
(1) A ‘permit to return’ is a document giving an individual (who is subject to 
a temporary exclusion order) permission to return to the United 
Kingdom. 
(2) The permission may be made subject to a requirement that the 
individual comply with conditions specified in the permit to return. 
(3) The individual’s failure to comply with a specified condition has the 
effect of invalidating the permit to return.609 
Furthermore, the permit to return must specify the time, manner and place of return,610 which 
may include a specific route, mode of transport, carrier or service.611 The SSHD must issue a 
permit to return if either the individual applies (and attends an interview with a constable or 
immigration officer if requested) or if the individual is to be deported to the UK.612 
Once the individual has returned to the UK, the Home Secretary may impose a number of 
conditions upon the individual. These are limited to three types of obligations, two of which 
are adopted directly from the TPIM regime. Firstly, an individual may be obliged to report to 
a police station,613 and secondly, to attend appointments which, according to the Act’s 
explanatory notes, may include de-radicalisation programmes.614 The third type of obligation 
that may be imposed upon an individual is that they must notify the police of their place of 
residence and any changes to their place of residence.615 The SSHD can vary or revoke any 
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of the obligations.616 Insofar as the courts are concerned, their function is to ‘determine 
whether the relevant decisions of the Secretary of State are obviously flawed’.617  
When receiving the application from the SSHD, the court may consider it in the absence of 
the individual, without the individual having been informed of the application, and without the 
individual having been given an opportunity to address the court.618 Finally, when a TEO is 
reviewed in the courts, a Special Advocate will represent the individual’s interests, although 
like Control Orders and TPIMs, no communication is allowed between the TEO subject and 
the Special Advocate once the latter has been served with the closed evidence, unless the 
court grants permission.619 Finally, when issuing a judgment, a court can withhold any of its 
reasons if disclosure would conflict with the public interest.620 
Individuals subjected to TEOs may commit an offence and be subjected to criminal 
sanctions in two ways. First, an individual ‘is guilty of an offence if, without reasonable 
excuse, the individual returns to the United Kingdom in contravention of the restriction on 
return specified in the order’.621 Second, ‘an individual subject to an obligation imposed 
under section 9 is guilty of an offence if, without reasonable excuse, the individual does not 
comply with the obligation’.622 With this latter offence, it is easy to draw parallels with the 
former Control Order regime and the TPIM mechanism which similarly provides for criminal 
punishment for contravening an imposed condition. Imitating both the Control Order and 
TPIM statutory regimes, an individual who breaches any condition attached to a TEO can 
face a maximum of five years’ imprisonment or a fine, or both.623 
Although the CTS Act entered into force in 2015, a freedom of information request submitted 
to the Home Office in February 2016 for the purposes of this research revealed that no 
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TEOs had been issued by April 2016.624 Documents published in December 2016,625 and 
again in February 2017,626 confirmed that the situation had not changed as of November 
2016. However, speaking shortly after the Manchester Arena terrorist bombing in May 2017, 
the Home Secretary Amber Rudd revealed that the power had been used for the first and 
only time.627 
 
3.4 Counter-Terrorist Hybrid Orders and the Right to a Fair Trial 
3.4.1 The Question of the Nature of Proceedings Relating to Counter-Terrorist Hybrid 
Orders 
As already discussed, determining the nature of any proceedings is fundamental when 
ascertaining what fair trial guarantees are to apply in those particular proceedings.628 If 
proceedings involve the determination of a criminal charge, the more stringent fair trial 
guarantees under the criminal limb of the right to a fair trial will apply, whereas if proceedings 
involve the determination of an individual’s civil rights and obligations, the less stringent fair 
trial guarantees under the civil limb of the right to a fair trial will apply.629 In the discussion 
that follows, it is important to bear in mind the relevant ECtHR jurisprudence which, as 
analysed earlier, indicates that the European Court will consider the domestic classification 
of the offence, the nature of the offence, and the degree of severity of the penalty.630  
Foreshadowing the analysis that follows, the UK domestic courts have generally struggled 
with the issue of procedural fairness and the appropriate standard of proof in proceedings 
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concerning preventive civil measures. In the Belmarsh litigation, the SIAC rejected the 
argument that Article 6 applied at all to the certification process under the ATCS Act 2001, 
as the process was deemed not to be a criminal charge nor concerned with a civil right.631 
However, in the Court of Appeal, Lord Woolf CJ held that the appeal proceedings against the 
certification process were civil in nature.632 Ultimately, the House of Lords did not address 
the issue or even consider the applicability of Article 6, but rather, decided the case solely on 
the bases of Articles 5 and 14 of the ECHR.633 However, when tackling the same issue in a 
non-terrorist context, namely, in relation to ASBOs, the courts have been much more mindful 
of the serious criminal implications the individual might face should they breach the 
restrictions imposed under an ASBO. For example, in R (McCann) v. Manchester Crown 
Court, the House of Lords held that the criminal burden of proof should apply when 
implementing an ASBO due to the seriousness of the matters, despite simultaneously 
concluding that the proceedings were civil in nature.634  
Inevitably, the same fundamental issue attracted a great deal of attention during the earliest 
years of the Control Order regime. The PTA 2005 faced no shortage of criticism throughout 
the course of its existence over the severity of possible measures and the circumstances in 
which they could be imposed. Insofar as the judicial oversight of Control Orders was 
concerned, the JCHR expressed doubts as to whether the mechanism was compatible with 
Article 6(1) ECHR.635 More specifically, the JCHR suggested that, for derogating Control 
Orders, the criminal limb of Article 6(1) should apply.636 However, the JCHR acknowledged 
that ‘a more difficult question arises about the standards of due process applicable in relation 
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to non-derogating control orders’.637 In a passage directly addressing the first Engel criteria, 
namely, the domestic classification, the JCHR noted: 
Formally speaking, control order proceedings are not classified in domestic 
law as ‘criminal proceedings’. On the contrary, they are deliberately 
designed to appear to be civil orders which are intended to be alternatives 
to criminal prosecution in cases where prosecution is said not to be 
possible because the information which is the basis of the case against the 
individual cannot be used as ‘evidence’ in a criminal trial.638 
The JCHR also considered the second and third Engel criteria, namely, the nature of the 
offence and the nature and severity of the penalty, and suggested that the majority of the 
earliest non-derogating Control Orders did actually amount to the determination of a criminal 
charge against the individual for three reasons.639 Firstly, the alleged conduct forming the 
basis for a non-derogating Control Order i.e. involvement in terrorism-related activity, was 
not only conduct of a criminal nature but of a particularly serious criminal nature. Secondly, 
in the view of the JCHR, the restrictions and obligations placed upon an individual were of a 
nature and severity equivalent to a criminal penalty. Finally, the possible duration of the 
conditions under a Control Order made them tantamount to a criminal sanction, as they were 
potentially indefinite. On these points, the JCHR appeared to be repeating many of the 
concerns that the Commissioner for Human Rights of the CoE had expressed in 2004.640 
The Commissioner questioned whether the severity of Control Orders would be equivalent to 
a criminal penalty, due to the fact that Control Orders would be made in respect of activity 
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which was essentially of a criminal nature, and also in respect of the severity of the 
restrictions imposed.641 
A further area of concern over the Control Order mechanism related to the standard of proof 
that had to be met for the attached measures to be imposed. As the JCHR acknowledged, 
the ‘reasonable suspicion’ standard reflected the ease with which the SSHD could impose a 
Control Order, which also affected the adequacy and effectiveness of subsequent judicial 
oversight to safeguard against arbitrary or unjustified interference with human rights.642 It is 
an obvious but necessary point that ‘reasonable suspicion’ falls someway short of the 
criminal burden of proof (‘beyond all reasonable doubt’), the civil burden of proof (‘balance of 
probabilities’), or even that of ‘reasonable belief’. In the JCHR’s view, reasonable suspicion 
was ‘too low a threshold to justify the potentially drastic interference with Convention rights 
which such orders contemplate’.643  
Particularly in the earliest days of the PTA 2005 before the regime came to be challenged in 
the House of Lords, criticism came from a variety of sources. For example, Lord Carlile 
produced the first report which reviewed the PTA 2005 in February 2006.644 In reference to 
an Annex which outlined the proforma of the schedule of obligations imposed upon most of 
the Control Order subjects at that time, the former IRTL admitted that the obligations were 
extremely restrictive, and that although they had not been found to trigger a derogation, the 
‘cusp was narrow’.645 Additionally, the Independent Reviewer concluded that the obligations 
fell ‘not very short of house arrest, and certainly inhibit normal life considerably’.646 In light of 
the Reviewer’s comments and the proforma, the JCHR went even further and concluded that 
in their view, the obligations were so restrictive so as to amount to a deprivation of liberty.647 
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The JCHR concluded that the PTA 2005 made it likely that the power to impose non-
derogating Control Orders would be exercised in a way which was incompatible with Article 
5(1) in the absence of a derogation under Article 15 of the ECHR.648 
Such was the extent of the restrictions permitted under Control Orders, the most fervent 
critics amongst civil society argued that the mechanisms amounted to criminal punishment 
without trial.649 Some academics suggested that they ‘amounted effectively to a form of 
severe punishment without conviction’.650 Helen Fenwick and Gavin Phillipson have argued 
that fines, probation, community service and suspended prison sentences were less severe 
than being under a Control Order for two or three years.651 In this regard, Lucia Zedner aptly 
described such preventative practice as amounting to pre-punishment.652 In these 
circumstances, extremely onerous obligations could be placed upon individuals without any 
criminal conviction and therefore without the benefit of the full spectrum of criminal trial 
guarantees. Undoubtedly, the most controversial measures possible under the PTA 2005 
concerned the lengthy curfews and forced relocation. As to the former restriction, some 
suggested that the longest curfews which were imposed on many subjects amounted ‘to 
virtual house arrest…[with] the homes of controlled persons being turned into “domestic 
prisons”.’653 As to the latter, the IRTL revealed that of the 52 Control Order subjects, 23 were 
forcibly relocated for national security or practical reasons.654 
When the mechanisms were inevitably challenged in court, the House of Lords strongly 
shaped the direction the Control Order regime would take, which would in turn have a knock 
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on effect and shape the parameters of subsequent counter-terrorist hybrid orders. In three of 
the most significant Control Order cases that reached the court; JJ, MB and AF, and AF (No. 
3), the House of Lords delivered important judgments that placed significant pressure upon 
the British Government to modify the Control Order regime in a number of ways.655 The first 
substantial legal challenge to the Control Order regime reached the House of Lords in July 
2007 with four appeals which were heard together. The individuals were each subjected to 
non-derogating Control Orders and the complaints concerned the compatibility of Control 
Orders with Articles 5 and 6 of the ECHR. However, due to the distinguishing facts of the 
four appeals, separate judgments were passed down.  
In JJ, the most important distinguishing feature was that the six individuals were subjected to 
18 hour curfews.656 In a complex and split 3:2 decision, the House of Lords dismissed the 
SSHD’s appeal against the Court of Appeal and held that the individuals’ right to liberty had 
been violated.657 Delivering the first judgment, Lord Bingham cited the Engel and Guzzardi 
cases before the ECtHR in which the Court held that when assessing whether a deprivation 
of liberty had occurred, account should be taken of a whole range of factors such as the 
nature, duration, effects and manner of execution or implementation of the penalty or 
measure in question.658 Lord Bingham concluded that through a combination of the 18 hour 
curfew and the exclusion of social visitors, the controlees were in practice in solitary 
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confinement.659 However, only Lord Brown was tempted to speculate over the exact length 
of a curfew before it could be considered to violate Article 5, holding that the acceptable and 
absolute limit for a house curfew was 16 hours.660 Due to the lengthy discussion in the 
related MB and AF judgment regarding the implications of Control Orders for Article 6, the 
Lords did not touch upon the right to a fair trial in JJ. Nevertheless, the case is important for 
illustrating the most extreme restrictions that could be imposed upon individuals who do 
benefit from the protections usually afforded under the criminal law. 
In that regard, the second judgment arising from the four appeals, MB and AF, focussed 
upon the compatibility of Control Order proceedings with the right to a fair trial under Article 6 
of the ECHR, as the court referred to the JJ judgment on the question of Article 5.661 Lord 
Bingham delivered the lead opinion and helpfully summarised the conditions that one of the 
individuals was subject to. The passage is useful to cite in length, not only as the individual’s 
particular case is arguably the most important of the Control Order regime, but also as it 
amounts to a typical depiction of the restrictions that Control Orders could impose: 
AF was required to remain in the flat where he was already living (not 
including any communal area) at all times save for a period of 10 hours 
between 8 am and 6 pm. He was thus subject to a 14 hour curfew. He was 
required to wear an electronic tag at all times. He was restricted during 
non-curfew hours to an area of about 9 square miles bounded by a number 
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of identified main roads and bisected by one. He was to report to a 
monitoring company on first leaving his flat after a curfew period had 
ended and on his last return before the next curfew period began. His flat 
was liable to be searched by the police at any time. During curfew hours he 
was not allowed to permit any person to enter his flat except his father, 
official or professional visitors, children aged 10 or under or persons 
agreed by the Home Office in advance on supplying the visitor’s name, 
address, date of birth and photographic identification. He was not to 
communicate directly or indirectly at any time with a certain specified 
individual (and, later, several specified individuals). He was only permitted 
to attend one specified mosque. He was not permitted to have any 
communications equipment of any kind. He was to surrender his passport. 
He was prohibited from visiting airports, sea ports or certain railway 
stations, and was subject to additional obligations pertaining to his financial 
arrangements.662 
Much of the judgment addressed the argument that Control Order proceedings under section 
3 of the PTA 2005 should be considered the determination of a criminal charge and, 
therefore, invoke the criminal limb of the right to a fair trial. On this issue, Sullivan J in the 
High Court in MB’s case considered that he was bound by the Court of Appeal decision in A 
v. SSHD, which held that the civil limb applied in the proceedings under Part 4 of the ATCS 
Act 2001.663 Similarly, the Court of Appeal did not consider the issue in depth but, 
nevertheless, expressed their opinion that Control Order proceedings under the PTA 2005 
did not involve the determination of a criminal charge.664 
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In the House of Lords however, which is of course not bound by any other domestic court, 
the issue was given much attention. Lord Bingham referred to the JCHR who viewed that 
derogating Control Orders would engage the criminal limb of Article 6.665 However, Lord 
Bingham and the remaining judges were unanimous that ‘non-derogating control order 
proceedings do not involve the determination of a criminal charge’ for the purpose of Article 
6 of the ECHR.666 
A particular focus was shown to the third Engel criteria which assessed the severity and 
nature of the penalty imposed. Although Lord Bingham accepted that the consequences of 
Control Orders could be ‘devastating for individuals and their families’,667 a distinction had to 
be made between preventative measures and those which were punitive or retributive.668 
Lord Hoffmann similarly rejected the claim that a Control Order hearing amounted to the 
determination of a criminal charge, holding that ‘as a matter of English law, this is beyond 
doubt’.669 This was because the individuals were not charged with a breach of law, the order 
was made on the basis of suspicion about a possible future act rather than the determination 
of a past action, and finally that the restrictions imposed were to prevent rather than punish 
or deter.670 Ultimately, amongst the abundance of case law that preceded and followed MB 
and AF which has considered the implementation and administration of Control Orders or 
similar counter-terrorist hybrid mechanisms, neither any UK domestic court nor the ECtHR 
has accepted that they should be classified and treated as criminal mechanisms.    
However, the fact that non-derogating Control Orders proceedings were deemed not to 
amount to the determination of a criminal charge did not then remove the case from the 
applicability of Article 6 in its entirety. As Lord Carswell acknowledged, ‘it is not in dispute 
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that the civil limb of article 6(1) applies to the examination of control orders by the courts and 
the person subject to such an order...is entitled to a fair hearing’.671  
Several years later, as the Control Order regime was set to be replaced by the new TPIM 
mechanism, the IRTL concluded that there was: 
[S]omething unsettling about any system which allows the executive to 
impose intrusive measures on the individual, challengeable only by way of 
a closed material procedure and after significant delay. Accordingly, while 
some compromise of fairness may be justifiable in the interests of national 
security, it is essential that the use of this and similar powers should be 
kept to an absolute minimum.672 
The proposals for more permanent legislation meant that there was a possibility that some of 
the misgivings with the Control Order regime could be addressed. In that regard, with what 
became the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill,673 the Home Office 
presented a memorandum addressing some concerns the Bill would raise insofar as the 
UK’s obligations under the ECHR were concerned.674 The Home Office considered inter alia 
the compatibility of the measures with Article 6 ECHR. The memorandum drew heavily upon 
Control Order jurisprudence and claimed that TPIM proceedings would engage the civil limb 
of Article 6 of the ECHR.675 As already mentioned, the courts were unanimous that Control 
Order proceedings did not amount to the determination of a criminal charge, but rather that 
they concerned the determination of civil rights and obligations. 
Due to its similarity with its predecessor regime, the TPIM regime has faced numerous 
criticisms over its lifespan thus far, particularly from human rights organisations and other 
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pressure groups.676 Despite the slightly less onerous measures permitted under a TPIM, the 
almost identical restrictions possible under the regime led Liberty to label the mechanism as 
a ‘Control Order-lite’.677 Going further, Liberty argued that the permanent legislation would 
replicate ‘the worst excesses of punishment without trial under the control order regime’.678 
On the other hand, the IRTL argued that ‘despite their structural similarities the TPIM is not a 
rebadged control order, but a new model’.679 Inevitably, much of the critique directed towards 
the Control Order regime equally applies to the TPIM mechanism.  
In this regard, one of the most recurring criticisms of TPIMs concerns its purported aim to be 
investigative in nature. During the drafting of the Bill, the JCHR warned that TPIMs would not 
go far enough to bring the restrictive regime back into the domain of criminal due process.680 
Furthermore, the JCHR suggested: 
[A]s the Bill currently stands it is clear that the overriding purpose of its 
provisions is prevention, not investigation and prosecution. Investigation of 
terrorism is very much a secondary purpose in the Bill as drafted.681 
Following the enactment of the TPIM Act, the JCHR again considered that the TPIM regime 
was problematic insofar as it was purportedly investigative in nature. The JCHR concluded: 
Our inquiry has failed to find any evidence that TPIMs have led in practice 
to any more criminal prosecutions of terrorism suspects. This confirms the 
concerns we expressed in our scrutiny Reports on the Bill that the 
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replacement for control orders were not ‘investigative’ in any meaningful 
sense. In our view it is time to recognise that the epithet ‘TPIMs’ is a 
misnomer, because they are not investigative in nature. TPIMs should be 
referred to as Terrorism Prevention Orders, or something similar, to reflect 
the reality that their sole purpose is preventive, not investigative.682 
Some academics have also drawn attention to this apparent contradiction. For example, 
Clive Walker and Alexander Horne have suggested that ‘the main weakness in the TPIM Act 
arguably resides not so much in the reformulation of its prevention objective but in the feeble 
augmentation of its investigation objective’.683 Going further, Helen Fenwick has argued that 
the idea that TPIMs are designed to enable investigation and prosecution of the individual 
‘should be openly abandoned’.684 
Of equal if not greater concern are the circumstances in which a TPIM is imposed and the 
judicial oversight of the administration of the measures. At one extreme, Liberty have 
condemned TPIMs as replicating the predecessor Control Order regime, amounting to 
‘severe criminal-style punishment imposed by civil order completely divorced from the 
criminal justice system, in circumstances where the individual is not told details of the case 
against them’.685 
For a number of reasons, there has been little judicial input regarding TPIMs of any 
significance for the purposes of this study. Firstly, as already mentioned, far fewer TPIMs 
have been issued than Control Orders were during the lifespan of the PTA 2005. Secondly, 
nine of those individuals served with TPIMs had already been subjected to Control Orders 
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before the regime was replaced.686 Finally, despite the differences between the two regimes, 
the fact that TPIMs are very similar in nature to its predecessor Control Order regime 
effectively meant that the courts would be hearing almost identical legal challenges.  
Nevertheless, the first review hearing under section 9 of the TPIM Act came in March 2012 
in BM.687 BM was served with a TPIM in January 2012 after previously being under a Control 
Order. In the review hearing, Collins J discussed the difference in standards between 
Control Orders and TPIMs that the SSHD had to satisfy, acknowledging that reasonable 
belief was a higher standard than reasonable suspicion.688 However, Collins J held that the 
difference in standards would not ‘affect the basis for disclosure to provide fairness and 
compliance with Article 6’.689 
As mentioned on a number of occasions, determining the nature of proceedings concerning 
counter-terrorist hybrid orders is fundamental to the task of ascertaining which fair trial 
guarantees are to apply in those proceedings. As this section has illustrated, the British 
Government has, to which Parliament and the judiciary have mostly acquiesced, maintained 
that the civil limb of the right to a fair trial, rather than the criminal limb, should apply in 
proceedings concerning the implementation of counter-terrorist hybrid orders.  
Beginning with the landmark ruling in MB and AF in 2007 on this particular issue, the courts 
have maintained throughout the life of the Control Order regime, and subsequently with the 
TPIM mechanism, that proceedings concerning the implementation of the mechanisms do 
not amount to the determination of a criminal charge. In this regard, it is clear that the fair 
trial guarantees espoused under Article 6(2) and Article 6(3) of the ECHR are generally not 
applicable when the mechanisms are challenged in the courts. However, as Chapter 2 set 
out, the exact meaning of a ‘fair hearing’ as guaranteed under Article 6(1) incorporates a 
number of principles not expressly laid out in the clause, including the equality of arms and 
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the right to adversarial proceedings. As the following sections will illustrate, in addition to 
basic common law principles such as open and natural justice, many fair trial guarantees are 
undoubtedly challenged when counter-terrorist hybrid orders are implemented and 
administered by the courts. 
Unfortunately, the ECtHR has yet to consider a case concerning the three mechanisms 
explored in this thesis. The Court has, however, considered CMP and the Special Advocate 
regime on a number of occasions,690 albeit not under Article 6 of the ECHR, with one further 
case, Gulamhussein and Tariq v. UK, currently pending before the Court which will examine 
the compatibility of CMP with Article 6 for the first time.691 Of the cases that have been 
decided already, the Court’s discussion in A v. UK touched upon the issue of disclosure and 
the degree to which Special Advocates can contribute to securing procedural justice insofar 
as Article 5 is concerned.692 Nevertheless, taking into account other important ECtHR 
jurisprudence, it could be argued that when counter-terrorist hybrid orders are implemented 
and challenged in the courts, the proceedings should import the protections guaranteed 
under the criminal limb of the right to a fair trial pursuant to the Engel three stage test.693  
Firstly, the ECtHR has attached significant weight to whether a measure potentially affects 
the public or whether a measure applies to a particular group or profession which would 
indicate it amounts to a disciplinary matter.694 It is perhaps ironic that counter-terrorist hybrid 
orders are potentially applicable to all of the public rather than any narrow group, wholly due 
to the decision of the House of Lords in the Belmarsh case which found that the indefinite 
detention of non-British citizens under Part 4 of the ATCS Act 2001 was inter alia 
discriminatory against foreign nationals.695 Secondly, as numerous commentators have 
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acknowledged, the suspected conduct which represents the basis for imposing counter-
terrorist hybrid orders is inherently terrorist-related and therefore generally of a criminal if not 
otherwise extremely serious nature. Thirdly, the ECtHR has attached weight to whether 
proceedings are brought by a public authority acting under statutory provisions.696 Clearly, 
the Home Secretary could impose a Control Order in the past, and now a TPIM or TEO, 
against an individual pursuant to her relevant statutory powers. Finally, and perhaps most 
importantly, the ECtHR has maintained that when determining if proceedings merit the 
invocation of criminal law fair trial guarantees, the nature and severity of a penalty is 
determined by reference to the maximum penalty which the law provides.697  
At the extreme, the curfews imposed under some of the earliest Control Orders were found 
to have deprived the subjects of their right to liberty under Article 5 of the ECHR, indicating 
immediately that the restrictions could, at least in practical terms, be similar to the 
deprivation of liberty which individuals may encounter when imprisoned.698 In that regard, the 
18 hour curfews that were imposed upon early Control Order subjects represented the most 
extreme condition imposed upon any individual yet subjected to a counter-terrorist hybrid 
order. The JCHR have similarly suggested that the restrictions possible under the early 
Control Orders amounted to a determination of a criminal charge.699 
Although the maximum lengths of curfews under Control Orders were scaled down, and 
further still with TPIMs, the fact remained that any breach of the conditions of a Control 
Order could be met with five years’ imprisonment, a fine, or both.700 Under the replacement 
TPIM mechanism, an identical punishment is possible for any breach of the attached 
conditions, although in the case of a travel measure violation, the maximum custodial 
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sentence is now 10 years.701 Finally, with the recent introduction of the TEO mechanism, any 
breach of a condition attached to the ‘permit to return’ can similarly be met with five years’ 
imprisonment, a fine, or both.702  
Whilst the degree of severity of the penalties for breaching the conditions attached to 
counter-terrorist hybrid orders is undoubtedly quite severe, if the maximum prison sentence 
is indeed imposed, their actual use following conviction has been extremely limited due to 
the low prosecution and conviction rates. As the IRTL has revealed, over the lifetime of the 
Control Order mechanism 14 individuals were prosecuted for breaching the conditions 
attached to their Control Orders, but only two individuals were actually convicted, one 
receiving a prison sentence of 20 weeks and the other 15 months.703 In respect of TPIMs, 
there have been at least three convictions so far for the breach of conditions attached to a 
TPIM notice, each resulting in a substantial prison sentence.704 
In reality, it has proven extremely difficult to prosecute individuals for breaching the 
conditions attached to their mechanisms, owing to inter alia, the time and resources needed 
to compile evidence, the tendency of juries to acquit what they perceive as minor breaches 
of apparently mundane conditions, and the difficulties of disclosing intelligence-gathering 
techniques in court.705 As such, the vast majority of breaches of Control Orders and TPIMs 
have not been prosecuted.706  
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3.4.2 Closed Material Procedures: The Administration of ‘Kafkaesque’ Trials 
As already mentioned, when counter-terrorist hybrid orders are implemented or reviewed in 
the courts, the proceedings can be heard under CMP.707 The justifications advanced by 
proponents for the use of CMP are multifaceted. One of the most overarching arguments is 
emphasised strongly in the Justice and Security Green Paper,708 and relates to the apparent 
frustrations felt by the Government regarding rules of disclosure and the perceived 
inadequacies of the law of Public Interest Immunity (PII).709 According to the Home Secretary 
at the time, this ‘rendered the UK justice system unable to pass judgment’ on vital matters, 
leading to the collapse of cases or out of court settlements.710 
The Green Paper went further and argued that certain sensitive evidence should not be 
disclosed in public due to the potentially grave implications for national security.711 More 
specifically, the Green Paper argued that disclosing evidence obtained from covert human 
intelligence sources, informers, or other sources providing intelligence could endanger lives, 
and that particular methods of surveillance should remain secret in order to ensure their 
effectiveness.712 It is also often claimed that disclosing intelligence can ‘break promises to 
foreign countries that shared intelligence would be kept secret’.713 
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As much of the evidence presented by the executive to support the implementation of a 
counter-terrorist hybrid order is presumably obtained in the ways just described, it is perhaps 
inevitable that such cases rest heavily upon sensitive material and are therefore necessarily 
conducted in closed sessions. On the flip side of the coin it is also argued, perhaps 
disingenuously, that the use of CMP can benefit the individuals who are subject to the 
proceedings and the public more broadly. This is because the full range of evidence held by 
the Government can be tested in court by an individual’s Special Advocate which therefore 
enhances the procedural fairness of proceedings,714 albeit on an ex parte and in camera 
basis. Moreover, it is suggested that the practice of CMP allows accusations against the 
State to be tested in court, although again this is on an ex parte and in camera basis.715 
For the purposes of this study, the use of CMP challenges several fair trial guarantees that 
are applicable in all proceedings regardless of their characterisation as civil or criminal in 
nature. These include the principles of natural and open justice, as well as more specific 
guarantees such as the right to be heard, to confront one’s accuser, to an adversarial trial, 
the equality of arms, and the right to a reasoned judgment. As such, the limited judicial 
oversight of hybrid orders under CMP presents new and unique challenges. When each 
aspect of CMP is considered in isolation, the implications for these fair trial guarantees are 
significant, but when analysed collectively, the consequences for the right to a fair trial are 
drastic. 
With regards to the use of CMP in Control Order proceedings, the JCHR expressed their 
difficulty in finding that the procedure was compatible with the right to a fair trial. In particular, 
the JCHR questioned the regime’s compatibility with: 
Article 6(1), the equality of arms inherent in that guarantee, the right of 
access to a court to contest the lawfulness of their detention in Article 5(4), 
the presumption of innocence in Article 6(2), the right to examine 
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witnesses in Article 6(3), or the most basic principles of a fair hearing and 
due process long recognised as fundamental by English law.716 
Such strong criticism implied that, in the JCHR’s view, the criminal limb of the right to a fair 
trial should have applied but, as discussed above, the courts have consistently rejected this 
position.717 Nevertheless, when trials are heard ex parte and in camera, the implications for 
the principle of open justice are obvious. Equally clear however is that Article 6(1) of the 
ECHR directly addresses the legitimate need for the press and public to be excluded from 
trial in the interests of national security.718 Nevertheless, excluding the individual from trial 
altogether is another matter. As Lord Dyson made clear in Al Rawi v. The Security Service, 
CMP ‘involves a departure from both the open justice and the natural justice principles’.719 
The challenges to the principle of natural justice are equally apparent. If one considers Lord 
Denning’s famous dicta in Kanda v. Government of the Federation of Malaya,720 the 
individuals subjected to counter-terrorist hybrid orders are clearly denied the right to know 
the full case against them, the right to hear the evidence used against them, and the chance 
to contest that evidence.  
Insofar as the right to an adversarial trial and the equality of arms is concerned, it cannot be 
doubted that an individual subjected to and challenging a counter-terrorist hybrid order is at 
an extremely disadvantaged position. They are not fully informed of the allegations against 
them, they are excluded from the trial, and their contact with their Special Advocate is almost 
entirely prohibited once the Advocate has been served with the closed material.721 Moreover, 
it is often argued that much of the evidence presented against individuals is not sufficiently 
robust due to it being of a second, or even third hand nature, otherwise known as hearsay 
                                                          
716
 JCHR, Counter-Terrorism Policy and Human Rights (n. 635) para 76. 
717
 See above, section 3.4.1. 
718
 Art. 6(1) ECHR. 
719
 Al Rawi and others v. The Security Service [2011] UKSC 34, para 14. 
720
 Kanda v. Government of the Federation of Malaya (n. 253). 
721
 For further analysis of the role of the Special Advocate, see section 3.5.2 below. 
149 
 
evidence, which would in other proceedings normally be excluded.722 The fact that such 
evidence is subjected to very limited cross-examination by a Special Advocate only moves to 
further undermine the fairness of CMP. Lord Hope in the Bank Mellat case acknowledged 
that CMP ‘will result in every case in an inequality of arms between the State, which will 
always be the party who invokes the procedure and will always have access to that material, 
and the other party against whom the State has taken action and to whom access to that 
material is always denied’.723 In that regard, Eric Metcalfe has forcefully argued why ‘secret 
evidence’ should not be used for six reasons: it is unreliable; it is unfair; it is undemocratic; it 
is damaging to the integrity of the courts and the rule of law; it weakens security; and it is 
unnecessary.724 
In addition to the Control Order and TPIM regimes which expressly provided for the use of 
CMP, the use of CMP in other proceedings involving national security concerns steadily 
increased after 9/11.725 However, this was often done on a common law basis, with the 
courts granting the request of the State to hear trials in closed session. In Al Rawi in 2011, 
the Supreme Court had to consider whether a court has the power under the common law to 
order a civil claim for damages to be heard in whole or in part under CMP.726 Triggering the 
claim for damages was the alleged complicity of the Security Service in the respondent’s 
detention, rendition and mistreatment in Guantánamo Bay.727  
The Supreme Court decided that there was no such common law power to hold proceedings 
under CMP, and in the process provided a wealth of useful critique of CMP in 
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proceedings.728 Lord Dyson stressed that ‘the right to be confronted by one’s accusers is 
such a fundamental element of the common law right to a fair trial that the court cannot 
abrogate it in the exercise of its inherent power. Only Parliament can do that’.729 Going 
further, Lord Dyson suggested that the Government would have to implement legislation for 
CMP to be applicable in civil proceedings in circumstances not already prescribed.730 Lord 
Kerr was equally critical, holding that ‘the right to be informed of the case made against you 
is not merely a feature of the adversarial system of trial, it is an elementary and essential 
prerequisite of fairness’.731  
Finally, the use and further expansion of CMP in the English legal system has not escaped 
criticism on the international scale. In 2015, the HRC expressed its concern at the extension 
of CMP into civil procedures following the enactment of the JSA 2013.732 The Committee 
noted the serious concerns in relation to the safeguards in place, and the Special Advocate 
system in particular. Ultimately, the Committee noted that States should ensure that the 
restrictions or limitations on fair trial guarantees based on national security grounds, 
including the use of CMP, are fully compliant with obligations under the ICCPR.733 
3.4.3 The Extra-Territorial Implications of TEOs 
In addition to the challenges already discussed in the context of Control Orders and TPIMs, 
TEOs by their very nature present further unique challenges for human rights.734 For 
example, due to the nature and purpose of TEOs, the exclusion of British citizens from 
British territory, even if temporary, may encourage other States to replicate such behaviour, 
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or leave the UK in a position of violating its obligations to other States.735 Others have 
warned that TEOs may dissuade individuals from returning to the UK altogether and 
encourage ‘the adoption of terrorism as a way of life’, which might be counter-productive if 
individuals are further alienated and acquire greater expertise in the tactics of warfare and 
terror.736  
Insofar as the right to a fair trial is concerned, given that an individual would, by definition, be 
in a foreign country when served with a TEO, ascertaining whether the UK’s human rights 
obligations apply extra-territorially in this context is problematic. In a memorandum prepared 
by the Home Office on the Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill, the Home Office asserted 
that, as TEOs would only be imposed on subjects outside the UK, the ECHR would not be 
directly engaged.737 Nevertheless, as Guy Goodwin-Gill has argued, it is ‘somewhat 
surprising’ that the Home Office has suggested that a decision to exclude British citizens 
from the UK would not directly engage their rights under the ECHR.738 As is widely known, 
jurisdiction for the purposes of Article 1 of the ECHR is primarily territorial,739 but can extend 
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to instances in which a State exercises effective control or State agents exercise authority 
and control abroad.740 
Furthermore, individuals subjected to TEOs may be denied recourse to judicial process for a 
number of reasons.741 Firstly, given the fact that individuals may be in remote and conflict-
torn areas, it may prove difficult for the Home Secretary to inform them of their status in 
accordance with her obligation under the CTS Act 2015.742 Secondly, once an individual has 
been informed that they are subjected to a TEO, they would by definition have to pursue any 
legal challenges from abroad, which would be limited to ex post facto judicial review. As a 
result, the ability of an individual subjected to a TEO to access a court in a practical and 
effective manner, which Article 6(1) of the ECHR generally guarantees for all individuals,743 
will be extremely difficult, if indeed possible at all. 
As already mentioned, only one TEO has been implemented at the time of writing and there 
is no jurisprudence regarding TEOs to analyse. However, recent developments relating to 
‘non-suspensive appeals’, and in particular, the rights of appeal against deportation orders, 
may shed some light as to how the right to a fair trial for an individual subject to a TEO may 
operate in practice. More specifically, it may be useful to consider the so-called ‘deport first, 
appeal later’ implications of section 94B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 
2002, as introduced by the Immigration Act 2014.744 The power allows the Home Office to 
certify human rights claims made by individuals facing deportation to prevent them appealing 
their deportation from within the UK. In other words, individuals are forced to bring an appeal 
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from the country they are deported to, save for individuals who can prove beforehand that 
they will suffer ‘serious irreversible harm’ if they are deported.745  
In the leading case concerning this certification power, R (Kiarie and Byndloss) v. SSHD, the 
Supreme Court held that the requirement for two individuals to appeal from abroad against 
the decision of the Home Office had denied them an effective appeal.746 Before reaching the 
Supreme Court however, the Court of Appeal had criticised the ‘serious irreversible harm’ 
test, but it did not find that the ‘deport first, appeal later’ provision violated the obligation to 
provide procedural fairness.747 Crucially, the Court cited R (Gudanaviciene) v Director of 
Legal Aid Casework, which concerned the circumstances in which the procedural 
guarantees inherent in Article 8 of the ECHR required the granting of legal aid in an 
immigration case involving a claim based on private and/or family life.748 In Gudanaviciene, 
the Court considered that the procedural guarantees inherent to Article 8 of the ECHR were 
in practice the same as Article 6.749 
In Kiarie and Byndloss, the appellants argued in the Court of Appeal that the ‘deport first, 
appeal later’ power deprived them of procedural fairness inherent to Article 8 for a number of 
reasons, each of which may be relevant to individuals subject to a TEO wishing to challenge 
the SSHD. The appellants argued that ‘out of country appeals are said to be generally less 
effective than in country appeals’;750 that they ‘would be faced with significant practical 
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difficulties in procuring, preparing and presenting evidence’ for appeal;751 that ‘removal 
pending appeal would have a clear impact on the overall fairness of the proceedings, 
including the appearance of fairness’;752 and finally that ‘requiring the appellant to pursue an 
appeal out of country would be likely to diminish his chances of success and, by parity of 
reasoning, to enhance the Secretary of State's prospects of successfully resisting the 
appeal’.753 
Although the Court of Appeal acknowledged that an out of country appeal would be less 
advantageous to the appellant than an in country appeal,754 the Court ultimately refused to 
accept that the appellants would be deprived of effective participation in the decision-making 
process and of a fair procedure. Richards LJ held that ‘Article 8 does not require the 
appellant to have access to the best possible appellate procedure or even to the most 
advantageous procedure available. It requires access to a procedure that meets the 
essential requirements of effectiveness and fairness’.755 Rather, Richards LJ stated that the 
SSHD was entitled to rely upon the existing specialist immigration tribunal system to ensure 
that an appellant is given effective access to a fair appeal process.756 On the specific 
difficulties which an appellant might face when appealing from abroad, Richards LJ held that 
the availability of modern electronic communications would not present serious obstacles to 
the preparation or submission of witness statements or obtaining relevant documents for 
appeal.757  
In the Supreme Court, however, the requirement for the two individuals to appeal against 
their deportation from abroad was found to have violated the right to procedural fairness 
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under Article 8 of the ECHR. Delivering the lead judgment, Lord Wilson held that the men 
and their lawyers would face practical difficulties communicating before and during their 
appeal,758 and that for an effective appeal the appellants would need to be able to present 
live evidence as to their family ties and their reformed characters.759 In that respect, Lord 
Wilson stressed that the financial and logistical barriers to giving evidence on screen are 
‘almost insurmountable’,760 which was particularly highlighted by the acknowledgement of 
academic research that 66% of First-tier Tribunal judges considered IT equipment in court to 
be poor.761  
The implications of Kiarie and Byndloss can however be contrasted with another recent case 
which concerned the deprivation of citizenship and the barring of an individual from returning 
to the UK for national security reasons. In K2 v. UK, some similar challenges were made in 
respect of the procedural fairness under Article 8 of requiring an individual to mount a 
challenge from abroad.762 In this case however, the ECtHR rejected the argument that the 
individual’s right to procedural fairness had been violated, as Article 8 could not be 
‘interpreted so as to impose a positive obligation on Contracting States to facilitate the return 
of every person deprived of citizenship while outside the jurisdiction in order to pursue an 
appeal against that decision’.763 Furthermore, of particular relevance to the nature of TEOs 
and the need for out-of-country appeals, the Court stated that it could not ignore the fact that 
K2 had chosen to leave the UK voluntarily which was the reason why the appeal had to be 
conducted from abroad.764 
Clearly, the TEO regime replicates many of the features of Control Orders and TPIMs, which 
will inevitably lead to similar issues being raised about the substantive and procedural 
                                                          
758
 R (Kiarie and Byndloss) v. SSHD [2017] UKSC 42, para 60. 
759
 ibid, paras 55 & 61. 
760
 ibid, para 76. 
761
 ibid, para 68. 
762
 K2 v. UK (n. 690). 
763
 ibid, para 57. 
764
 Ibid, para 60. 
156 
 
fairness of the new mechanism. However, as discussed in this section, TEOs will present 
unique challenges to the right to a fair trial, the effects of which are not yet clearly known. 
 
3.5 Mitigating the Unfairness 
3.5.1 Minimum Disclosure 
Attempts to mitigate the inherent unfairness of the mechanisms have come in two main 
ways. First, the courts have had a significant impact over the amount of disclosure that must 
be made to the individuals during the proceedings. Second, the relevant statutory regimes 
provide for the appointment of Special Advocates who represent the interests of the 
individuals.  
The courts were initially inconsistent and unclear regarding the level of disclosure of the 
allegations that had to be made in order for the individual to be in a position to give effective 
instructions for their defence. In MB and AF, the first case before the House of Lords to 
consider the compatibility of Control Orders with the right to a fair trial, a majority of the 
Lords held that the right to a fair trial had been violated as insufficient disclosure had been 
made to the individuals to allow any effective challenge.765 However, rather than issue a 
declaration of incompatibility under section 4 of the HRA 1998, the judges decided that the 
PTA 2005 could be ‘read down’ to make it rights-compliant under section 3 of the HRA. In 
particular, Lord Bingham cited Roberts v. Parole Board,766 in which it was found that the 
‘concept of fairness imports a core, irreducible minimum of procedural protection’.767 In light 
of this standard, Lord Bingham had difficulty accepting that MB and AF ‘enjoyed a 
substantial measure of procedural justice, or that the very essence of the right to a fair 
hearing has not been impaired’.768 In ‘reading down’ the PTA, the majority of the House of 
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Lords effectively recognised the seriousness of the potential consequences of Control 
Orders, and therefore increased the measure of procedural protection that had to be 
afforded to the controlee under Article 6 of the ECHR.769 
Having delivered somewhat inconsistent judgments in MB and AF, the House of Lords 
delivered the most decisive ruling on the level of disclosure required to satisfy the 
requirements of Article 6(1) in AF (No. 3),770 which came before the court just weeks after 
the significant ECtHR decision in A v. UK.771 In A v. UK, whilst affirming the earlier decision 
of the House of Lords in 2004,772 the ECtHR also ‘addressed the extent to which the 
admission of closed material was compatible with the fair trial requirements of article 5(4)’.773 
Ultimately, the ECtHR found that the individual had to be provided with sufficient information 
about the allegations against him to enable him to give effective instructions for his 
defence.774 As such, the House of Lords was immediately confronted with a compelling 
Strasbourg decision on a closely related matter, which the Law Lords could not ignore under 
the court’s statutory duty to take Strasbourg judgments ‘into account’.775 
In AF (No 3), the three appellants were ‘subject to non-derogating control orders involving 
significant restriction of liberty’, with the conjoined appeals focussing upon whether ‘the 
procedure that resulted in the making of the control order satisfied the appellant’s right to a 
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fair hearing’.776 Lord Phillips delivered the leading judgment in which a great deal of attention 
was shown to the appeal history and the ECtHR decision of A v. UK. The nine judges were 
unanimous that the appeals had to be allowed because the necessary disclosures to each 
appellant had not been made. The essence of the ECtHR decision, to which the nine judges 
adhered, was that ‘the controlee must be given sufficient information about the allegations 
against him to enable him to give effective instructions in relation to those allegations’.777 
Crucially, Lord Phillips also raised public policy concerns regarding the procedures used in 
issuing a Control Order. He spoke of a ‘rule that a trial procedure can never be considered 
fair if a party to it is kept in ignorance of the case against him’.778 Most significantly, Lord 
Phillips considered that ‘if the wider public are to have confidence in the justice system, they 
need to able to see that justice is done rather than being asked to take it on trust’.779 
Lord Scott summarised the result effectively: 
Does a judicial process the purpose of which is to impose, or to confirm the 
imposition of, onerous obligations on individuals on grounds and evidence 
of which they are not and cannot be informed constitute a fair hearing? The 
judgment of the Grand Chamber in A v United Kingdom has made clear 
that, for the purpose of Strasbourg jurisprudence and Article 6(1) of the 
Convention, it does not.780 
Despite the unanimous judgment, Lord Hoffmann in particular was reluctant to follow the 
Strasbourg line, doing so only ‘with very considerable regret’.781 Lord Hoffmann went as far 
                                                          
776
 SSHD v. AF (No. 3) (n. 655) para 1. For analysis see M. Chamberlain, ‘Update on Procedural 
Fairness in Closed Proceedings’ (2009) 28 Civil Justice Quarterly 448; M. Elliott, ‘Stop Press: 
Kafkaesque Procedures are Unfair’ (2009) 68 Cambridge Law Journal 495; B. Middleton, ‘Secret 
Control Order Hearings: A Qualified Victory for the Right to a Fair Trial’ (2009) 73 J. Crim. L. 389; A. 
Kavanagh, ‘Special Advocates, Control Orders and the Right to a Fair Trial’ (2010) 73 MLR 824; C. 
Dobson, ‘Procedural Fairness Before the House of Lords: A Fair Procedure or a Fair Result?’ (2009) 
14 Judicial Review 340. 
777
 SSHD v. AF (No. 3) (n. 655) para 59 in reference to A v. UK (n. 485) para 220. 
778
 SSHD v. AF (No. 3) (n. 655) para 63. 
779
 ibid. 
780
 ibid, para 96. 
781
 ibid, para 70. 
159 
 
as suggesting the Strasbourg judgment in A v. UK was wrong and could even destroy the 
Control Order regime and damage the UK’s defences against the threat of terrorism.782 
According to Lord Hoffmann, the ECtHR had ‘imposed a rigid rule that the requirements of a 
fair hearing are never satisfied if the decision is based solely or to a decisive degree on 
closed material’, which ran contrary to previous House of Lords jurisprudence.783 This was 
undesirable for Lord Hoffmann, who held that ‘the particular procedures which have to be 
followed to make a hearing fair cannot…be stated in rigid rules’.784  
Following the ECtHR’s judgment in A v. UK, and the subsequent reiteration by the House of 
Lords of the irreducible minimum of disclosure needed for a Control Order hearing to satisfy 
Article 6, the UK Government was once again placed in a difficult position. The various court 
judgments, some of which have been analysed in this section, had clearly ‘chipped away’ at 
the Control Order regime over time.785  
Having definitively settled the issue for the Control Order regime, it was clear that similar 
problems would arise with the replacement TPIM regime. In BM, the crucial question was 
whether there had been sufficient disclosure to enable the individual to give meaningful 
instructions to his Special Advocates that they could act upon.786 Accordingly, when deciding 
if the requirements under Article 6 of the ECHR had been met, Collins J identified the AF 
(No. 3) test which was adopted in light of the Strasbourg decision in A v. UK.787 Although 
acknowledging that the restrictions under a TPIM were slightly less onerous than Control 
Orders, Collins J determined that the approach would be that set out in AF (No.3) as there 
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was no material difference between the two regimes.788 As such, there appears to be an 
identical approach when determining how much information the individual must receive in 
order to receive a fair trial. Although many TPIMs were reviewed in the courts following the 
first review hearing in BM, there is very little of substance to reflect upon insofar as the right 
to a fair trial is concerned.789  
It remains to be seen whether the courts will insist that individuals faced with TEOs will also 
need to be provided with sufficient information so as to allow them to give effective 
instructions for their defence. The application of the principle for individuals stranded abroad 
will perhaps add another level of difficulty to the task. Ultimately, although the courts have 
since AF (No. 3) maintained the requirement for minimum disclosure in counter-terrorist 
hybrid orders, perhaps the best summary came from Lord Hope in that case who 
acknowledged that the ‘principle is easy to state, but its application in practice is likely to be 
much more difficult’.790 
3.5.2 Special Advocates  
As already mentioned, Special Advocates were appointed to represent the interests of 
individuals in Control Order proceedings, as they are now in TPIM proceedings, and may 
also be appointed when TEOs are implemented or reviewed in the courts.791 The two 
functions of Advocates were summarised by Sedley LJ in Murungaru v. SSHD:  
[F]irst, to test by cross-examination, evidence and argument the strength of 
the case for non-disclosure. Secondly, to the extent that non-disclosure is 
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maintained…to protect the interests of the appellant, a task which has to 
be carried out without taking instructions on any aspect of the closed 
material.792 
Despite the cautious optimism that initially greeted the appointment of Special Advocates in 
SIAC proceedings in 1997,793 confidence in the apparent safeguard soon faded as the 
implications of CMP for the right to a fair trial and the limited function of Advocates became 
clear. For example, in 2007, Lord Judd of the JCHR suggested, finding approval from one of 
the Advocates presenting evidence to the Committee, that: 
the public should be left in absolutely no doubt that what is happening… 
has absolutely nothing to do with the traditions of adversarial justice as we 
have come to understand them in the British legal system.794 
The courts have voiced an inconsistent and unconvincing degree of support for the use of 
Special Advocates in proceedings. In MB and AF, which was the first time the House of 
Lords had to consider the role of Special Advocates in the administration of counter-terrorist 
hybrid orders, several judges voiced comparable scepticism.795 Baroness Hale expressed 
her lack of confidence that ‘Strasbourg would hold that every control order hearing in which 
the special advocate procedure had been used…would be sufficient to comply with article 
6’.796 Lord Brown expressed similar doubts, holding that ‘the special advocate procedure, 
highly likely though it is that it will in fact safeguard the suspect against significant injustice, 
cannot invariably be guaranteed to do so’.797 Lord Bingham noted Roberts v. Parole Board 
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where, in the much cited excerpt of his judgment, Lord Woolf held that the use of a Special 
Advocate was ‘never a panacea for the grave disadvantages of a person affected not being 
aware of the case against him’.798 For Lord Bingham:  
The reason is obvious. In any ordinary case, a client instructs his advocate 
what his defence is to the charges made against him, briefs the advocate 
on the weaknesses and vulnerability of the adverse witnesses, and 
indicates what evidence is available by way of rebuttal. This is a process 
which it may be impossible to adopt if the controlled person does not know 
the allegations made against him and cannot therefore give meaningful 
instructions, and the special advocate, once he knows what the allegations 
are, cannot tell the controlled person or seek instructions without 
permission, which in practice (as I understand) is not given. ‘Grave 
disadvantage’ is not, I think, an exaggerated description of the controlled 
person’s position where such circumstances obtain.799 
More famously in Roberts v. Parole Board, Lord Bingham aptly described the role of the 
Special Advocates as ‘like taking blind shots at a hidden target’.800 Going further, in Al Rawi, 
several judges noted the serious shortcomings of the Special Advocate system. Lord 
Neuberger in the Court of Appeal described them as ‘a particularly poor substitute for the 
claimant’s own advocate in an open hearing’ and that their use ‘cannot be guaranteed to 
ensure procedural justice’.801 Lord Dyson referred to ‘the limitations of the special advocate 
system’ and the criticisms of the JCHR in its 2010 report.802 Finally, Lord Kerr said that the 
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use of Advocates ‘should never be regarded as an acceptable substitute for the compromise 
of a fundamental right’.803  
However, there has been notable judicial discussion highlighting the important role that 
Special Advocates can play in an apparently otherwise flawed process. For example, in MB 
and AF, Lord Bingham held the use of Special Advocates could ‘help to enhance the 
measure of procedural justice available to a controlled person’.804 Baroness Hale held that 
‘with strenuous efforts from all, difficult and time consuming though it will be, it should usually 
be possible to accord the controlled person a substantial measure of procedural justice’.805 
Lord Hoffmann was the most confident in the procedure, suggesting that the ECtHR had 
directly identified the Canadian special advocate as the way in which the dilemma over 
closed material should be resolved.806 He concluded that ‘in principle the special advocate 
procedure provides sufficient safeguards to satisfy article 6’.807 The ECtHR has also made 
some expressions of support for the Special Advocate system, most notably in A v. UK,808 
but also in other cases such as I. R. & G. T. v. UK,809 and K2 v. UK.810 
In addition to the widespread scepticism from many senior judges, criticism has also come 
from the Special Advocates themselves who are evidently at the very heart of the CMP 
process.811 At one extreme, in December 2004, one Advocate resigned from his position, 
refusing to ‘give a fig-leaf of respectability and legitimacy to a process’ which he found 
odious.812 More recently however, shortly before the TPIM Act came into force, the Coalition 
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Government published the Justice and Security Green Paper in October 2011 and opened 
up public consultation into the possibility of allowing for CMP to be authorised and 
implemented in any civil proceedings.813 The consultation phase of the Green Paper 
provided an invaluable opportunity for policy-makers, lawyers, civil libertarians and other 
stakeholders to critique the use of CMP in the limited contexts in which it currently operated. 
The Special Advocates presented a damning response to the Green Paper and highlighted 
how the practice of CMP challenged the basic principles of natural justice and open justice. 
In their memorandum, 57 of the 69 appointed Advocates collectively rebuked the 
Government proposals, whilst none of the Advocates who did not sign it expressed active 
disagreement with its contents.814 At the outset, the Special Advocates stated that CMP: 
represent a departure from the foundational principle of natural justice that 
all parties are entitled to see and challenge all the evidence relied upon 
before the court and to combat that evidence by calling evidence of their 
own. They also undermine the principle that public justice should be 
dispensed in public.815 
Despite the various attempts to improve the fairness of CMP, the Special Advocates 
nevertheless offered their critical verdict: 
Our experience…leaves us in no doubt that CMPs are inherently unfair; 
they do not ‘work effectively’, nor do they deliver real procedural fairness. 
The fact that such procedures may be operated so as to meet the 
minimum standards required by Article 6 of the ECHR, with such 
modification as has been required by the courts so as to reduce that 
inherent unfairness, does not and cannot make them objectively 
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fair…Neither the provision of Special Advocates, however conscientious, 
nor (where applicable) the modifications to current CMPs required by the 
House of Lords decision in AF (No.3), are capable of making CMPs ‘fair’ by 
any recognisable common law standards.816 
In that regard, the Advocates drew attention to a number of factors they perceived to be 
problematic which challenged several fair trial guarantees, not least of all the equality of 
arms. The Advocates criticised the ban on communication with individuals; their inability to 
challenge non-disclosure; their lack of ability to call evidence; the lack of formal rules of 
evidence; systematic late disclosure by the Government; reluctant and ‘iterative disclosure’ 
when the AF (No. 3) rule applies; redacted closed documents; and finally a lack of ‘a 
searchable database of closed judgments’.817 In that regard, the use of secret intelligence as 
evidence raises problems as the Special Advocate can only test it to a very limited extent.818 
The Advocates expanded further when addressing the JCHR consultation, suggesting that 
the ‘absolute bar on direct communication’ between the Advocates and open representatives 
after the former had received the closed material was the most significant restriction on the 
ability of the Advocates to operate effectively.819  
The JCHR similarly responded to the Justice and Security Green Paper and drew attention 
to what they perceived to be the ‘inherent unfairness of closed material procedures’.820 The 
JCHR noted that ‘neither the provision of special advocates, nor the AF (No.3) disclosure 
obligation, where it applies, are capable of making CMPs “fair” by any recognisable common 
law standards’.821 The JCHR had previously noted that in some cases, Advocates were only 
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presented with the closed material just before a hearing commenced, therefore limiting the 
time they had to scrutinise the evidence and mount a defence.822  
However, acknowledging these issues and responding to a specific recommendation of the 
former IRTL in 2014 in respect of the TPIM regime,823 the Government established a working 
group to discuss the concerns with the Special Advocate regime, seek solutions and to make 
recommendations.824 It is also apparent that a court can refuse to enter into closed hearings, 
that Special Advocates have successfully argued for specific materials to be disclosed in 
open session, and that Advocates can communicate with the subjects after the case has 
moved into closed hearings if the court grants permission.825 Nevertheless, the clear 
inadequacies of the Special Advocate system drew criticism from the UN, when in 2015 the 
HRC noted  the widespread criticisms of the procedure for ‘not securing sufficiently the rights 
of the affected parties, including equality of arms’.826 
Despite the commendable assistance that Special Advocates can offer to individuals in 
closed proceedings, they are beset with obstacles which complicate the attempt to provide 
adequate procedural justice. It is certainly only a minority of judges, such as Lord Hoffmann, 
who have placed faith in the procedure. What is perhaps clear however, is that Special 
Advocates are not seen as a definitive solution to the unfairness of CMP, but merely a 
modest means of mitigating the unfairness. Returning to where there this section began, the 
situation is perhaps best summarised by Sedley LJ in Murungaru v. SSHD as follows: 
[T]he special advocate represents no-one. A special advocate system is 
thus not a substitute for the common law principle that everyone facing an 
accusation made by the State is entitled to a fair chance to know the 
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evidence in support of it and to test and answer it in a public hearing. But it 
is the best procedure so far devised to mitigate the effect of trial without 
disclosure if such a trial is unavoidable.827 
3.6 Conclusions 
After briefly discussing the origins of the mechanisms that this thesis focusses on and 
outlining their respective statutory frameworks, this chapter has sought to evaluate the 
compatibility of the mechanisms with the right to a fair trial. Whilst the right to a fair trial is not 
systematically violated when counter-terrorist hybrid orders are administered, the chapter 
has argued that the mechanisms should be treated as criminal sanctions for the purposes of 
IHRL, which should, therefore, result in the more stringent criminal trial guarantees being 
incorporated into proceedings concerning their implementation and administration. Whilst 
this stance appears to be roundly rejected by the majority of political opinion and judicial 
reasoning in the UK, the chapter has argued that the nature of CMP and the extra-territorial 
nature of TEOs has nevertheless exposed several aspects of the mechanisms which 
seriously challenge the right to a fair trial. Lastly, the chapter has also assessed the 
measures that have been taken in the attempt to mitigate the more controversial aspects of 
the mechanisms, concluding that procedural fairness has been improved to some extent by 
the requirement of minimum disclosure and the appointment of Special Advocates in closed 
hearings.
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Chapter 4. The State of Perpetual Quasi-Emergency 
4.1 Introduction 
In light of the analysis in Chapters 2 and 3, this chapter asserts that, although counter-
terrorist hybrid orders fall short of systematically violating the right to a fair trial according to 
the UK courts, the design, implementation and administration of the mechanisms does not 
meet with the long established standards of procedural fairness in the UK. Despite the UK’s 
historically strong attachment to high human rights standards, some of the most 
controversial aspects of the mechanisms have encountered what could only be described as 
a mixed response from the legislature, courts and public in recent years. This can be, in and 
of itself, a cause for concern, but as often transpires with extraordinary laws, there is a risk of 
the exception being normalised and spreading to other areas of law.  
Whilst the UK’s approach to counter-terrorism is grounded in law enforcement which 
generally upholds high human rights standards, the framework and administration of 
counter-terrorist hybrid orders actually resembles the behaviour of States enduring 
‘prolonged emergencies’. This is so even though the UK purposefully does not acknowledge 
a state of emergency or formally derogate from its obligations under IHRL. In fact, the UK 
has never derogated from Article 6 of the ECHR, even during the worst periods of the 
Troubles, and the most recent derogation from the ECHR in respect of Article 5 of the ECHR 
and the ATCS Act 2001 was withdrawn on the basis that its replacement, the non-derogating 
Control Order regime, would not require a derogation.  
Even so, with counter-terrorist hybrid orders, the UK has been acting for several years now 
at the margins of permissible conduct under IHRL, and, as the courts have found, 
occasionally strayed beyond these margins. This has the effect of reducing the protections 
afforded to individuals under the fair trial guarantees usually associated with proceedings 
concerning serious alleged behaviour. In the context of the right to a fair trial, this is 
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particularly evident when counter-terrorist hybrid orders are implemented and administered 
by the courts as minimalistic safeguards are applied. Moreover, acting at the margins of 
permissible conduct has the simultaneous effect of avoiding the need to resort to the 
accommodation mechanisms possible under IHRL.828 It is for these reasons that the UK 
could be said to be in a state of ‘perpetual quasi-emergency’,829 which has in turn created 
the space necessary for the adverse effects upon the right to a fair trial to materialise. 
Although the Control Order mechanism was established in response to the stalemate 
created by the Belmarsh case, in that foreign nationals who could not be deported or 
prosecuted could also no longer be indefinitely detained, the apparent justifications for 
counter-terrorist hybrid orders since then have clearly evolved as the majority of 
mechanisms are now actually imposed against British citizens. Moreover, since the Chahal 
decision in 1996, the need to provide procedural fairness to individuals in proceedings that 
carry national security concerns has continued to trouble the British Government. This 
chapter argues a number of factors have maintained the state of perpetual quasi-emergency 
since the Chahal and Belmarsh judgments. Crucially, the chapter asserts that the state of 
perpetual quasi-emergency could not be maintained by legal factors alone, as certain 
decisions of the courts have pushed back against the Government to reduce the harsh 
conditions attached to the mechanisms and, more importantly, to gradually improve the 
procedural fairness of proceedings. Equally important, the appointment of Special Advocates 
in relevant proceedings has undoubtedly improved procedural fairness to some extent. 
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Accordingly, a number of extra-legal factors have helped to reinforce the state of perpetual 
quasi-emergency which has created the space necessary for the erosion of certain fair trial 
guarantees to take place.  
As such, the purpose of this chapter is twofold. Firstly, the chapter explains how the state of 
perpetual quasi-emergency was established in the UK, and secondly, it critically analyses 
what legal and extra-legal factors may have contributed to its preservation. Following this 
Introduction, the second section briefly explores the notion of a ‘prolonged emergency’, of 
which the ‘War on Terror’ and the emergency paradigm more generally represent obvious 
manifestations. The core of the chapter then critically analyses how the state of perpetual 
quasi-emergency is preserved, drawing upon relevant legal and extra-legal factors. As such, 
the third section focusses upon the legal factors that have contributed to the preservation of 
the state of perpetual quasi-emergency before the fourth section explores what extra-legal 
factors may have also played a role. The fifth section considers what aspects of counter-
terrorist hybrid orders are arguably being normalised in the domestic legal system, and the 
sixth section draws upon the chapter as a whole and concludes. 
 
4.2 Establishing the State of Perpetual Quasi-Emergency in the UK 
Before analysing the intricacies and implications of the perpetual quasi-emergency, it is first 
necessary to consider some notions that underpin the concept. The broad notion of a 
situation of permanent emergency raises obvious connotations with the dystopian world in 
George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four.830 Under the scrutiny of Big Brother, the citizens of 
super-state Oceania are brutally brainwashed into obedience through constant surveillance, 
fear and a belief fuelled by propaganda that a constant state of war exists between rival 
super-states. In the political manifesto of the orchestrated enemy of Oceania’s citizens, 
Emmanuel Goldstein, the situation is described in the following terms: 
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It does not matter whether the war is actually happening, and, since no 
decisive victory is possible, it does not matter whether the war is going well 
or badly. All that is needed is that a state of war should exist.831 
Furthermore, the fact that the particular super-state which Oceania was supposedly at war 
with often changed was inconsequential to the desired effect to permanently institutionalise 
total war and supress dissent. 
The need for a ‘state of war’ in order to justify exceptional measures in the post-9/11 world 
sees a parallel in the seemingly perpetual emergencies under which citizens of several 
States endure. Although widely dismissed by legal scholars, the notion of the ‘War on Terror’ 
is the most obvious and significant manifestation of this analogy in the context of counter-
terrorism.832 The Orwellian notion of permanent war can be juxtaposed with President Bush’s 
declaration after 9/11 that:  
Our war on terror begins with Al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not 
end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and 
defeated.833  
From a purely semantic perspective, President Bush’s deeply hyperbolic and infinitely-
scoped declaration of war which signalled a new era of counter-terrorism was loaded with 
analogies of religious struggle, notions of ‘good’ versus ‘evil’, and abstract ideals such as 
‘freedom’ and ‘justice’.834 Specifically, President Bush claimed that ‘enemies of freedom 
committed an act of war against our country’ and that ‘freedom itself is under attack’. 
However, the speech is most memorable for the assertion that the war would not end with Al 
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Qaeda, but rather, only when every terrorist group on the planet had been beaten.835 Despite 
the apparent scaling back of the rhetoric of the ‘War on Terror’ under President Obama, 
similar rhetoric surfaced in France after the terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2015. 
Since the attacks, the then President Hollande stated that France was at war and referred to 
the attacks as acts of war on numerous occasions.836 
Dealing with abstract notions however creates a whole raft of problems. As Thomas 
McDonnell helpfully reflected, ‘we can claim we are fighting a war against poverty or drugs or 
ignorance, but we know deep down that when we use such language, we are really 
engaging in rhetorical hyperbole – exaggeration to make a point’.837 A war on an abstract 
concept such as ‘terrorism’ is evidently of a completely different nature and scope to a war 
against a State. When fighting terrorists, generally speaking, we cannot witness the collapse 
of governments, the redrawing of borders or the signing of armistices. Wars are typically 
fought against ‘proper nouns’ for the reason that States can surrender, whereas wars 
against ‘common nouns’ such as drugs are less successful as opponents never surrender.838 
A war on an abstract concept, or a state of emergency which might have no conceivable 
end, clearly begs several fundamental questions, not least of all in relation to democratic 
desirability, political accountability and, most importantly, legality. 
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However, any attempt to compare the behaviour of the UK with the USA in post-9/11 
counter-terrorism is clearly a difficult and contentious undertaking. Whilst the UK’s approach 
to the ‘War on Terror’ was mostly grounded in the rhetoric of law, rather than war,839 which 
reinforced the primacy of criminal prosecution in disrupting terrorism,840 this did not stop the 
UK taking drastic action in the immediate aftermath of 9/11.  
As already mentioned, due to the implications of the ATCS Act 2001, the UK derogated from 
certain aspects of the right to liberty until the House of Lords declared that the measures 
were incompatible with the UK’s human rights obligations.841 Formally, the UK’s derogation 
from Article 5 of the ECHR lasted from November 2001 until April 2005.842 Running almost 
simultaneously, the UK’s derogation from Article 9 of the ICCPR lasted from December 2001 
until March 2005.843 Nevertheless, as will be explored in more detail below, there remains a 
degree of uncertainty as to when, if at all, the British Government actually considered that 
the state of emergency which justified those measures had lapsed.  
Although the formal state of emergency declared by the UK after 9/11 was far shorter in 
duration compared against the most serious prolonged emergencies in some States in the 
past century that have spanned several decades,844 it would be a mistake to assign too 
much weight to matters of duration. It is equally, if not more important, to consider the extent 
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of the actual measures that are adopted or made possible during the state of emergency. 
For example, the ECtHR in the Belmarsh case held that the ECHR had never incorporated 
the requirement that an emergency be temporary.845 Rather, the ECtHR held that the 
jurisprudence concerning emergencies in Northern Ireland demonstrated that it was possible 
for a public emergency to continue for many years. The Court also rejected that derogations 
implemented ‘in the immediate aftermath of the al-Qaeda attacks in the United States of 
America, and reviewed on an annual basis by Parliament’ could be said to be ‘invalid on the 
ground that they were not “temporary”.’846 
As explored in Chapter 2, both the ECHR and the ICCPR allow contracting States to 
derogate from certain aspects of their IHRL obligations in times of emergency.847 When 
implemented in strict accordance with the legal requirements, the practice of a State 
derogating from its IHRL obligations has the potential to be relatively uncontroversial from a 
legal perspective, and indeed, represents a prima facie willingness to be transparent and 
abide by the rule of law. However, questions inevitably arise when emergencies and 
derogations become prolonged.848  
Given the rhetoric from several governments that followed 9/11 which ‘portrayed 
international terrorism as the ultimate security challenge’,849 it is somewhat surprising that 
the UK was the only State in the CoE to derogate immediately from its IHRL obligations. 
Having said that, the UK Government was particularly mindful of the presence of foreign 
nationals in the country who were engaged in terrorist activities, but whom could be neither 
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deported nor prosecuted,850 which the ECtHR acknowledged when granting a wide margin of 
appreciation to the UK Government.851 
Although the UK’s derogation from Article 5 of the ECHR formally lasted only until 2005, the 
behaviour of the UK since then strongly resembles the behaviour of States enduring a 
‘prolonged emergency’. In that regard, the IComJ produced a seminal and comprehensive 
report in 2009 in which they suggested that: 
A prolonged emergency is characterised by the assumption of greater 
executive powers, legal frameworks that create an environment prone to 
human rights violations […], limitations on accountability mechanisms, and 
eventually a detrimental effect on the wider criminal justice system.852 
Bearing in mind the focus of this study, all four characteristics are palpable to some extent in 
the UK, insofar as the design, implementation and administration of counter-terrorist hybrid 
orders are concerned. Inevitably, the extraordinarily broad definitions of the key terminology 
that underpins counter-terrorist hybrid orders represents an overarching concern and 
impacts upon all four characteristics. In particular, the definition of ‘terrorism’ grants the 
executive an extremely broad room to manoeuvre pursuant to the aim of protecting national 
security, which will be explored in more detail later.853 
Regarding the first characteristic, namely, the assumption of greater executive powers, the 
Home Secretary’s broad power to impose counter-terrorist hybrid orders upon individuals 
comes with very limited judicial supervision and clearly represents a significant growth in 
executive power in the field of counter-terrorism. This is particularly evident by the fact that 
Control Orders could be imposed on the basis of ‘reasonable suspicion’,854 that TPIMs could 
initially be imposed on the basis of ‘reasonable belief’ (and now the ‘balance of 
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probabilities’),855 and that TEOs can be imposed on the basis of  ‘reasonable suspicion’.856 
Moreover, regarding the use of CMP in court proceedings, the executive benefits from clear 
advantages over an individual subjected to the relevant mechanism, insofar as the individual 
can be excluded from trial and can be given limited disclosure of the evidence or final 
judgment. 
On the second characteristic, namely, the creation of legal frameworks that create an 
environment prone to human rights violations, although the courts have been clear that the 
mechanisms do not systematically, in and of themselves, violate the right to liberty or fair trial 
guarantees, they nevertheless place huge restrictions upon the human rights of subjects and 
have at times been found to violate Article 5 and 6 of the ECHR.857 In regard to the right to a 
fair trial, the use of CMP, which has become ubiquitous in trials involving national security 
concerns, unquestionably places individuals at a massive disadvantage vis-à-vis the State. 
As discussed earlier, this legal framework has been controversial from the outset.858  
Regarding the third characteristic, namely, the limitations on accountability mechanisms, the 
predominant emphasis upon national security makes it extremely difficult to effectively 
challenge the actions, allegations and evidence of the executive, or to even comprehend 
how often such powers are used. This is evident in the manner that counter-terrorist hybrid 
orders are implemented and reviewed in the courts, or in proceedings involving secret 
evidence more generally. For example, the fact that Special Advocates cannot communicate 
with individuals without approval once they have been served with the closed evidence 
makes it extremely difficult to cross-examine crucial evidence provided by the Security 
Service. 
Finally, regarding the fourth characteristic, namely the detrimental effect on the wider 
criminal justice system, the fact that counter-terrorist hybrid orders are deliberately 
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administered in the civil law illustrates how the criminal law is bypassed altogether, save for 
the possibility of imposing criminal sanctions for any breach of a condition. In other words, 
the emergence of a parallel justice system may represent a significantly detrimental effect 
upon the criminal justice system. Moreover, as will be looked at later, the extension of CMP 
into other areas of law and the gradual normalisation of the exceptional has shown how the 
criminal justice system may be neglected whenever national security concerns arise.859  
 
4.3 Legal Factors Preserving the Perpetual Quasi-Emergency 
As already mentioned, the legal developments between 1996 and 2004 created a legal 
impasse in which the UK had to decide how to treat foreign terrorist suspects who could be 
neither deported or prosecuted, nor no longer indefinitely detained. Moreover, since the 
Chahal judgment in 1996, the British Government has had to persistently grapple with the 
issue of providing adequate levels of procedural fairness in court proceedings that carry 
national security concerns. The impasse established by the Belmarsh judgment in 2004, with 
the implications of the Chahal judgment overshadowing it, led to the creation of the first 
counter-terrorist hybrid order that this thesis focusses on, the Control Order.  
Although Control Orders were initially imposed against the 10 foreign nationals who had 
previously been detained under the ATCS Act 2001, the imposition of the mechanisms 
against British citizens gradually became more commonplace. Ultimately, of the 52 Control 
Orders imposed over the course of the PTA 2005, 24 were against British citizens and 28 
were against foreign nationals.860 Moreover, the vast majority of TPIMs have been imposed 
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against British citizens,861 whilst TEOs can only be imposed against individuals with the right 
to live in the UK, which obviously includes British citizens.862  
As such, the justifications for counter-terrorist hybrid orders have clearly developed and 
evolved since the initial introduction of Control Orders under the PTA 2005 in the aftermath 
of the Belmarsh case. Rather, since the creation of the Control Order regime, the state of 
perpetual quasi-emergency has been preserved in part by a variety of additional legal and 
extra-legal factors. 
The legal factors which have helped to preserve the state of perpetual quasi-emergency are 
inextricably linked and ultimately culminate to provide the executive the opportunity to 
operate at the boundaries of permissible conduct under IHRL. First and foremost, the 
definition of key terminology underpinning the counter-terrorist hybrid order statutory regimes 
raises concerns that are familiar with counter-terrorist legislation; that is, that the legislation 
encompasses broad definitions and grants extensive discretionary powers to the executive. 
Secondly, when counter-terrorist hybrid orders are reviewed or challenged in the courts, 
some have criticised the deference of the judiciary to the executive in light of the inherent 
national security issues at stake. However, as will be discussed, the courts have had some 
significant impact insofar as the frameworks of the mechanisms are concerned.   
4.3.1 Definition ‘Creep’ in Counter-Terrorist Legislation 
Although a thorough examination of the challenges emanating from the definition of terrorism 
in British counter-terrorist legislation is clearly beyond the scope of this thesis,863 a more 
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focussed analysis in the context of counter-terrorist hybrid orders is warranted. This is 
because the definition of ‘terrorism’ for the purposes of the statutory regimes underpinning 
the mechanisms is the definition of terrorism contained within the Terrorism Act (TA) 2000.864 
In other words, the restrictions and obligations which can be imposed upon individuals as a 
result of a counter-terrorist hybrid order are done so on the basis of that individual’s 
suspected involvement in terrorism, as defined under the TA 2000. Moreover, the fact that 
counter-terrorist hybrid orders can be imposed on the basis of suspected ‘terrorism-related 
activity’ adds a further layer of complexity by extending the chain of individuals who could be 
subjected to the mechanisms.  
In this regard, the UK is well noted for having one of the broadest definitions of terrorism in 
the world which has presented an unprecedented level of definition ‘creep’ since the turn of 
the millennium.865 The former IRTL, David Anderson, has noted a theoretical example of an 
individual who could be deemed a terrorist under current legislation, demonstrating the 
breadth of the definition and, in particular, the relatively weak notion of ‘influencing’ a 
government which forms the ‘target’ element of the definition. Anderson alludes to a 
campaigner who voices a religious objection to vaccination, suggesting that if that 
campaigner tries to influence a government against vaccinations, and their words are 
deemed capable of causing a serious risk to public health, they could be considered a 
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terrorist.866 Even more concerning, anyone who encouraged or otherwise supported the 
campaigner could also fall foul of the relevant ancillary or preparatory terrorist offences.867 
However, the notion of ‘terrorism-related activity’ under the various statutory counter-terrorist 
hybrid order regimes presents further difficulties. For the purposes of Control Orders, the 
PTA 2005 defined ‘terrorism-related activity’ as four types of conduct. The first type of 
conduct was uncontroversial and concerned ‘the commission, preparation or instigation of 
acts of terrorism’.868 More questionable were the second and third types of activities that 
concerned ‘conduct which facilitates the commission, preparation or instigation of such acts, 
or which is intended to do so’, and ‘conduct which gives encouragement to the commission, 
preparation or instigation of such acts, or which is intended to do so’.869 However, the fourth 
type of conduct was incredibly broad, and created a potentially infinite chain of causation. 
This concerned conduct ‘which gives support or assistance to individuals who are known or 
believed to be involved in terrorism-related activity’.870 
For the purposes of imposing a TPIM, the TPIM Act 2010 defines the first three types of 
‘terrorism-related activity’ in identical ways to the PTA 2005 outlined above.871 However, the 
fourth type of conduct is less broad than its equivalent under the PTA 2005, and concerns 
that ‘which gives support or assistance to individuals who are known or believed by the 
individual concerned to be involved in conduct falling within paragraph (a)’.872 In other words, 
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assuming the other requirements to impose a TPIM under section 3 of the TPIM Act are also 
met, an individual can be subjected to a TPIM if they support or assist another individual who 
the first individual knows or believes is involved in ‘the commission, preparation or instigation 
of acts of terrorism’. Finally, for the purposes of TEOs, the CTS Act 2015 defines ‘terrorism-
related activity’ in identical ways to the current TPIM regime.873 
However, the definitions of ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorism-related activity’ are not the only terms 
underpinning counter-terrorist hybrid orders that raise concerns. As alluded to already, the 
requirement for the Home Secretary to have a ‘reasonable suspicion’,874 ‘reasonable 
belief’,875 or, to be ‘satisfied, on the balance of probabilities’,876 that the individual has been 
involved in ‘terrorism-related activity’, are all much lower thresholds than the familiar criminal 
standard of ‘beyond all reasonable doubt’. When one considers the limited role of the courts 
in the first place, the discretion afforded to the SSHD is extraordinarily broad. In this regard, 
the breadth of Ministerial discretion in the implementation of counter-terrorist hybrid orders 
may warrant a comparison with the prosecutorial discretion afforded to the executive in 
regards to alleged terrorist criminal offences. In R v. Gul, which concerned an individual 
prosecuted for disseminating terrorist publications, the Supreme Court rejected the notion 
that a statutory prosecutorial discretion mitigated the width of the definition of terrorism in 
section 1(1) of the TA 2000, holding that it was not ‘an appropriate reason for giving 
“terrorism” a wide meaning’.877 
Due to the definitions of some of the fundamental terms contained within the statutory 
regimes of counter-terrorist hybrid orders, the measures envisaged can be imposed upon 
individuals on the basis of a vast array of alleged conduct, and on the basis of a very low 
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threshold of proof that the individual is involved in that conduct. This arguably represents a 
significant expansion of executive power, one of the characteristics of States enduring a 
prolonged emergency as defined by the IComJ. Taking these factors together, serious 
questions arise over the role and effectiveness of the courts in the implementation and 
oversight of the mechanisms. 
4.3.2 Judicial Deference to the Executive in Matters of National Security 
Of the factors contributing to the preservation of the state of perpetual quasi-emergency, the 
approach of the judiciary to the executive over matters of national security is worthy of 
particular attention as the issue of judicial deference has provoked debate in the UK long 
before 9/11 and the creation of the mechanisms that this thesis examines. The issue has 
been particularly exposed in the context of domestic terrorism in Northern Ireland. For 
example, as noted by Clive Walker, ‘there is a long history of judicial deference to challenges 
to national security restrictions on organisations’.878 In other cases concerning matters of 
national security the domestic courts have often declined to challenge the executive, for 
example, when faced with judicial review claims in respect of exclusion orders during the 
Troubles,879 and the deportation of aliens.880 
Owing to the prevalence of judicial deference to the executive in cases concerning national 
security, some have criticised the judiciary for being overly deferential at times.881 In that 
respect, Lucia Zedner has suggested that there are five conceivable reasons why the 
judiciary are deferential to the executive: decisions relating to security are expert matters in 
which judges are not expert; decisions relating to security are political matters requiring 
accountability through Parliament; it is for the executive to make controversial decisions 
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regarding security; that the courts’ function as a check on legislative action ought to be 
diminished in times of crisis; and finally, the courts may actually be persuaded of the need to 
protect the public.882 
As risk-aversion policies are advanced in the name of national security, which indefinite 
detention and counter-terrorist hybrid orders undoubtedly represent, it is perhaps inevitable 
that the executive would defend such policies by arguing that the judiciary should defer to its 
judgment over matters of national security. The submissions made by the Government 
during the Belmarsh case were strongly of that persuasion: 
[A]s it was for Parliament and the executive to assess the threat facing the 
nation, so it was for those bodies and not the courts to judge the response 
necessary to protect the security of the public. These were matters...calling 
for an exercise of political and not judicial judgment.883 
Beginning with the Belmarsh case, as already discussed, the House of Lords ruled against 
the Government and issued a declaration of incompatibility in respect of the indefinite 
detention regime. This was a significant moment, ultimately leading to the creation of the 
Control Order regime as a means to solve the legal impasse created by the judgment. 
Having said that, the majority of the House of Lords did not challenge the British 
Government’s declaration of a state of emergency under Article 15 of the ECHR.884  
In this regard, the performance of judges in common law countries standing up the executive 
on matters of national security has been described by some as ‘decidedly patchy’,885 and by 
another as ‘at worst dismal, at best ambiguous’.886 For example, in SSHD v. Rehman, Lord 
Hoffmann’s postscript comments represent what might be considered the most extreme end 
of the deferential spectrum: 
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I wrote this speech some three months before the recent events in New 
York and Washington. They are a reminder that in matters of national 
security, the cost of failure can be high. This seems to me to underline the 
need for the judicial arm of government to respect the decisions of 
ministers of the Crown on the question of whether support for terrorist 
activities in a foreign country constitutes a threat to national security. It is 
not only that the executive has access to special information and expertise 
in these matters. It is also that such decisions, with serious potential results 
for the community, require a legitimacy which can be conferred only by 
entrusting them to persons responsible to the community through the 
democratic process. If the people are to accept the consequences of such 
decisions, they must be made by persons whom the people have elected 
and whom they can remove.887 
In the context of emergencies, as Chapter 2 analysed, the ECtHR will generally not 
challenge a State’s declaration of a state of emergency and has nearly always deferred to 
States on this issue. Rather, the ECtHR has stressed that it will limit its scrutiny to the issue 
of whether States have acted within the exigencies of the situation.888  
However, in the Belmarsh case before the Court of Appeal, Brooke LJ was particularly 
deferential to the Government on these matters: 
[T]he judiciary must be willing…to put an appropriate degree of trust in the 
willingness and capacity of ministers and Parliament, who are publicly 
accountable for their decisions, to satisfy themselves about the integrity 
and professionalism of the Security Service. If the security of the nation 
may be at risk from terrorist violence, and if the lives of informers may be at 
risk, or the flow of valuable information they represent may dry up if 
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sources of intelligence have to be revealed, there comes a stage when 
judicial scrutiny can go no further.889 
The alternative, according to Brooke LJ, would involve a ‘purist approach’ which entailed the 
belief ‘that it is better that this country should be destroyed, together with the ideals it stands 
for, than that a single suspected terrorist should be detained without due process’.890 
Offering the lead judgment in the Belmarsh case before the House of Lords, Lord Bingham 
encapsulated the deferential nature of the judiciary in matters of national security and held: 
The more purely political (in a broad or narrow sense) a question is, the 
more appropriate it will be for political resolution and the less likely it is to 
be an appropriate matter for judicial decision. The smaller, therefore, will 
be the potential role of the court. It is the function of political and not 
judicial bodies to resolve political questions. Conversely, the greater the 
legal content of any issue, the greater the potential role of the court, 
because under our constitution and subject to the sovereign power of 
Parliament it is the function of the courts and not of political bodies to 
resolve legal questions. The present question seems to me to be very 
much at the political end of the spectrum.891 
However, ruling alone on this fundamental point, Lord Hoffmann offered a separate 
judgment which stands at odds somewhat with his earlier postscript comment in Rehman 
discussed above. The core of Lord Hoffmann’s opinion focussed on whether or not indefinite 
detention could be justified on the grounds that a war or other public emergency threatening 
the life of the nation existed in the UK.892 He discussed the notable and historical examples 
of the Napoleonic Wars and the World Wars of the twentieth century in which habeas corpus 
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was suspended and far-ranging detention powers were granted to Government.893 Crucially, 
Lord Hoffmann held that a public emergency did not exist in the aftermath of 9/11 which led 
to the subsequent British legislation. He dismissed the argument that terrorism threatened 
the life of the nation: 
This is a nation which has been tested in adversity, which has survived 
physical destruction and catastrophic loss of life. I do not underestimate 
the ability of fanatical groups of terrorists to kill and destroy, but they do not 
threaten the life of the nation. Whether we would survive Hitler hung in the 
balance, but there is no doubt that we shall survive Al-Qaeda. The Spanish 
people have not said that what happened in Madrid, hideous crime as it 
was, threatened the life of their nation. Their legendary pride would not 
allow it. Terrorist violence, serious as it is, does not threaten our institutions 
of government or our existence as a civil community.894 
The defining and most memorable passage of Lord Hoffmann’s speech came at his 
conclusion, when he held: 
The real threat to the life of the nation, in the sense of a people living in 
accordance with its traditional laws and political values, comes not from 
terrorism but from laws such as these. That is the true measure of what 
terrorism may achieve. It is for Parliament to decide whether to give the 
terrorists such a victory.895 
Subsequently, at the ECtHR, the Grand Chamber agreed with the majority of the House of 
Lords that a public emergency existed. After recounting its prior decisions in Lawless, The 
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Greek Case, Ireland v. UK, Brannigan and McBride v. UK, Marshall v. UK, and Aksoy, the 
Court delivered some useful additional comments. The Grand Chamber stated: 
The requirement of imminence cannot be interpreted so narrowly as to 
require a State to wait for disaster to strike before taking measures to deal 
with it. Moreover, the danger of a terrorist attack was, tragically, shown by 
the bombings and attempted bombings in London in July 2005 to have 
been very real. Since the purpose of Article 15 is to permit States to take 
derogating measures to protect their populations from future risks, the 
existence of the threat to the life of the nation must be assessed primarily 
with reference to those facts which were known at the time of the 
derogation.896 
Additionally, the Grand Chamber discussed the problematic aspect of the duration of public 
emergencies. The Court noted that prior case law had never previously ‘incorporated the 
requirement [emanating from the HRC] that the emergency be temporary’.897 Quite to the 
contrary, the Court stated that with particular regard to the Northern Ireland situation, it was 
possible for a public emergency ‘to continue for many years’.898 The Court then proceeded to 
reject Lord Hoffmann’s strong assertion that there had to exist a threat to the institutions of 
government or the existence as a civil community, for a public emergency to occur. Rather, 
the Court acknowledged that it had ‘in the past concluded that emergency situations have 
existed even though the institutions of the State did not appear to be imperilled to the extent 
envisaged by Lord Hoffman’.899 Ultimately, despite noting the fact that the UK was the only 
contracting State to lodge a derogation, the Grand Chamber confirmed that the national 
authorities, as the guardians of their own people’s safety, were to enjoy a wide margin of 
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appreciation. Consequently, the Court agreed with the majority of the House of Lords that 
there did exist a public emergency threatening the life of the nation. 
Insofar as the counter-terrorist hybrid order frameworks are concerned, the domestic courts 
have undoubtedly had a significant impact and improved their fairness to some extent. 
Initially however, the lower domestic courts remained considerably more hands-off than the 
previous ‘episodes’ of judicial review in the UK in cases concerning national security.900  
As alluded to already, as the role of the courts is merely to test if the decisions of the SSHD 
are ‘obviously flawed’, immediate doubts can be cast upon the ability of the courts to subject 
the mechanisms to more meaningful scrutiny and oversight.901 During the earliest years of 
the Control Order regime, the lower courts were ‘extremely cautious’ when tackling the issue 
of disclosure, ‘allowing the Home Secretary to refuse to disclose simply because there were 
national security concerns about the type and source of the material in general’.902  
Moreover, when MB’s appeal was heard before the Court of Appeal, Lord Phillips appeared 
to adopt a deferential stance, holding that the SSHD is ‘better placed than the court to 
decide the measures that are necessary to protect the public against the activities of a 
terrorist suspect’.903 It was for this reason, according to Lord Phillips, that ‘a degree of 
deference must be paid to the decisions taken by the Secretary of State’ which had long 
been recognised as appropriate in matters relating to state secrecy.904 Having said that, Lord 
Phillips acknowledged that there was ‘scope for the court to give intense scrutiny to the 
necessity for each of the obligations imposed on an individual under a control order, and it 
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must do so’.905 Closely related to this, as already discussed in depth, the courts have 
consistently agreed with the Government that proceedings concerning counter-terrorist 
hybrid orders do not involve the determination of a criminal charge, and do not therefore 
invoke the criminal limb of the right to a fair trial.  
Secondly, the judgment in AF (No. 3), and in particular the required level of disclosure, was 
one that several Law Lords did not want to make, and may even have been rather different 
had the House of Lords not had the legal obligation under the HRA 1998 to take the 
ECtHR’s decision in A v. UK into account.906 In this regard, Fenwick and Phillipson have 
argued that ‘the fact it took an international court to show the UK’s highest court the way is 
an eloquent and sobering illustration of the dangers of excessive judicial deference’.907 
Fenwick and Phillipson have been equally damning of the overall judicial approach to the 
earliest Control Order cases, arguing that the ‘overuse of judicial deference to the executive 
or Parliament can have wider, damaging constitutional implications’ which distorted ‘both the 
reasoning and outcome in some of the key control order cases’.908  
The approach of the judiciary in the administration of Control Orders was also criticised by 
Baroness Hale, who, towards the end of the life of the Control Order regime in 2010, 
suggested that it was worrying that ‘the courts have so far adopted such a restricted view of 
their powers to challenge the Home Secretary’s claims to secrecy’.909 Going further, Hale 
queried: 
Can it be right to allow less fair procedures for imposing preventive 
measures on the ground of reasonable suspicion than it is for imposing 
punishment for proven wrong-doing if the result is the same – a long time 
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behind bars or confined to the home? How far can the judiciary lend itself 
to modifications of the traditional notion of a fair trial in order to prosecute 
terrorists to conviction?910 
Former Law Lord Johan Steyn has similarly suggested that despite the judiciary being 
‘charged with the duty of standing between the government and individuals’, judges ‘are 
often too deferential to the executive in times of peace’.911 Indeed, the courts might lack 
sensitive information which the Security Service has attained. This ‘information poverty’ as 
Michael Haile describes it, might make a judge unwilling to ‘risk their credibility’ and thus 
defer to the executive, rather than ‘risk a wrong decision that may put the nation in 
danger’.912 Alternatively, as discussed in Chapter 2, ‘by leaving to the state the primary 
determination if there is a public emergency the Court is clearly deferring to the sovereignty 
of the state’.913 
Whilst the domestic courts have almost always deferred to the executive over the existence 
of an emergency and have, at times, appeared reluctant to challenge the executive over the 
substantial fairness of the counter-terrorist hybrid order regimes, the higher courts have 
nevertheless helped to shape the regimes as they currently exist and improve their 
procedural fairness. In particular, the House of Lords had a significant impact over the 
substantial and procedural fairness of the earliest Control Orders, not least of all in MB and 
AF and AF (No. 3), and these judgments have continued to shape subsequent counter-
terrorist hybrid orders.914 
Moreover, in SSHD v. AP which was one of the last Control Order cases, the Supreme Court 
held that a 16 hour curfew and the relocation of the individual 150 miles from his home 
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violated Article 5 of the ECHR.915 Seemingly at odds with his opinion in SSHD v. JJ, Lord 
Brown held that there was not a simple cut-off point for a curfew to be acceptable. Rather, 
Lord Brown held that ‘for a Control Order with a 16-hour curfew (a fortiori one with a 14-hour 
curfew) to be struck down as involving a deprivation of liberty, the other conditions imposed 
would have to be unusually destructive of the life the controlee might otherwise have been 
living’.916 
Whether due to the enormous flexibility granted to the executive, which limits the role of the 
courts, or the occasional reluctance of the courts to challenge the executive on matters of 
national security, the courts have undoubtedly played a part in shaping the various counter-
terrorist hybrid order regimes. Nevertheless, during the earliest years of the Control Order 
regime in the lower courts, the lack of meaningful scrutiny shown towards the decisions of 
the executive reveals a troubling lack of accountability, demonstrating the third characteristic 
of a prolonged emergency to some extent. 
 
4.4 Extra-Legal Factors Preserving the Perpetual Quasi-Emergency 
As already mentioned, this chapter argues that the various legal factors explored are, 
despite being significant in their own right, unable to preserve the state of perpetual quasi-
emergency alone, due to two significant factors. Firstly, the courts have marginally improved 
the fairness of proceedings by, inter alia, requiring a minimum level of disclosure, and 
secondly, the statutory regimes have provided for the appointment of Special Advocates in 
relevant proceedings. These developments contrast significantly with the generally 
deferential nature of the courts to the executive over matters of national security, and the 
consistent position that proceedings concerning counter-terrorist hybrid orders invoke the 
civil limb of the right to a fair trial, rather than the more stringent criminal limb. As such, it 
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may be argued that a number of closely related extra-legal factors reinforce these legal 
factors to preserve the state of perpetual quasi-emergency. 
Firstly, as the Literature Review in Chapter 1 illustrated, contemporary political, philosophical 
and legal discussion which has addressed the issue of diminishing human rights standards 
in the face of national security concerns has focussed on the metaphor of striking a balance 
between liberty and security. Although this line of thought has some role to play in 
contemporary debate about counter-terrorism measures and civil liberties, a more critical 
analysis of the metaphor reveals that such an approach may be disingenuous and overly 
simplistic. Secondly, the rhetoric of panic, threat and fear, which often accompanies any 
discussion of counter-terrorist law and policy, remains an overwhelming concern when 
matters of national security arise in parliamentary debates. This is all too familiar during the 
legislative processes of counter-terrorism policy and in society more broadly, although little 
legal research has evidenced this. 
4.4.1 The Metaphor of ‘Balance’ between Liberty and Security 
In the aftermath of acts of terrorism or in the face of future terrorist threats, counter-terrorist 
policy and law that purports to bolster security has the obvious potential to threaten the civil 
liberties of suspected wrongdoers and law-abiding citizens alike. As mentioned earlier, one 
of the most prevalent themes of discussion amongst political, philosophical and legal 
commentators has concerned the alleged conflicts between the dual imperatives of security 
and liberty. Moreover, it is difficult to reject the argument that the debate has been 
dominated by the metaphor of balance between the two notions.917 Few have seriously 
attempted to ascertain what fundamental root causes or factors may have contributed to the 
erosion of fair trial guarantees, or human rights more broadly, in post-9/11 UK counter-
terrorism legislation. Such discussion has generally been confined to more theoretical 
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disciplines such as political science, politics and philosophy. However, when probing the 
metaphor, a number of contradictions and fallacies are exposed.  
In Jeremy Waldron’s classic article on the balancing metaphor, one of the reasons the 
author contended the balancing metaphor must be subjected to scrutiny centred on the 
‘difficulties with distribution’.918 Waldron argued that although we may frame the debate as 
pitching our liberties against our security, we need to be aware that the reduction in liberty 
may affect some people more than others. In other words, any changes that may be 
implemented could in truth equate to ‘a proposal to trade off the liberties of a few against the 
security of the majority’.919 
Building on from this argument, David Luban has contended that eight fallacies taint the 
debate over liberty and security, with the first fallacy meriting particular attention. Luban 
labels the first fallacy the ‘Mel Brooks Fallacy’, in testament to the comedian’s quip that 
‘Tragedy is when I cut my finger. Comedy is when you fall into an open sewer and die’.920 In 
essence, Luban argues that this poignantly describes the implicit assumption that 
proponents of the ‘trade-off’ thesis make, which involves the trade-off of rights belonging to 
other people, often minorities or foreigners, against one’s own security.921 According to 
Luban, the debate about liberty and security trade-offs ‘becomes genuine only when we 
pose the question in its legitimate form: how many of your own rights are you willing to 
sacrifice for added security?’922 Even this is problematic, as Luban admits. The author 
acknowledges that being a ‘respectable, middle-aged, native-born, white, tenured professor’, 
it is highly unlikely he would ‘ever need to invoke the right against self-incrimination or the 
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right to a speedy, public trial’.923 Accordingly, this realisation causes Luban to undervalue 
these rights and brand them as Other People’s rights (OPR).924 In a similar manner, Geoffrey 
Stone has contended that ‘the individuals whose rights are sacrificed are not those who 
make the laws, but minorities, dissidents, and noncitizens. In those circumstances, “we” are 
making a decision to sacrifice “their” rights’ which, according to Stone, is ‘not a very prudent 
way to balance the competing interests’.925 Slightly diverging from the emphasis upon 
foreign citizens or ethnic minorities, is what Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule term 
‘democratic failure theory’.926 According to Posner and Vermeule, ‘rational and well-
motivated governments will provide more security as threats increase’ which may involve 
wholly or partially externalising ‘the costs of security onto non-voters or other politically 
unrepresented groups’.927 
In that regard, it is important to recall that of the 52 Control Orders imposed, all were 
imposed against men suspected of Islamist extremism,928 whilst the first 10 TPIMs were also 
imposed against men suspect of Islamist extremism.929 Equally, due to the fact that TEOs 
were created in response to the threat of potential jihadists returning to the UK from Syria 
and Iraq, there is little doubt that the subjects of these mechanisms will also be individuals 
suspected of Islamist extremism. 
However, indicating that exceptional measures can become the norm, it might be contended 
that laws that appear to target specific categories of people actually come to affect the public 
at large. This is made possible in two ways. Firstly, Martin Scheinin has argued that the 
trickle-down nature of counter-terrorism legislation can be thought of with regard to a 
pyramid metaphor, in the sense that draconian laws aimed at a very select few (potentially) 
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harmful individuals can actually impact the public.930 Specifically, counter-terrorism laws may 
be implemented in which a tiny number of suspected or genuine terrorists suffer serious 
human rights violations, whilst the majority of average law-abiding citizens at the bottom of 
the pyramid may face (in comparison) minor interferences with their human rights. Scheinin 
gives the example of the right to privacy in which new rules on the interception of 
communications, databases and data retention affect everyone. In this sense, it might be 
contended that the OPR thesis deceives the public into believing that only a minority are 
affected by draconian legislation whilst in fact human rights guarantees for the wider public 
are adversely affected. 
Secondly, as Daniel Moeckli contends, ‘exceptional law and law enforcement 
practices…have significant implications beyond the anti-terrorism context: they have a 
tendency to transgress their original temporal, spatial, and communal boundaries and to find 
their way into states’ ordinary legal systems’.931 This closely overlaps and builds upon the 
more general argument that times of crisis or emergency provide the perfect environment for 
a security-minded executive to enact harsh counter-terrorism legislation. Going further, the 
public might be more willing to accept the erosion of human rights guarantees in times of 
emergency, which may target a tiny minority of people, before these restrictions become 
entrenched or even expanded to encroach upon the rights of the public. In other words, what 
were originally measures affecting a tiny minority of the population may become expanded to 
affect the public more widely. In effect, the exceptional situation creates space for harsh 
legislation to filter into the ordinary criminal or civil justice systems. 
As is often shown in matters of national security or public order, laws that carry broad 
definitions or otherwise grant a broad discretion to those charged with implementation risk 
being viewed as arbitrary or discriminatory when they are applied. The seemingly 
disproportionate use of certain police powers in the context of national security and public 
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order against ethnic minorities can be easily identified in the UK. For example, black and 
Asian people continue to be disproportionately subjected to stop and search police 
powers.932 With regards to the use of temporary detention at international terminals pursuant 
to Schedule 7 of the TA 2000, Asian people accounted for 28% of all examinations lasting 
under one hour in the 2015-16 reporting year, rising to 36% of all examinations lasting over 
an hour.933  
A further observation which may help to explain why the right to a fair trial is being eroded, or 
for that matter why respect for human rights more broadly may be waning, concerns what we 
actually mean by the concept of security itself. Whereas the OPR thesis concerns the 
question of whose security is being protected and whose liberty is being restricted, Conor 
Gearty argues that the term ‘security’ itself has been historically focussed on national 
security and ensuring the protection of the State from external and internal threats.934 In 
other words, the very concept of security is not about human security, as the debate about 
balancing liberty and security may imply, but rather the concept is about the security of the 
State. The increasing dominance of national security interests in terrorism trials pays 
testament to this assertion. Gearty contends, however, that there is ‘no need to accept the 
elision of security with state protection the way that an exclusive preoccupation with 
terrorism seems to focus us to do’.935  
On the other hand, Lucia Zedner has argued that pursuant to this balancing task, security 
from the State is in fact being neglected.936 Zedner effectively asks the most pressing 
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question: ‘What tips the balance? In whose interests? And what lies in the scales?’.937 For 
example, Luban argues that the presumption that liberties and rights are different from 
security is wrong in the sense that rights are themselves a form of security against State 
abuse.938 Additionally, Luban contends that the Fallacy of the Perpetual Emergency reflects 
the troubling long-term effect of so-called emergency measures, as was witnessed in the 
aftermath of 9/11 with the detention of thousands of Middle Eastern men.939 
4.4.2 The Rhetoric of Panic, Threat and Fear 
Few contemporary issues attract as much public attention and media coverage as terrorism 
and counter-terrorism, and many commentators have explored how acts of terrorism are 
purposefully theatrical in nature.940 However, in terms of counter-terrorism, fear of future 
terrorist attacks can play a role in eroding the public’s commitment to upholding high human 
rights standards, and ‘especially the rights of those considered to be “other”.’941 As already 
discussed, counter-terrorist hybrid orders have been implemented against a particularly 
narrow category of people, namely, males suspected of involvement in Islamist terrorism. 
However, for Fiona de Londras, an ‘othered enemy’ is just one of the ‘vital ingredients’ 
necessary for ‘panic-related repression’; the others being ‘a serious but unquantifiable risk, 
widespread and deeply felt fear, an impulse towards “security”…a security-conscious 
populace and a cadre of moral entrepreneurs ready to make the case that increasing their 
powers would also increase “our” security’.942 In developing her argument, de Londras 
argues that the downwards recalibration of human rights in the UK and US can be attributed 
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to a combination of genuine ‘bottom-up’ fear and manufactured ‘top-down’ panic.943 These 
different sources of panic are ‘in concert, thus creating a significant political space within 
which to introduce laws and policies that result in an expansion of state power’.944 
Furthermore, de Londras contends that in times of panic, genuine public concern and 
governmental ambition may then correspond which allows for governmental action that 
would be unlikely to be accepted in normal circumstances.945  
Of the two sources of panic, it is perhaps the nature of ‘top-down’ panic which is the most 
concerning and in need of further analysis, particularly in light of the mechanisms explored in 
this thesis which circumvent the criminal law and grant substantial power to the executive. 
One very graphic and publicly observable phenomenon which illustrates the notion of top-
down panic in the UK is the official five-tier threat level system indicating the current threat 
assessment at any given time.946 Other countries have, or have had, similar mechanisms, 
most notable of which was the almost identical ‘Homeland Security Advisory System’ which 
functioned in the USA between 2002 and 2011.947 Since August 2006 in the UK, the Joint 
Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC), a self-standing organisation comprised of security 
experts from a variety of governmental departments, has set the threat level covering 
international terrorism threats. The UK’s domestic Security Service, ‘MI5’, sets the threat 
level covering Irish and Northern Ireland-related domestic terror threats. The five tiers range 
from ‘Low’ and escalate through ‘Moderate’, ‘Substantial’, ‘Severe’, and peak at ‘Critical’ at 
the most serious.  
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After nearly two years in which the threat from international terrorism in the UK was deemed 
to be ‘Substantial’, the threat level was increased to ‘Severe’ in August 2014 when the role of 
British citizens who had left the country to fight in the conflicts in Iraq and Syria became 
clearer.948 Speaking shortly after the announcement of the increase in the UK terror threat 
level, the Home Secretary said that the increase was related to developments in Syria and 
Iraq where terrorist groups were ‘planning attacks against the West. Some of these plots are 
likely to involve foreign fighters who have travelled there from the UK and Europe to take 
part in those conflicts’.949 The UK system received widespread attention again in May 2017 
following the Manchester Arena terrorist attack, when the threat level was temporarily raised 
to ‘Critical’ for four days,950 before returning to ‘Severe’, whilst the police and Security 
Service sought to identify whether the perpetrator had acted alone or with assistance. 
The effectiveness and practicality of publicly disseminated terror alert levels such as these 
can be questioned for a number of reasons. First, at no point since the introduction of the UK 
system in 2006 has the threat from international terrorism dropped below the third tier, 
‘Substantial’. Whilst the lowest tiers represent conceivable choices which provide standards 
to be striven for eventually if the terrorist threat subsides, the steady maintenance of the 
threat level at the highest tiers arguably plays a significant role in publicly institutionalising a 
sense of permanent threat. Having said that, despite the obvious severity of the threat from 
international terrorism in recent months and years, the JTAC has demonstrated considerable 
restraint by only temporarily triggering the highest level twice in 2017.951 
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Second, the instructions given to the public as the threat level escalates are of limited use. 
On the one hand, the public are strongly encouraged, albeit in vague language, to be more 
vigilant and alert, and to assist the police when they can, begging the question as to what 
practical steps the majority of the public can actually take, if any.952 In contrast, operators of 
city centres and major public venues such as shopping centres and places of entertainment 
have received additional training pursuant to Project Argus,953 which instructs these 
individuals how to respond to terror threat levels. More dramatically, the police and security 
services can be given extra resources and powers in times of crisis which can be extremely 
visible, as demonstrated by the recent deployment of soldiers on the streets of London after 
the Manchester Arena attack.954 Standing in some contrast, for example, the USA’s 
DEFCON five-tier system requires the American military to implement specific actions in 
readiness for a potential conflict, whilst in a different context, hurricane warnings can instruct 
people to evacuate their homes or buy essential supplies.955 
As already mentioned, the UK’s experience in the aftermath of 9/11 raised particular 
concerns over the British Government’s rhetoric towards the existence of a state of 
emergency.956 On the threat of international terrorism and the existence of a state of 
emergency in the UK, the JCHR noted in 2010 that despite the withdrawal of the derogations 
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from the ECHR and the ICCPR in 2005, the British government had never actually 
relinquished its assertion that a public emergency threatening the life of the nation existed.957 
For example, in August 2007 the Government responded to the JCHR and insisted that 
despite the introduction of Control Orders and revocation of the derogation from the ECHR, 
its position on whether the UK faced a public emergency had not changed since 2001, and if 
anything that the threat had increased.958 In December 2009, the JCHR heard evidence from 
David Hanson MP, the Minister of State for Security, Counter-Terrorism, Crime and Policing. 
When pressed about the Government’s current position, the Minister maintained that there 
was still a potential public emergency,959 whilst also avoiding the question of how low the 
threat level would have to get before a public emergency no longer existed.960 When it was 
put forward by the Chairman of the JCHR to the Minister that the UK was in a permanent 
state of emergency, the Minister appeared to acquiesce to the suggestion.961 
As such, the position of the Blair Government over the question of the existence of an 
emergency was repeatedly reprimanded by the JCHR: 
The Government's position that there is a public emergency threatening 
the life of the nation is important because it determines the starting point in 
any debate about the justification for counter-terrorism powers. Like the 
language of the ‘War on Terror’, it asserts the existence of a state of 
exception, which implies that exceptional measures require less 
justification than when times are normal. It amounts to a permanent claim 
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that courts and other accountability mechanisms should defer to the 
Government's assessment of what measures are required.962 
The concept of ‘top-down panic’ and the ‘deleterious effect’ that the vague notion of a ‘threat’ 
can have on public debate can also be seen in the legislative processes behind the 
enactment of the statutory regimes pertaining to counter-terrorist hybrid orders. 
Underpinning this argument, a number of basic assumptions can be made. Firstly, given the 
growth of risk-averse policies and powers in the UK and the prioritisation of security, the 
‘profound fear of further attack weighs heavily in favour of security and against the protection 
of liberties’.963 Secondly, ‘the more ill-defined the threat, the greater its potential to tip the 
balance in favour of tougher security measures, to detain and hold suspects on the slightest 
of grounds, to carry out covert searches, and to suspend normal protections associated with 
due process and a fair trial’.964  
4.4.3 Results of Content Analysis 
Accordingly, in light of the general discussion of methodology earlier in Chapter 1,965 some 
content analysis was undertaken for the purposes of this thesis. This was done in order to 
investigate the rhetoric of panic, threat and fear in the legislative processes leading to the 
enactment of the four key Acts of Parliament underpinning the counter-terrorist hybrid order 
regimes which were analysed in Chapter 3. Specifically, these are the Prevention of 
Terrorism (PT) Bill, the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIM) Bill and the 
Counter-Terrorism and Security (CTS) Bill, which introduced Control Orders, TPIMs and 
TEOs respectively, whilst the Justice and Security (JS) Bill provided a significant opportunity 
for Parliament and the public to critically review the use of CMP.  
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In order to ensure consistency, the analysis was confined to the second readings and 
committee stages of each Bill in both Houses of Parliament as these arguably represent the 
most crucial stages of the legislative process,966 whilst according strongly with the purpose of 
the more critically orientated methodologies outlined earlier which prioritise primary data.967 
Furthermore, in respect of the methodological commitment to show a ‘sensitivity to power’, it 
is imperative to pay particular attention to the contributions of some parliamentarians, 
Ministers in particular, who often introduce Bills in readings and whose contributions can 
dominate debates. 
Before discussing the findings however, it is important to acknowledge the possible flaws 
and important differences of the sources which may limit the reliability and usefulness of the 
research. Firstly, the Bills were not all put through the legislative process in an identical 
manner, meaning that they differed in several important ways. Perhaps most significantly, 
the PT Bill was subject to a fast-track legislative procedure,968 whereas the CTS Bill was 
semi fast-tracked through Parliament, limiting their exposure to scrutiny in and outside of the 
legislative process.969 In contrast, the TPIM Bill and JS Bill were not subject to the same time 
pressures and did therefore face more pre-legislative scrutiny.970  
Additionally, when the PT Bill and the CTS Bill reached the committee stages in the House 
of Commons, they were considered by Committees of the Whole House, meaning that the 
Bills were considered in the main chamber with every Member of Parliament able to 
participate and vote on its content.971 This is a rare process usually reserved for Bills of 
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major constitutional importance or those the Government wishes to pass quickly, amongst 
other things.972   
Secondly, the second readings and committee stage debates pertaining to the four Bills 
varied in length considerably, and as such, the sources that were analysed were not of 
similar length.973 For example, the House of Lords committee stage debates were by far the 
lengthiest stages in terms of total word count during the enactment of the PT, JS and CTS 
Bills, whereas the House of Commons committee stage debate was the lengthiest stage 
during the enactment of the TPIM Bill.  As such, it may be difficult to accurately compare the 
sources and draw any definitive conclusions. Furthermore, given the fast-tracked nature of 
the PT Bill and the semi fast-tracked nature of the CTS Bill, it is somewhat ironic that the 
parliamentary stages leading to the enactment of these two statutes were both lengthier than 
the equivalent stages during the passing of the TPIM Bill. However, this may be countered 
by the fact that parliamentary committees and civil society had far less time, if indeed any at 
all, to consider the proposals, undertake consultation, and provide critique or make 
recommendations to Parliament. 
Lastly, there was some disparity between the amount of emphasis each of the four Bills 
placed upon the issues which this thesis is investigating. Whereas the PT Bill and the TPIM 
Bill focussed solely upon the statutory regimes pertaining to Control Orders and TPIMs 
respectively, the JS Bill concerned the oversight of intelligence and security agencies as well 
as the extension of CMP into the civil justice system. Moreover, the CTS Bill concerned a 
number of proposed amendments to existing counter-terrorism powers, including the existing 
TPIM mechanism, as well as the creation of the TEO mechanism and other new powers. As 
such, the sources analysed varied in how much of their content concerned counter-terrorist 
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hybrid orders. Despite these possible concerns, the results provide many interesting points 
to reflect upon, some of which lend support to this thesis.  
With the aims and objectives of this thesis in mind, a number of queries were performed in 
respect of each Bill. These findings are summarised below in various figures and 
subsequently analysed, whilst the exact methods, search parameters and evidence of the 
research can be found in Appendix II. Given the limitations of these sources outlined earlier, 
no definitive conclusions should be drawn from the findings, and any conclusions that 
directly compare and contrast the various Bills should be treated with caution. However, the 
findings may help to shed some light on the general prevalence of rhetoric in the legislative 
processes leading to the enactment of counter-terrorist legislation. 
Firstly, Query 1 entailed a comprehensive word frequency search of the second readings 
and committee stages of the four Bills to identify the general distribution of keywords that 
featured in the debates, with the condensed results displayed in Figures I-IV.974 Before 
examining some of these notions and the specific contributions of certain parliamentarians in 
more detail, a brief analysis of the general distribution and frequency of keywords may be 
useful as it ‘can help to acquire a better grasp of the leitmotif of deliberations in the making 
of counter-terrorism policies’.975 From these findings, it will be useful to compare and 
contrast how often certain notions were raised in the second readings and committee stage 
debates. 
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Figure I: Total Distribution of Keywords in the Second Reading and Committee Stage 
Debates Pertaining to the Prevention of Terrorism Bill 
 
Figure II: Total Distribution of Keywords in the Second Reading and Committee Stage 
Debates Pertaining to the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill 
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Figure III: Total Distribution of Keywords in the Second Reading and Committee Stage 
Debates Pertaining to the Justice and Security Bill 
 
Figure IV: Total Distribution of Keywords in the Second Reading and Committee Stage 
Debates Pertaining to the Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill 
 
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500
amendments
committees
governments
security
noble
material’ 
courts’ 
informed
ministers
proceedings
public
right
nations
judges
member
intelligence
clause
interest
points
states
evidence
closed
friend
cases
column
whether
issue
houses
procedures
lords’ 
Justice and Security Bill: Total Distribution of Keywords in Second 
Readings and Committee Stages 
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400
amendments
noble
governments
right
terrorism
people
powers
individual
issue
ministers
clause
points
secretary
order
community
column
friend
security
states
legislative
prevent
relation
review
provide
country
returns
think
committees
housing
importantly
Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill: Total Distribution of Keywords 
in Second Readings and Committee Stages 
208 
 
As Figures I-IV illustrate, common parliamentary language such as ‘amendments’, ‘noble’, 
‘member’ and ‘ministers’ featured heavily in all the debates, which is unsurprising and of little 
value for the purposes of this thesis given the well-known formalities of parliamentary 
debates. Of far greater importance are how and why other notions were represented in the 
parliamentary debates, in particular those notions that shed some light upon the UK’s 
general approach to counter-terrorism.  
For example, the language contained in all of the examined parliamentary stages 
demonstrates to some extent how the UK has persistently rejected the war paradigm,976 
suggesting instead that the UK’s general counter-terrorism approach is indeed grounded in 
the rhetoric of law. In all of the debates examined, the notion of a ‘court’ features heavily,977 
suggesting that the role of the judiciary is significant in respect of the counter-terrorism 
powers at stake. Other notions concerning judicial proceedings feature heavily in the PT and 
JS Bill debates in particular, with words such as ‘evidence’ and ‘judge’ featuring often in 
both.978 Other notions in the various debates which further underpin the rhetoric of law 
include ‘derogation’ in respect of the PT Bill,979 and ‘proceedings’ and ‘disclosure’ in respect 
of the JS Bill.980 
In contrast to these findings, which provide some evidence that the UK’s counter-terrorism 
approach is grounded in the rhetoric of law, adversarial and confrontational language 
scarcely featured in the debates. In that respect, Query 2 sought to identify how often 
provocative notions of a ‘battle’, ‘campaign’, ‘conflict’, ‘fight’, ‘struggle’, or ‘war’ in the context 
of countering terrorism were mentioned in the debates. As Figure V illustrates below, these 
notions did not feature heavily in the various parliamentary debates when compared to the 
rhetoric grounded in law. 
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Figure V: Frequency of Keywords Describing the Nature of UK Counter-Terrorism in 
the Second Reading and Committee Stage Debates Pertaining to the Four Bills 
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Having verified, to some extent, that the UK’s counter-terrorism approach has generally 
been grounded in the rhetoric of law, it may also be useful to consider the metaphor of 
balance between liberty and security that is often invoked when discussing national security 
and the legal responses to terrorism. As discussed earlier, the purportedly competing 
demands of the dual imperatives of liberty and security have been considered in depth by 
political, philosophical and legal commentators.982 
In that respect, the purpose of Query 3 was to explore whether the perceived conflict 
between the rights of an individual and the rights of wider society factored into parliamentary 
debate, as the earlier analysis in this Chapter seems to imply.983 The Query identified 
instances in which the notion of ‘balance’ was used to describe the relationship between the 
notion of security (whether that be state security or public security) and the civil liberties or 
rights of individuals. 
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Figure VI: Frequency of References to the Balance between Security and Civil 
Liberties in the Second Reading and Committee Stage Debates Pertaining to the Four 
Bills 
 
As the results from Query 3 which are illustrated in Figure VI indicate, the notion of striking a 
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debates. For example, when opening the Bill’s second reading, the then Home Secretary, 
Theresa May, emphasised that the balance between national security and civil liberties had 
to be re-struck.986 It is also unsurprising that the notion featured heavily in the Justice and 
Security Bill parliamentary debates, given that one of the fundamental objectives of the Bill 
was to significantly expand CMP by conferring the power upon the Secretary of State to 
apply for any civil trial to proceed under CMP. 
Lastly, in order to provide a more general picture of the prevalence of the rhetoric of panic, 
threat and fear in the various parliamentary stages, it will be important to consider how the 
notion of the terrorist threat was perceived and described by parliamentarians. As the 
proposed legislation inherently concerned matters of national security and counter-terrorism, 
it would be expected that the general notion of a terrorist ‘threat’ would feature prominently in 
all of the parliamentary debates that led to the enactment of the four Acts. 
Of far greater importance is how the nature of the terrorist ‘threat’ in question was actually 
perceived and described by certain parliamentarians. As already discussed, in order to 
demonstrate sensitivity to issues of power, it is important to consider the contributions of 
Government ministers and Opposition shadow ministers.987 On the one hand, Government 
ministers represent the executive which dominates Parliament, whilst on the other, the 
contributions of Opposition shadow ministers can strongly indicate if the Bill enjoys 
bipartisan support.  
As such, the purpose of Query 4 was to analyse how and how often the terrorist threat was 
described by parliamentarians as being qualitatively different to previous threats (i.e. that the 
threat was evolving, different or unique), and how often the gravity of the terrorist threat was 
emphasised (i.e. that the threat was grave, serious or severe). The notion of ‘risk’ was 
initially considered due to its significance in counter-terrorism lexicon and relative similarity in 
meaning, but this was ultimately excluded for a number or reasons: the word ‘risk’ is 
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inherently less serious and more malleable than ‘threat’, and the word ‘threat’ is used 
exclusively by the authorities in relation to the terror alert levels explored earlier.988  
Figure VII: Frequency of Keywords Describing the Terrorist ‘Threat’ in the Second 
Reading and Committee Stage Debates Pertaining to the Four Bills 
 
As the results obtained by Query 4 and displayed in Figure VII indicate, the notion that the 
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moderately in the various parliamentary debates, but these references remains significant 
nevertheless. In a general sense, it is understandable to some extent why the notion was 
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Government had to decide how to deal with terrorist suspects who could not be deported or 
prosecuted, nor no longer indefinitely detained.989 Secondly, the CTS Bill was partly in 
response to the perceived changing nature of the terrorist threat, with UK citizens or citizens 
with the right to remain in the UK travelling to fight in Syria and Iraq (i.e. FTFs), before 
returning to the UK.990  
However, when introducing the two Bills for debate in the second readings in the House of 
Commons, the respective Home Secretaries emphasised more specifically that the new 
powers were necessary in response to qualitatively different threats. When introducing the 
PT Bill, the Home Secretary, Charles Clarke, stated that ‘Al-Qaeda and its network are 
qualitatively different in their destructive character’ due to its ‘catastrophic lack of restraint’ 
and the fact that its resources and capabilities were of an ‘utterly different order’.991 When 
introducing the CTS Bill, the then Home Secretary Theresa May, stressed that the ‘threat 
from terrorism is becoming ever-more complex and diverse’, emphasising that ‘[w]e face the 
very serious prospect that British nationals who have fought with terrorist groups in Syria and 
Iraq will seek to radicalise others, or carry out attacks here’.992 
In respect of the TPIM Bill debates, which featured far fewer references to the existence of a 
qualitatively different terrorist threat, this may accord with the objective of the Bill which was 
intended to liberalise existing counter-terrorism powers under the PTA 2005 to some extent, 
whilst responding to the same or similar nature of the terrorist threat.  
Moreover, as the results obtained by Query 4 and displayed in Figure VII indicate, notions 
that emphasised the serious gravity of the terrorist ‘threat’ were often raised during the 
second readings and committee stages of each Bill in both Houses of Parliament, although 
                                                          
989
 See above, section 3.2.3. 
990
 See above, section 3.3.3. 
991
 C. Clarke, SSHD, HC Deb 23 February 2005, vol 431, cols 333-334 as referenced in Horne & 
Walker, ‘Lessons Learned from Political Constitutionalism?’ (n. 55) 273-274. See also Home 
Office, Prevention of Terrorism Bill 2005 Background Briefing Papers: Paper One: The Threat (TSO, 
2005). 
992
 T. May, SSHD, HC Deb 2 December 2014, vol 589, col 207. 
215 
 
significantly less so for the JS Bill when compared to the other three Bills in question. These 
findings are, again, arguably unsurprising for a number of reasons.  
Firstly, the prevalence of these notions in the PT Bill and CTS Bill debates in particular may 
further reflect the fast-tracked nature of these Bills, and the assumption that new legislation 
was required to respond to the perceived changing nature of the threat. With the TPIM Bill, 
despite the aim to re-strike the balance between security and liberty, the prevalence of 
similar rhetoric in these debates may, in part, stem from the perceived continuation of the 
terrorist threat. Insofar as the JS Bill debates are concerned, which featured far fewer 
references to the serious gravity of the terrorist threat, this may reflect the fact that the Bill 
also addressed the oversight of intelligence agencies, which therefore stretched the scope of 
the debates beyond counter-terrorism issues. Equally, the Bill was presented to Parliament 
in order to extend the possibility of hearing proceedings under CMP to all civil trials, rather 
than to establish wholly new and novel powers pertaining to national security. 
Given the underlying argument of the thesis and the significance of these findings, it will be 
important to consider the specific contributions of some parliamentarians in more detail. 
Clearly, the notion of a terrorist ‘threat’ was prevalent during the debates pertaining to the 
fast-tracked PT Bill.993 For example, when introducing the PT Bill for its second reading in 
the House of Commons, the Home Secretary, Charles Clarke, opened his speech with a 
statement to that effect, illustrating the apparent urgency of the fast-tracked Bill: 
The core of the case for this legislation is that this country faces substantial 
and real threats to the freedoms of institutions and people in our society 
that are qualitatively different since 11 September 2001. Despite this 
country's long experience over decades of terrorism of different kinds in 
relation to Ireland and anti-colonial struggles of various descriptions, the 
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nature of the threat that we now face is of a qualitatively different order 
and, in my opinion, requires qualitatively different measures.994 
Similarly, when introducing the Bill in the House of Lords for its second reading, the 
Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs and Lord Chancellor, Lord Falconer, stated early 
in his speech that the Bill needed to be ‘seen in the context of the scale of the continuing 
and serious threat to the security of the United Kingdom from terrorism’.995 
Despite being passed in 17 days, the passage of the PT Bill was a notoriously troublesome 
process, provoking widespread disagreements between the House of Commons and the 
House of Lords that ultimately led to legislative ‘ping-pong’ which involved Parliament sitting 
for 36 consecutive hours to agree the Bill’s final content.996 Insofar as the issue of 
bipartanship is concerned, the Bill struggled to gain widespread support and faced 
opposition from the Conservative Party and Liberal Democrats due to the substantive 
conditions that could be imposed under Control Orders, and concerns over procedural 
fairness when imposing the mechanisms. Nevertheless, during the Bill’s second reading, the 
Shadow Home Secretary, David Davis, acknowledged the ‘qualitatively different set of 
terrorist threats than existed before’,997 therefore appearing to echo some Governmental 
rhetoric. Despite the opposition of the Conservative Party, the Bill eventually attracted 
enough parliamentary support following the insertion of a sunset clause which required the 
operative provisions of the Act to be subject to annual renewal.998 
In respect of the TPIM Bill, which was not fast-tracked through the legislative process as the 
PT Bill was, the notion of the terrorist ‘threat’ remained prevalent nevertheless.999 There was, 
on the face of it however, greater concern for other issues at stake. Whilst insisting that the 
                                                          
994
 C. Clarke, SSHD, HC Deb 23 February 2005, vol 431, col 333. 
995
 Lord Falconer, Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs and Lord Chancellor, HL Deb 1 March 
2005, vol 670, col 116. 
996
 Horne & Walker, ‘Lessons Learned from Political Constitutionalism?’ (n. 55) 272; House of Lords 
Select Committee on the Constitution, Fast-Track Legislation (n. 55) para 82. 
997
 D. Davis, Shadow SSHD, HC Deb 23 February 2005, vol 431, col 354. 
998
 PTA 2005, s. 13. 
999
 See above Figure II and Figure VII. 
217 
 
threat remained serious, parliamentarians emphasised that other issues had influenced the 
introduction of the Bill. When the Home Secretary, Theresa May, introduced the Bill to the 
House of Commons for its second reading, she acknowledged the threat but immediately 
reflected the wish of the Government to strike a fairer balance between security and liberty: 
There is no greater task for any Government than to protect their citizens, 
to uphold their values and to defend their way of life, but when we face 
such a significant threat from terrorism over so great a period it becomes 
even more important that the Government ensure that the protection of our 
citizens does not overshadow the freedoms of us all.1000 
Speaking in a similar tone when introducing the Bill in the House of Lords for its second 
reading, Lord Henley, the Minister of State for the Home Office, opened his speech by 
insisting that protecting the public from terrorism was always the ‘top priority of the 
Government’, and that the Government was ‘committed to ensuring that the police and 
others have the powers they need to tackle terrorism’.1001 However, Lord Henley added that 
the Government was also ‘committed to ensuring that there is a correct balance between 
state powers and the civil liberties of individual citizens’.1002 
Insofar as the issue of bipartanship is concerned, the TPIM Bill generated controversy and 
political disagreements for very different reasons to the PTA 2005. The Shadow Home 
Secretary, Yvette Cooper, criticised the Bill for ‘recreating most of control orders while 
pretending not to do so’,1003 which would simultaneously weaken the powers of the Home 
Secretary in important ways, in particular, the removal of the power to forcibly relocate terror 
suspects. At the same time, the Labour Opposition criticised the inclusion of fewer 
safeguards, in particular, the decision to omit an annual renewal sunset clause from the 
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Bill.1004 It was clear that for the Labour Party, the terrorist threat did not justify the substitution 
of the PTA 2005 for a more liberal framework. For example, during the House of Commons 
committee stage, Gerry Sutcliffe, the Shadow Minister for Home Affairs, emphasised that 
‘The risk level is at severe. We face threats from a whole range of people. When I was 
Prisons Minister, I visited some of our prisons and I saw some of the terrorists who had been 
prosecuted, and they really are scary people’.1005 Ultimately, the Bill was passed despite the 
opposition of the Labour Party. 
Lastly, in respect of the CTS Bill, the terrorist threat was again greatly emphasised.1006 When 
the Home Secretary, Theresa May, introduced the CTS Bill to the House of Commons for its 
second reading, the immediacy of the terrorist threat had seemingly resurfaced. The Home 
Secretary stated that the threat from terrorism was ‘serious, and it is growing’.1007 However, 
reflecting the apparent shift in the source of the threat when introducing the CTS Bill for its 
second reading in the House of Lords, Lord Bates, the Under-Secretary of State for the 
Home Office, referred to the ‘emergence of ISIL and its territorial gains in Syria and Iraq’ 
which ‘present a clear and present threat to our national security’.1008 Lord Bates then added 
that ‘nearly 600 people from the UK’ were thought to have travelled to the region with almost 
half having returned.1009 
In contrast to the PT and TPIM Bills which encountered strong opposition during the 
legislative process, the CTS Bill enjoyed support from the Labour Party to the extent that the 
Bill passed the reading stages in the House of Commons without division. For example, the 
Shadow Home Secretary, Yvette Cooper, expressed her support for the Bill and stressed the 
severity of the terrorist threat during its second reading: ‘At a time when the terror threat has 
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grown, more action is needed to make sure that the police, the security agencies and other 
organisations have the powers that they need to protect us.’1010 
Accordingly, the findings gathered by Query 4 and displayed in Figure VII go some way to 
support the assumptions made earlier. Firstly, as de Londras argued, ‘panic-related 
repression’ can come about through the identification of a serious but unquantifiable risk, 
‘widespread and deeply felt fear’, and ‘an impulse towards security’.1011 The frequency and 
quality of language used to convey the nature of the terrorist threat in the parliamentary 
debates corresponds with these assertions. Secondly, as Zedner argued, the fear of further 
attack can weigh heavily in favour of security and against civil liberties, and ‘the more ill-
defined the threat, the greater its potential to tip the balance in favour of tougher security 
measures, to detain and hold suspects on the slightest of grounds, to carry out covert 
searches, and to suspend normal protections associated with due process and a fair 
trial’.1012 The results illustrated in Figure VII undoubtedly lend support to these arguments. 
 
4.5 Looking Beyond Counter-Terrorist Hybrid Orders: The Normalisation of the 
Exceptional 
It is now a truism that legislation which undermines civil liberties in the name of national 
security can be gradually normalised over time.1013 Indeed, if what was originally justified as 
an exception and necessary in response to a threat is then slowly spread to other areas of 
law, the base level of what is considered acceptable may be pushed up as the unthinkable 
actually becomes normalised over time.1014 In other words, ‘in any future crisis government 
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will take as its starting point the experience of extraordinary powers and authority granted 
and exercised during previous emergencies’.1015 
In the context of states of emergency, the JCHR warned in 2010 against the British 
government’s rhetoric and practice which ran the risk of ‘normalising the exceptional’.1016 
This was because, since the enactment of the ATCS Act 2001 which resulted in the 
Government’s derogation from Article 5 of the ECHR, the British position that a state of 
emergency was in existence lasted, perhaps, until at least December 2009, whilst there has 
never been an official retraction since. Moreover, with the new Coalition Government in May 
2010 it was not clear if the situation had changed. This is problematic for several reasons. 
As the JCHR suggested, ‘the Government’s approach means that in effect there is a 
permanent state of emergency, and that this inevitably has a deleterious effect on public 
debate about the justification for counter-terrorism measures’.1017 
Going further, the JCHR spoke more cautiously about the behaviour of the British 
Government and the nature of executive power in the UK when public emergencies arise. 
The Committee stated, ‘under our current arrangements derogation is an essentially 
executive act and there is very little to ensure that there will be an opportunity for 
parliamentary scrutiny of the Government’s justification for derogating in the event that it 
decides to do so’.1018 This led the JCHR to suggest that there is a ‘woeful lack of 
opportunities for parliamentary scrutiny of such a derogation under current arrangements’ to 
the extent that they suggested a statutory framework be enacted to allow proper 
parliamentary scrutiny.1019 
With these issues in mind, some of the conduct of the UK in the past decade and particularly 
in the past few years has raised concerns that certain aspects underpinning counter-terrorist 
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hybrid orders that have been explored in this thesis are no longer exceptional phenomenon. 
Rather, the progressive expansion of CMP into other areas of law, and plans to introduce a 
new counter-extremism civil order that may replicate some of the fundamental 
characteristics of counter-terrorist hybrid orders, strongly indicates that exceptional aspects 
of contemporary national security policy are rapidly becoming more mainstream and 
normalised. 
4.5.1 Closed Material Procedures 
The use of CMP, which has been a particular focus of this study, is a clear example of an 
exceptional phenomenon that has become normalised and spread to other areas of law.1020 
It was noted in the House of Commons in 2010 that there were ‘no fewer than 22 different 
types of court hearings’ in which Special Advocates could be deployed.1021 Since the 
introduction of the SIAC in 1997,1022 the use of CMP has been extended to many other 
courts and tribunals. In addition to proceedings concerning the three mechanisms analysed 
in this study, CMP can be used in, or by, inter alia the Northern Ireland National Security 
Certificate Review Tribunal;1023 the Proscribed Organisations Appeals Commission;1024 the 
Investigatory Powers Tribunal;1025 the Pathogens Access Appeals Commission;1026 the 
Northern Ireland Sentences and Life Sentences Review Commissioners;1027 Parole Board 
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hearings;1028 employment tribunals;1029 asset-freezing and financial restrictions 
proceedings;1030 and passport seizures.1031  
Although these developments are all significant in their own right, the possibility for a court to 
authorise the use of CMP in any civil trial pursuant to the JSA 2013 is the most significant 
extension.1032 Specifically, the JSA 2013 extends the possibility of implementing CMPs in 
any civil case following an application to the High Court, Court of Appeal, Court of Session, 
or Supreme Court.1033 During the consultation stage of the Justice and Security Green Paper 
in 2012, Eric Metcalfe stated before the JCHR in 2012 that: 
It is interesting to note that the Lord Chancellor…suggested that the secret 
evidence or the closed material procedure would only be applied to a 
handful of cases. You go back to Hansard in 1997 when the Special 
Immigration Appeals Commission bill was first being debated and you find 
similar statements by Home Office Ministers…saying exactly this, that the 
special advocate closed material procedure in SIAC would only be used in 
a handful of cases. Since that time, over the last 15 years, the use of 
closed proceedings in UK courts and tribunals has expanded 
considerably.1034 
                                                          
1028
 The possibility of CMP in parole board hearings first applied in Northern Ireland. See Criminal 
Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 2008 [SI 2008/1216] and the Parole Commissioners’ Rules (Northern 
Ireland) 2009 [SI 2009/82]. This was later extended to the UK more broadly. See the Parole Board 
Rules 2011 [SI 2011/2947] issued by the Secretary of State for Justice under the powers conferred by 
the Criminal Justice Act 2003, s. 239(5). 
1029
 In Northern Ireland, see the Industrial Tribunals (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) 
Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2005. In the rest of the UK, see Employment Tribunals Act 1996, s. 10 
and Schedules 1 and 2 of the Employment Tribunals (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) 
Regulations 2004. See also the Race Relations Act 1976, s. 67A(2), as amended by the Race 
Relations (Amendment) Act 2000, s. 8. 
1030
 Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, ss. 66-68 and Part 79 of the CPR. 
1031
 CTS Act 2015, s. 3(3). 
1032
 JSA 2013, s. 6. 
1033
 ibid. 
1034
 JCHR, The Justice and Security Green Paper (2010-12, HC 1777-i-v) Oral Evidence (6 March 
2012). 
223 
 
In that regard, applications made to court for a trial to proceed under CMP pursuant to 
section 6 of the JSA 2013 doubled in the second year of the statute’s existence. During 
2013-2014, five applications were made,1035 whereas 11 applications were made during 
2014-2015.1036 The number of applications rose again slightly to 12 during 2015-2016.1037 
Reflecting on the second reporting year, Lawrence McNamara warned that the increase in 
applications and range of issues concerned made it clear that ‘closed material proceedings 
and closed judgments cannot be considered extraordinary’ but that they ‘appear to be 
becoming the norm’, thus representing ‘a major departure from our traditions of open justice 
and the accountability those traditions help secure’.1038 
In essence, as exceptional measures become more widespread, the adverse consequences 
of the measures become more commonplace, and may therefore become more tolerated 
and accepted amongst society. The extension of CMP represents an extension of a legal 
framework which undermines certain fair trial guarantees of the accused, thus indicating the 
second characteristic of behaviour typically exhibited by States enduring prolonged 
emergencies. Moreover, as the use of CMP becomes more common in civil proceedings, the 
criminal law as the traditional route to address alleged serious activity may be neglected. 
Ultimately, as Lord Neuberger recognised in Al Rawi v. Security Service, ‘[I]t is a melancholy 
truth that a procedure or approach which is sanctioned by a court expressly on the basis that 
it “is applicable only in exceptional circumstances” nonetheless often becomes common 
practice’.1039 
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4.5.2 The Counter-Extremism Proposals 
The Cameron Government’s counter-extremism proposals under the Counter-Extremism 
and Safeguarding Bill demonstrate how other aspects pertaining to the various counter-
terrorist hybrid order regimes may be normalised further.1040 Dispensing with the various 
‘Orders’ described in the previous ‘Counter-Extremism Bill’ outlined in 2015,1041 the new Bill, 
if the current Government seeks to pursue it, will include inter alia a ‘new civil order regime 
to restrict extremist activity’. It is entirely possible that these orders will be implemented and 
administered in a similar manner to counter-terrorist hybrid orders, and in that respect, 
present similar challenges to the right to a fair trial. Like counter-terrorist hybrid orders, one 
of the most fundamental aspects of the new civil order regime will be the threshold of belief 
or suspicion that must be met in order to impose the mechanism. Moreover, it remains to be 
seen what role the courts will have in the implementation of the orders, and equally crucial, 
whether the relevant proceedings will be heard under CMP. More broadly, the former Prime 
Minister, David Cameron, repeatedly described the struggle to defeat extremism as a 
‘generational challenge’,1042 indicating perhaps that when the Counter-Extremism and 
Safeguarding Bill comes before Parliament, it may be subjected to rhetoric similar to that 
witnessed during the enactment of the counter-terrorist hybrid order statutory regimes. 
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During the research phase of this study, a freedom of information request was submitted to 
the Home Office in the attempt to clarify the nature of the proposed civil order regime.1043 
Although the request was unsuccessful, the previous Government had pledged to conduct a 
full and wide public consultation on the Bill in its entirety.1044 This will provide a useful 
window of opportunity for relevant stakeholders to input into the drafting of the proposals. 
Confirming that many of the concerns explored in this thesis will arise with the new 
proposals, Karen Bradley, the then Government Minister for Preventing Abuse, Exploitation 
and Crime, discussed the proposed ‘civil order regime’ at length when presenting evidence 
before the JCHR in June 2016.1045 The Minister suggested that the Government were 
envisaging: 
[A] civil order regime, the breach of which would be a criminal act. We are 
looking at quite a high threshold, because breach of it would be not a civil 
penalty but a criminal penalty. We are looking at what would be the right 
threshold and level for that civil order, so that we can deal with activities 
that do not get to the criminal level of activity for incitement.1046 
As such, it is entirely possible that the civil orders will be implemented by the Home 
Secretary on the basis of reasonable suspicion or belief, or on the balance of probabilities, of 
the individual’s involvement in extremist behaviour. As experience with counter-terrorist 
hybrid orders demonstrates, whether relying upon ‘reasonable suspicion’, ‘reasonable belief’ 
or the ‘balance of probabilities’, the standards all fall someway short of the tougher and more 
familiar criminal standard of ‘beyond all reasonable doubt’ which is integral to the more 
stringent criminal limb of the right to a fair trial. Moreover, the proposals appear to replicate 
counter-terrorist hybrid orders by attaching criminal penalties to the breach of conditions 
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which are imposed upon individuals in proceedings conducted under the less stringent civil 
limb of the right to a fair trial. As such, the implementation and judicial oversight of the new 
civil order regime may run the risk of replicating some of the most controversial aspects of 
Control Orders, TPIMs and TEOs by departing from the ordinary protections afforded under 
the criminal law.  
Like the terminology underpinning counter-terrorist hybrid orders, clear problems will also lie 
in the definitions of key terms operating at the heart of the counter-extremism proposals. In 
particular, much controversy has developed over the meaning of ‘extremism’, and what 
actions or beliefs will amount to ‘violent extremism’ and ‘non-violent extremism’.1047 
Presenting evidence before the JCHR on the Extremism Bill, the previous and the then in 
post Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation expressed doubts over the proposals, 
which the JCHR reflected in its recently published report on the proposals.1048 Lord Carlile 
stated that many of the powers will be extremely hard to define, and in any event would likely 
be ‘butchered’ in the House of Lords.1049 Moreover, Lord Carlile expressed concern at 
making ‘unlawful that which we have always taken to be lawful’, offering the examples of 
people who advocated creationism or people who refuse to speak English and only speak 
Welsh.1050 Anderson concurred and suggested it was practically impossible to define 
‘extremism’.1051 The widespread concerns with the potential definition of ‘extremism’ and 
implications of the extremism proposals have also been voiced by senior police officers,1052 
and an alliance of politicians, campaign organisations and faith groups.1053 
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In that regard, the former IRTL has identified 15 particularly difficult issues which the 
counter-extremism proposals raise.1054 Insofar as the right to a fair trial is concerned, the 
Reviewer effectively summarised one of the most recurring criticisms of counter-terrorist 
hybrid orders when he questioned ‘why it is deemed necessary to resort to civil orders rather 
than the creation of additional criminal offences, thereby removing the protections inherent in 
jury trial from those accused of extremist activity’.1055 Repeating these sentiments in March 
2016 whilst presenting oral evidence on the Extremism Bill before the JCHR, Anderson 
expressed ‘great reservation about using a system of civil orders as a substitute for trial by 
jury’.1056 The Independent Reviewer also probed what the maximum duration and lapse 
period of ‘Extremism Disruption Orders’ would be,1057 before questioning ‘the penalties for 
breach of the new civil orders that the criminal courts will be able to impose, and whether 
those penalties are to be considered proportionate in view of the types of conduct being 
restrained’.1058 Furthermore, the Reviewer has queried ‘the burden of proof that will be 
required for the making of civil orders, whether they will be made by Ministers or judges and 
the provision for and likely time scale of appeals’.1059  
 
4.6 Contemporary British Counter-Terrorism Policy: Manipulating the Margins 
of Permissible Conduct under International Human Rights Law 
This thesis has argued that certain aspects pertaining to the design and implementation of 
counter-terrorist hybrid orders do not accord with the long established standards of 
procedural fairness in the UK, and that this has been made possible due to the 
establishment of the state of perpetual quasi-emergency. At the most extreme, some 
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aspects of these mechanisms may have amounted to a ‘covert derogation’ from IHRL.1060 
According to Helen Fenwick and Gavin Phillipson, a covert derogation is the attempt to:  
[U]se the threat of terrorism not as a reason for openly derogating from 
human rights standards, but instead to persuade Parliament and the 
judiciary into acquiescing in the creation of minimal interpretations of 
certain ECHR rights that stripped them of much of their content.1061 
In other words, these are pre-emptive attempts to dilute and redefine what human rights 
standards actually apply when counter-terrorist hybrid orders are implemented. Arguably the 
strongest example of a covert derogation in this regard can be seen with the curfews 
imposed upon early Control Order subjects. As discussed earlier, an 18 hour curfew 
imposed upon the earliest Control Order subjects was found to have violated Article 5 of the 
ECHR.1062 Although the Courts consistently maintained that the hearing of Control Orders 
did not amount to the determination of a criminal charge, some of the conditions attached to 
the mechanisms were akin to, or were at times, ‘far more draconian punishment than many 
criminal sanctions, including fines, probation, community service, and suspended 
sentences’.1063 
Insofar as the procedural fairness of the earliest Control Orders is concerned, the lack of 
disclosure of the allegations and the conditions under which mechanisms were imposed 
were so restrictive that it could be argued that the Government was relying upon an 
unacknowledged derogation from the right to a fair trial.1064 Despite the fact that the most 
extreme challenges witnessed in the earliest days of the Control Order regime have been 
                                                          
1060
 As alluded to in the Literature Review, when States implement preventive policies which are likely 
to stretch the limits of IHRL, States have to decide whether to assert that human rights are 
inapplicable, derogate from human rights obligations, or find a way of diluting rights standards. See 
Fenwick & Phillipson, ‘Covert Derogations and Judicial Deference’ (n. 52). 
1061
 ibid, 867. 
1062
 SSHD v. JJ (n. 655). 
1063
 Fenwick & Phillipson, ‘Covert Derogations and Judicial Deference’ (n. 52) 878. The argument that 
the restrictions permitted under counter-terrorist hybrid orders can amount to criminal punishment was 
explored in Chapter 3, section 3.4.1. 
1064
 ibid. 
229 
 
reduced somewhat due to the requirement of a minimum level of disclosure, the wider 
concerns over the effects of counter-terrorist hybrid orders for the right to a fair trial have 
clearly endured. 
These developments, which can be seen as an erosion of high human rights standards, may 
also be described as an attempt to recalibrate what the standards even are. Insofar as the 
policy of detention is concerned, Fiona de Londras argues that the UK has not replicated the 
USA’s approach which denied the applicability of human rights. Instead, the UK has 
asserted that the current terrorist threat is so severe that certain IHRL standards should be 
recalibrated, which poses a significant challenge to pre-existing standards.1065 Going further, 
the UK’s approach may represent what de Londras has described as an ‘internal challenge’ 
to IHRL in the sense that the UK has not attempted to dismiss the applicability of IHRL 
altogether, but rather, it has deliberately sought to scale back the strength of the rights in 
question.  
Insofar as counter-terrorist hybrid orders are concerned, the content analysis undertaken 
earlier suggests that British parliamentarians have indeed emphasised the significance of 
the terrorist threat and that rights of individuals ought to be balanced with those of the public. 
At the same time, the most extreme rhetoric of the ‘War on Terror’ has had a negligible role 
in the legislative process and the primacy of prosecution has remained the priority of 
subsequent UK governments.   
With this in mind, it has been argued that the right to a fair trial has been significantly 
affected in a number of ways. The deliberate framing of counter-terrorist hybrid orders as 
civil in nature, which therefore invokes the civil limb of the right to a fair trial rather than the 
more stringent criminal limb, has significantly reduced the scope of fair trial guarantees 
available to individuals subject to these mechanisms. In that regard, the principles of open 
and natural justice which have been fundamental to the common law for centuries have 
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been adversely affected in response to national security concerns. Building upon these 
concerns, the rights of individuals under IHRL to a public trial, including the right to a 
reasoned judgment, and the rights to the equality of arms and to an adversarial trial, have 
been similarly challenged. The dangers of such laws are pertinent, but cannot be viewed in 
isolation.  
Although this thesis has analysed the notion of the state of perpetual quasi-emergency 
strictly in relation to the design and implementation of counter-terrorist hybrid orders and the 
right to a fair trial, this is just one aspect of contemporary British counter-terrorist policy that 
raises serious questions over the extent of the UK’s adherence to IHRL. Clearly, it may be 
possible that the progressive expansion of other counter-terrorist powers which appear to 
stretch the limits of IHRL may also have been allowed to occur as a result of, inter alia, 
definition ‘creep’ of certain terminology, occasional judicial deference, a flawed balancing 
metaphor purportedly justifying the trade-off of rights, and the rhetoric of panic, threat and 
fear.  
Most obviously, the compatibility of counter-terrorist hybrid orders with the right to liberty 
may be subjected to similar analysis and yield similar results, in the sense that the perpetual 
quasi-emergency has created the space necessary for the harsh conditions to be accepted 
by lawmakers, the judiciary, and the public more broadly. Going further, other administrative 
counter-terrorist powers that share some characteristics with the mechanisms analysed in 
this thesis, such as asset-freezing measures, may be analysed in a similar manner. More 
specifically, it may be useful to assess what legal and extra-legal factors may have played a 
part in the policy decisions underpinning these powers that have, to some extent, 
circumvented the traditional criminal process and, possibly, led to the margins of permissible 
conduct under IHRL being manipulated in a similar manner. In essence, although the history 
and development of counter-terrorist hybrid orders raise unique challenges vis-à-vis the right 
to a fair trial, the specific problems explored in this thesis could be said to be symptomatic of 
a broader legal problem in the UK.  
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4.7 Conclusions 
Having concluded in Chapter 3 that the three mechanisms explored in this thesis do not 
systematically violate the right to a fair trial, this chapter has sought to identify why they have 
nevertheless been accepted in the UK with its well-known attachment to high human rights 
standards. Crucially, this chapter has argued that the acceptance of these mechanisms as 
they are currently designed is due to the establishment of the perpetual quasi-emergency. 
Whilst being fundamentally grounded in law, this denotes the legal environment in which the 
mechanisms stretch the margins of permissible conduct of IHRL and have, at least in the 
earliest days of the Control Order regime, occasionally strayed beyond these margins. After 
outlining how and why this situation came into being, this chapter has identified what legal 
and extra-legal factors have helped to preserve the perpetual quasi-emergency. Lastly, the 
chapter examined what characteristics of counter-terrorist hybrid orders may be in the 
process of being normalised, before concluding that current practice may represent an 
erosion and downward calibration of previously held high human rights standards. 
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Chapter 5. Conclusions 
5.1 Recommendations and Scope for Reform 
This thesis has examined the development, implementation and administration of three 
particular executive mechanisms that have been termed counter-terrorist hybrid orders, in 
order to evaluate the implications of the mechanisms for, and ultimately their compatibility 
with, the right to a fair trial under IHRL. In light of the findings of the study, there are a 
number of opportunities for meaningful reform that could improve the substantive fairness 
and, more importantly for the purposes of this thesis, the procedural fairness of proceedings 
concerning the mechanisms, in order to ensure that the UK does not risk straying beyond 
the margins of permissible behaviour under IHRL. Moreover, as some European States have 
enacted similar counter-terrorist administrative powers, and others may be drawing 
inspiration from current UK practice, certain steps could be taken by those States in light of 
the UK’s experience in order to avoid similar problems and issues.  
First, in light of the legal framework pertaining to the right to a fair trial in the context of 
national security set out in Chapter 2, this thesis has argued that the criminal limb of the right 
to a fair trial should apply in proceedings concerning counter-terrorist hybrid orders. Whilst 
no domestic court nor the ECtHR has reached this conclusion, it could be argued that if the 
ECtHR was confronted with a case concerning one of the mechanisms explored in this 
thesis, it is likely that the Court would determine that the proceedings should be classified as 
criminal in nature. This assertion is in line with the substantial jurisprudence of the ECtHR on 
these matters,1066 which points to such a conclusion for a number of reasons: counter-
terrorist hybrid orders are imposed on the basis of allegations of terrorism-related or 
otherwise serious types of activity; they impose harsh restrictions and obligations upon 
subjects which are often more onerous than some forms of criminal punishment; they are 
imposed by the Secretary of State pursuant to her statutory powers and most significantly; 
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they provide for the possibility of strong criminal sanctions, including imprisonment, for any 
breach of the conditions. These combined factors indicate that the proceedings in which 
counter-terrorist hybrid orders are reviewed by the courts should be treated as the 
‘determination of a criminal charge’ for the purposes of Article 6 of the ECHR, and therefore 
import the stronger fair trial guarantees required in criminal proceedings.  
As such, to avoid any potential future clash between the ECtHR and the UK courts on this 
fundamental issue, Parliament could consider reforming the current design and 
administration of the various statutory regimes analysed in Chapter 3 to import the maximum 
set of fair trial guarantees espoused under Article 6 of the ECHR, subject to the permissible 
restrictions that may be invoked. 
Accordingly, if the UK wishes to avoid the risk of straying beyond the margins of permissible 
conduct under IHRL, it should consider granting full rights of disclosure to individuals, 
including a full reasoned judgment, and it should not exclude the individuals from 
proceedings, although the press and public may be excluded from all or part of a trial on 
national security grounds. The Government would also still be able to invoke the implied 
limitations of some specific guarantees that underpin the right to a fair trial, provided that any 
restrictions adopted in order to achieve legitimate objectives such as the protection of 
national security or the rights of others are strictly necessary to achieve one or more of those 
aims, and that these restrictions do not impair the essence of the right. For example, should 
it be deemed necessary not to disclose certain evidence to the individual for national security 
reasons, it is conceivable that a Special Advocate may still be able to serve a purpose in 
such proceedings by being appointed to represent the interests of an accused during 
applications by the prosecution to withhold relevant unused material.1067 
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Crucially, reflecting the inherently criminal nature of proceedings, the various counter-
terrorist hybrid orders should only be imposed upon individuals when the Home Secretary is 
convinced, beyond reasonable doubt, that the individual is, or has been, involved in terrorist-
related activity. It is worth recalling at this point that, despite the civil and non-terrorism 
related nature of ASBOs, the Court of Appeal in McCann held that the mechanisms should 
be implemented on the criminal burden of proof.1068 Although the IRTL has suggested that 
the courts should be able to review the decisions of the SSHD to the standard of the 
‘balance of probabilities’ in relation to TPIMs, rather than on the lesser judicial review 
standard as the situation currently stands,1069 the courts should also be bound to apply the 
criminal burden of proof when reviewing the Home Secretary’s decisions if the proceedings 
are indeed criminal in nature. Where relevant, all of these recommendations should also be 
implemented insofar as TEOs are concerned. 
Such a conclusion may also have implications for other administrative counter-terrorist 
powers and non-terrorism-related executive powers that were briefly addressed earlier.1070 
The findings of this thesis may imply that other administrative powers should be 
fundamentally reformed in similar ways and that they should be considered as criminal in 
nature. In line with the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, this is especially relevant if such 
executive powers are imposed on the basis of allegations of serious activity; if they impose 
harsh restrictions and obligations; if they are imposed upon people by the Secretary of State; 
and if they provide for strong criminal sanctions for any breach. Whilst other administrative 
powers undoubtedly share some characteristics with the three mechanisms explored in this 
thesis, most are not concerned with activities as serious as terrorism. In addition, the 
restrictions and obligations that can be imposed upon individuals are generally not as 
onerous as those under counter-terrorist hybrid orders, or they are much more limited, and 
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lastly, their manner of implementation and administration sets them apart from counter-
terrorist hybrid orders which are immersed in secrecy due to the use of CMP.  
Implementing the above recommendations would ensure that the principles of natural and 
open justice are respected, and that the relevant guarantees of the right to a fair trial under 
IHRL challenged by current practice are fully complied with, not least of all the right to a 
public trial, the right to an adversarial trial and the equality of arms, and the additional fair 
trial guarantees which must be adhered to in criminal proceedings. 
However, it is clear that the UK courts do not attach as much significance to the distinction 
between criminal and civil proceedings as the ECtHR does, instead emphasising that the 
range of applicable fair trial guarantees can vary depending on the situation. In light of the 
case law discussed in this thesis, it is unambiguous that the UK courts, as well as the 
executive and legislature, view proceedings concerning counter-terrorist hybrid orders as 
civil in nature. 
In that respect, although some efforts to mitigate and counter-balance the unfairness of 
proceedings concerning counter-terrorist hybrid orders have been made, most importantly 
with the requirement of minimum disclosure and the appointment of Special Advocates, 
more should be done. For example, the de facto ban on communication between subjects 
and their Special Advocates once the latter has seen the closed evidence could be relaxed 
somewhat, in order to allow some meaningful communication between the subject and their 
Advocate.1071 Finally, the British legislature could fully accommodate the modest and more 
general recommendations of the IRTL insofar as TPIMs are concerned, in order to improve 
the fairness of existing practices to some extent.1072 
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In light of the UK’s response to the enduring problem of terror suspects who cannot be 
prosecuted or deported, this thesis has argued that the UK’s current practice in relation to  
counter-terrorist hybrid orders strongly resembles the behaviour typically manifested by 
States enduring a ‘prolonged emergency’. One could argue that the legal framework 
pertaining to counter-terrorism measures in the UK has progressively crystallised into a state 
of ‘perpetual quasi-emergency’. The UK is acting at the margins of permissible conduct 
under IHRL and has, at least in the early years of the Control Order regime, occasionally 
acted beyond these limits, thereby eroding long-established fair trial guarantees usually 
associated with proceedings concerning alleged terrorist behaviour.  
Whilst it could be argued that, as a measure of last resort, the UK Government should be 
more up front about the fairness of the mechanisms and formally derogate from certain 
aspects of Article 6 of the ECHR, such a drastic course of action would not accord with the 
general approach of subsequent UK governments which has been to reject the notion of the 
‘War on Terror’ and the emergency paradigm.1073 In fact, derogating from certain aspects of 
IHRL may be undesirable and ultimately detrimental to these objectives. The recent 
experience in France has provided strong evidence that exceptional measures advanced 
pursuant to a formal derogation can be applied on a large scale and normalised over 
time.1074 For example, it is clear that France has imposed considerably more ‘Assigned 
Residence Orders’ in the space of two years than the total amount of the similar Control 
Order and TPIM mechanisms imposed by the SSHD in the UK since 2005.1075 
Demonstrating the potential consequences of derogations even further, the restrictions and 
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erosions of civil liberties in Turkey following the failed coup d’état in 2016 and subsequent 
derogations from IHRL have been disturbing and roundly criticised.1076 
 
5.2 Future Developments and Scope for Further Research 
This study has examined and evaluated a number of rapidly developing counter-terrorism 
and human rights issues that will remain of significant interest for legal scholars, civil liberties 
advocates and the public more broadly for many years. Accordingly, researchers should be 
mindful of a number of issues likely to transpire in the short-term and long-term which may 
have a significant bearing upon the findings of this study. In any case, these developments 
will undoubtedly present opportunities for further research into the themes explored in this 
study.  
First, researchers should be attentive to the future disclosure of statistics concerning the 
implementation of counter-terrorist hybrid orders. As it seems clear that the UK’s general 
counter-terrorism policy is grounded in law and priorities criminal prosecution, the use of 
TPIMs and TEOs should remain infrequently used powers. Nevertheless, it will be important 
to note how many TPIMs are imposed in the coming months and years and if the use of 
TEOs increases, since the introduction of the regime in February 2015.1077 Additionally, it will 
be important to note how many applications are made to the High Court, Court of Appeal, 
Court of Session and Supreme Court under section 6 of the Justice and Security Act 2013 
for a civil trial to be heard under CMP. These statistics will serve as useful evidence when 
critically analysing if exceptional measures relating to national security, particularly the 
authorisation and use of CMP, are indeed being normalised over time. 
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Second, an appeal pending before the ECtHR, Gulamhussein and Tariq v. UK, represents 
the first time the Court will have to directly address the fairness of CMP under Article 6 of the 
ECHR.1078 The case concerns the fairness of appeal proceedings heard under CMP relating 
to the withdrawal of government-issued security clearances. This appeal followed the 
revocation of the security clearances of two Home Office employees due to their links to 
individuals concerned with terrorism. The ECtHR has given notice of the applications to the 
British Government and put forward four questions to the parties. These include the issue of 
whether the civil limb of the right to a fair trial applied to the Security Vetting Appeal Tribunal, 
but most importantly, the question of whether the applicants had enjoyed a fair hearing in the 
determination of their civil rights and obligations.1079 Moreover, the ECtHR questioned 
whether ‘the principle of equality of arms; the right to an adversarial hearing; and the right to 
a reasoned judgment’ were respected in the closed proceedings.1080 The judgment of the 
ECtHR will undoubtedly build upon A v. UK,1081 I. R. and G. T v. UK,1082 and K2 v. UK,1083 
which considered the fairness of CMP, albeit through the lens of different human rights, and 
offer some invaluable insight into the compatibility of CMP with the more detailed and 
meticulous requirements of the right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the ECHR. Should the 
ECtHR criticise the practice and gradual expansion of CMP in the British legal system, it may 
be the case that history repeats itself, and that it takes a judgment from the European Court 
to compel the UK to rethink its approach to proceedings entailing national security concerns. 
Third, in addition to the more immediate developments just mentioned, there are more long 
term implications of the themes explored in this thesis. In particular, there are obvious and 
entirely legitimate anxieties over the direction in which the right to a fair trial may be heading 
when national security concerns arise. Although civil proceedings can clearly be held in 
camera and ex parte, no criminal trial in the UK has ever been held completely in secret to 
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the extent that the proceedings are held in camera and ex parte with the public and media 
excluded, in which the reporting of the trial is also prohibited in its entirety, and where the 
defendants’ identities are withheld from the public. Such a scenario would represent the 
most accurate manifestation of what is popularly labelled a ‘secret court’.1084  
In 2014 the English and Welsh legal system came close to allowing the first ‘secret trial’ in 
modern history when it emerged that the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) was pressuring 
the High Court to allow a criminal trial to proceed entirely in secret and for the defendants’ 
identities to be anonymised. In the High Court, Nicol J authorised the CPS request, but 
following a legal challenge led by The Guardian newspaper, the Court of Appeal held that 
the identities of the defendants and some of the facts of the trial had to be made public.1085 
Despite this outcome, as legal practitioners and the public become more accustomed to the 
use of CMP in civil proceedings, the risks of such practices becoming ‘normalised’ and 
spreading to other areas of law remains a serious concern. This arguably demonstrates that 
the practice of CMP in civil proceedings is having a detrimental effect on the wider criminal 
justice system, one of the hallmarks of a prolonged emergency.1086 
Fourth, the various counter-terrorist hybrid order regimes which have been the focus of this 
study are just some of the examples of contemporary counter-terrorism practices which have 
the underlying objectives of prevention and pre-emption. This particular counter-terrorism 
approach involves the apparent sidestepping of traditional post-crime, punitive action and 
the greater use of pre-crime, preventative approaches. In addition to the mechanisms 
explored in this study, a pre-crime and preventative approach is also manifested currently 
with the Government’s Prevent Strategy which seeks to ‘prevent people being drawn into 
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terrorism’.1087 The Strategy was given a statutory footing under the CTS Act 2015, placing a 
duty upon specified public authorities to ‘have due regard to the need to prevent people from 
being drawn into terrorism’ in the exercise of their functions.1088 The move has proven deeply 
controversial, not least of all for institutionalising the ‘conveyor-belt’ theory of 
radicalisation.1089  
Going further, the Government’s new Counter-Extremism Strategy and subsequent counter-
extremism proposals mark a significant expansion of the Prevent Strategy.1090 These 
counter-extremism proposals may risk straying into uncharted territory by criminalising 
‘thought-crime’ if action can be taken against individuals who exhibit vague notions such as 
‘non-violent extremism’.1091 Moreover, whether the objectives of counter-terrorism and 
counter-radicalisation policies actually end up being counter-productive in the sense that 
they contribute to the alienation of certain communities is a serious concern. 
Finally, there is obvious scope for further content analysis into the role that the rhetoric of 
panic, threat and fear can play during the parliamentary debates leading to the enactment of 
counter-terrorist legislation. Although this form of socio-legal analysis clearly strays from 
traditional doctrinal legal analysis most familiar to legal scholars, this study has indicated that 
some content analysis can be useful, especially when critically analysing areas of law that 
dominate popular and media discourse and have a clear impact in society, as matters of 
counter-terrorism evidently can do. Other counter-terrorist legislation could be subjected to 
similar analysis, whilst it may be useful to analyse similar issues insofar as the media 
contribute to the rhetoric of panic, threat and fear. Going further, given the well-known 
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influence of British counter-terrorism laws and policies, there is obvious potential to examine 
the similarities and differences, if any, that the role of rhetoric has in the legislative 
processes leading to the enactment of counter-terrorism laws in States such as Australia 
and Canada, and also more recently in Europe. 
 
5.3 Final Remarks 
Since 9/11, subsequent British Governments have demonstrated clear willingness to ‘defend 
further up the field’ in the struggle against terrorism,1092 by going further back in the timeline 
of an individual’s potential path to committing acts of terrorism in order to prevent that path 
being fully realised. Obviously, the further back in time a policy or law functions in the 
attempt to prevent terrorist acts from occurring, the broader the net of people who may be 
subjected to counter-terrorist measures becomes. Equally troubling, as the criminal burden 
of proof becomes harder to satisfy with mechanisms which are inherently pre-emptive in 
nature, the growth of a parallel justice system which circumvents the normal criminal process 
is a real cause for concern. The implications for IHRL are drastic, as standards previously 
held in high regard may be gradually eroded pursuant to the objective of protecting national 
security. Counter-terrorist hybrid order orders that are implemented in the civil courts but can 
involve criminal sanctions undoubtedly manifest this approach.  
Going further, the UK’s counter-extremism proposals may replicate these challenges and 
stretch them even further. Like the overly broad definitions underpinning counter-terrorist 
hybrid orders, the exceedingly wide notions of ‘extremism’ – and in particular ‘non-violent 
extremism’ – may play an integral role in the implementation of the proposed counter-
extremism ‘civil order regime’. The broad notions may create an even wider range of 
individuals who could be subjected to restrictive conditions without benefitting from the fair 
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trial guarantees usually associated with proceedings concerning conduct of serious criminal 
nature. Despite being deliberately framed as risk-averse administrative mechanisms, it is 
hard to dismiss fears that the growing use of preventative mechanisms explored in this study 
have the effect of ‘criminalising’ certain conduct, whilst simultaneously diminishing long-
established human rights standards.  
In light of the recent terrorist attacks in Europe and reports that terrorist plots are regularly 
thwarted by police and security services, the threat posed by terrorism is very real. However, 
the risks inherent in creeping and unacknowledged limitations of some essential fair trial 
guarantees cannot be underestimated. Whilst heavy-handed restrictions may be necessary, 
Governments need to be clear where they stand and meet their obligations under IHRL. 
With regard to counter-terrorism hybrid orders, the invocation of the criminal limb to the right 
to a fair trial would be the desirable course of action which would provide a greater degree of 
procedural fairness to individuals. This might also accord more strongly with the general 
counter-terrorism policy of the UK which has emphasised the prioritisation of criminal 
prosecution. However, as it seems clear that such a significant reform is unlikely, a more 
realistic conclusion should be determined. Whilst the possibility of the UK derogating from 
certain aspects of the right to a fair trial may seem a viable option as a measure of last 
resort, recent experience in France has provided further evidence that exceptional counter-
terrorism measures which are implemented on the basis of a formal derogation pursuant to a 
state of emergency can become normalised. As such, despite the concerns addressed in 
this thesis, the continued but minimal use of counter-terrorist hybrid orders which are 
fundamentally grounded in law may be a more desirable course of action than the use of 
emergency powers, which would necessitate a derogation from IHRL, and which may 
ultimately lead to procedures which are incompatible with human rights being normalised 
over time. 
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APPENDIX II: Content Analysis in Relation to the Rhetoric 
of Panic, Threat and Fear in Legislative Processes 
Summary of Nvivo Research 
As mentioned in the Methodological Framework in Chapter 1, section 1.5, some content 
analysis was undertaken via Nvivo (v. 11) for the purposes of this thesis. This Appendix 
builds upon the Methodological Framework in Chapter 1 which explained why the analysis 
was necessary, and the results of the analysis which were displayed and analysed in 
Chapter 4, section 4.4.3. Moreover, this Appendix explains and evidences how the content 
analysis was actually carried out. The sources used were the second readings and 
committee stages from both Houses of Parliament pertaining to the four identified Bills of 
Parliament: the Prevention of Terrorism (PT) Bill; the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation 
Measures (TPIM) Bill; the Justice and Security (JS) Bill; and the Counter-Terrorism and 
Security (CTS) Bill. The various readings of each Bill were manually transposed into unique 
documents before being imported as unique sources into a new project on Nvivo. 
Deliberately excluded from the sources were the various divisions in which MPs names were 
listed when casting votes and the statements of committee membership. The sources were 
as follows: 
Bill House Stage Date Hansard 
References 
Word 
Length 
PT Commons Second Reading 23 February 2005 Vol. 431 Cols. 333-448 56,727 
PT Commons Committee  28 February 2005 Vol. 431 Cols. 663-768 52,871 
PT Lords Second Reading 1 March 2005 Vol. 670 Cols. 116-219 57,061 
PT Lords Committee  3 & 7 March 2005 Vol. 670 Cols. 359-
383, 398-464, 482-556 
& 568-616 
108,590 
PT Commons 
& Lords 
Second Readings & 
Committee Debates 
  275,249 
TPIM Commons Second Reading 7 June 2011 Vol. 529 Cols. 69-130 36,048 
TPIM Commons Committee  21, 23, 28, & 30 
June 2011; 5 July 
2011 
Cols. 1-28 & 29-52, 
53-78 & 79-118, 119-
162 & 163-206, 207-
230 & 231-260, 261-
302 & 303-314 
157,466 
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TPIM Lords Second Reading 5 October 2011 Vol. 730 Cols. 1133-
1203 
39,770 
TPIM Lords Committee  19 October 2011; 
1 November 2011 
Vol. 731 Cols. 290-351 
& 1121-1133 
40,014 
TPIM Commons 
& Lords 
Second Readings & 
Committee Debates 
  273,298 
JS Commons Second Reading 18 December 
2012 
Vol. 555 Cols. 713-805 51,629 
JS Commons Committee  29 & 31 January 
2013; 5 & 7 
Feburary 2013  
Cols. 1-38 & 39-80, 
81-106 & 107-156, 
157-200 & 201-248, 
249-276 & 277-298 
151,463 
JS Lords Second Reading 19 June 2012 Vol. 737 Cols. 1659-
1697 & 1709-1758 
48,374 
JS Lords Committee  9, 11, 17 & 23 
July 2012 
Vol. 738 Cols. 910-
977, 995-1018, 1161-
1208, 1223-1242; Vol. 
739 Cols. 119-180, 
200-222, 488-562 & 
579-592 
182,605 
JS Commons 
& Lords 
Second Readings & 
Committee Debates 
  434,071 
CTS Commons Second Reading 2 December 2014 Vol. 589 Cols. 207-274 37,178 
CTS Commons Committee  9, 15 & 16 
December 2014 
Vol. 589 Cols. 784-
838, 1173-1234 & 
1305-1373 
95,140 
CTS Lords Second Reading 13 January 2015 Vol. 758 Cols. 661-772 63,189 
CTS Lords Committee  20, 26 & 28 
January 2015 
Vol. 758 Cols. 1207-
1278, 1293-1318; Vol. 
759 Cols. 12-75, 90-
100 & 205-318 
154,565 
CTS Commons 
& Lords 
Second Readings & 
Committee Debates 
  350,072 
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Query 1: Distribution of Keywords in the Second Reading and Committee 
Stage Debates Pertaining to the Four Bills 
The purpose of this query was to assess which words featured most prominently in the 
various parliamentary debates. The word frequency tool within the Nvivo Query Wizard was 
used to identify the 30 most common words of five characters or more in each debate, 
including stemmed words. These results are displayed in full in Tables I-IV below, whilst 
Figures I-IV in Chapter 4, section 4.4.3, have condensed these results for ease of reference 
and analysis. Evidence of these word frequency searches is provided below. 
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Table I: Distribution of Keywords in the Second Reading and Committee Stage 
Debates Pertaining to the Prevention of Terrorism Bill 
The Distribution of Keywords in the Second Reading and Committee Stage Debates 
Pertaining to the Prevention of Terrorism Bill 
Second Reading 
(House of 
Commons) 
Committee Stage 
(House of Commons) 
Second Reading 
(House of Lords) 
Committee Stage 
(House of Lords) 
Word Count Word Count Word Count Word Count 
right 316 secretary 403 order 329 noble 926 
secretary 304 order 367 governments 256 amendments 874 
orders 285 right 250 noble 237 order 850 
control 194 amendments 235 secretary 194 court 474 
houses 187 courts 197 right 187 controls 417 
member 187 member 197 terrorism 174 secretary 384 
governments 163 clause 194 lords 161 right 315 
points 156 point 180 liberty 150 learned 314 
powers 152 judge 166 terrorist 146 derogation 304 
people 151 liberty 158 controls 144 states 278 
friend 144 derogation 153 derogation 143 government 277 
court 140 controlled 152 court 142 committee 226 
evidence 121 friend 150 judge 139 person 224 
issue 120 house 140 houses 135 matter 219 
security 116 committee 121 evidence 130 whether 219 
whether 114 state' 118 powers 128 relation 211 
gentleman 107 governments 114 process 121 column 210 
judicial 104 debate 111 security 117 clause 208 
column 103 process 111 state 114 points 199 
question 99 people 110 people 114 friend 196 
terrorism 97 clarke 102 threats 106 reasons 193 
terrorist 95 column 98 column 104 think 190 
liberty 93 matter 96 place 98 question 186 
derogation 92 first 96 matter 91 falconer 172 
process 91 different 88 judicial 85 thoroton 172 
decision 90 accept 85 decision 82 issue 169 
different 90 whether 85 legislation 82 agreed 167 
debate 89 place 83 whether 80 scotland 160 
considering 88 powers 82 country 75 baroness 158 
judge 86 issue 80 reasons 73 ruling 156 
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Table II: Distribution of Keywords in the Second Reading and Committee Stage 
Debates Pertaining to the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill 
The Distribution of Keywords in the Second Reading and Committee Stage Debates 
Pertaining to the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill 
Second Reading 
(House of 
Commons) 
Committee Stage 
(House of Commons) 
Second Reading 
(House of Lords) 
Committee Stage 
(House of Lords) 
Word Count Word Count Word Count Word Count 
orders 230 order 731 noble 236 amendments 324 
control 219 right 678 orders 230 noble 314 
right 164 controls 610 control 197 order 183 
people 145 secretary 582 secretary 133 secretary 179 
member 134 member 547 governments 127 measures 159 
measures 113 amendments 521 right 123 court 150 
secretary 104 policing 494 individual 104 state 148 
terrorism 104 point 489 debate 95 individual 141 
governments 103 measures 486 courts 94 clause 129 
security 99 ministers 479 measures 93 lords 118 
individual 94 state’ 469 terrorism 93 government 104 
terrorist 87 clauses 454 powers 88 control 100 
tpims 77 committee 441 security 88 notice 95 
liberty 69 people 407 public 79 powers 95 
community 69 number 388 house 78 reasonably 92 
issues 69 individual 377 states 78 terrorism 91 
evidence 68 security 371 legislative 73 rights 90 
powers 67 evidence 363 friend 72 imposed 88 
house 62 issues 334 lords 72 requirement 88 
column 61 governments 331 ministers 72 friend 84 
friend 61 terrorism 321 evident 71 provisions 83 
system 60 regime 309 terrorist 70 decision 82 
place 59 court’ 303 column 70 ministers 82 
prosecutions 58 column 295 review 67 committee 81 
threats 57 might 289 parliament 66 baroness 79 
protect 57 think 284 liberties 65 relatively 77 
years’ 57 friend 273 people 64 review 76 
legislation 56 relatively 273 point 61 points 74 
regime 56 gentleman 264 imposed 60 column 74 
court 55 review 257 protect 60 provides 71 
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Table III: Distribution of Keywords in the Second Reading and Committee Stage 
Debates Pertaining to the Justice and Security Bill 
The Distribution of Keywords in the Second Reading and Committee Stage Debates 
Pertaining to the Justice and Security Bill 
Second Reading 
(House of 
Commons) 
Committee Stage 
(House of Commons) 
Second Reading 
(House of Lords) 
Committee Stage 
(House of Lords) 
Word Count Word Count Word Count Word Count 
right 282 amendments 1220 governments 267 noble 1422 
governments 255 committee 917 noble 244 amendments 1179 
committee 222 governments 817 security 232 committees 991 
security 216 informed 599 committee 220 security 821 
material 197 member 546 courts 204 material 715 
courts’ 193 material 519 material 198 governments 649 
cases 178 ministers 517 intelligence 186 court 584 
member 177 clause 507 informed 175 proceedings 549 
closed 172 security 497 interest 166 judging 522 
justice 148 courts 474 public 163 nations 506 
evidence 139 proceedings 420 judge 146 informed 492 
friend 135 points 392 evidence 127 public 478 
intelligence 131 number 384 justice 122 lords 453 
judge 129 party 337 cases 119 closed 426 
informers 128 right 333 disclosure 118 ministers 417 
houses 126 public 324 procedures 118 friend 417 
ministers 126 states 314 right 110 interests 385 
nations 125 national 313 national 108 states 372 
procedures 113 issue 303 states 106 procedures 366 
proceedings 113 intelligence 300 whether 102 points 360 
agencies 109 interests 290 ministers 99 evidence 356 
point 108 house 289 column 87 intelligence 351 
place 104 matter 288 closed 84 clause 348 
public 102 column 281 principle 84 whether 343 
states 98 evidence 267 sensitive 84 right 336 
principle 93 important 262 agencies 80 advocate 329 
think 93 whether 259 house 77 column 329 
interest 93 provide 257 lords 77 matter 322 
column 91 report 257 proceedings 76 issue 320 
issues 91 think 252 importer 75 disclosure 310 
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Table IV: Distribution of Keywords in the Second Reading and Committee Stage 
Debates Pertaining to the Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill 
The Distribution of Keywords in the Second Reading and Committee Stage Debates 
Pertaining to the Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill 
Second Reading 
(House of 
Commons) 
Committee Stage 
(House of Commons) 
Second Reading 
(House of Lords) 
Committee Stage 
(House of Lords) 
Word Count Word Count Word Count Word Count 
right 222 right 367 noble 266 amendments 1068 
people 175 individual 341 government 201 noble 961 
secretary 133 clause 328 people 181 governments 441 
member 132 amendments 288 terrorism 178 powers 406 
governments 115 terrorism 279 powers 176 lords 397 
terrorism 110 member 268 security 162 point 375 
friend 105 people 267 right 151 clause 356 
community 103 secretary 255 minister 132 terrorism 350 
powers 100 governments 254 legislative 127 issue 349 
country 96 ministers 246 community 126 individual 348 
issue 85 order 244 housing 123 ministers 335 
orders 83 issue 231 terrorist 116 baroness 330 
returns 80 power 228 returns 113 friend 324 
security 80 community 215 column 111 university 317 
house 79 states 207 country 111 states 314 
points 77 provide 206 committee 108 review 307 
prevent 75 court 203 prevent 105 secretary 294 
counter 72 point 201 issue 103 people 291 
measures 71 relation 189 lords 99 order 286 
threats 69 column 184 threats 97 column 282 
important 66 prevent 177 think 97 legislative 278 
column 64 security 171 measures 96 think 269 
ensure 60 measures 157 policing 94 reasons 267 
legislation 57 returns 149 order 92 provide 264 
things 56 informed 147 reviewer 92 relation 264 
committee 56 important 147 individual 89 whether 260 
individual 55 review 143 however 88 community 256 
place 54 place 137 debate 88 authorities 254 
differently 51 required 136 concerned 87 right 246 
response 51 legislative 135 proposed 86 committees 243 
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Prevention of Terrorism Bill (House of Commons Second Reading) 
 
 
 
Prevention of Terrorism Bill (House of Commons Committee Stage) 
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Prevention of Terrorism Bill (House of Lord Second Reading) 
 
 
 
Prevention of Terrorism Bill (House of Lords Committee Stage) 
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Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill (House of Commons 
Second Reading) 
  
 
 
Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill (House of Commons 
Committee Stage) 
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Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill (House of Lords Second 
Reading) 
  
 
 
Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill (House of Lords 
Committee Stage) 
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Justice and Security Bill (House of Commons Second Reading) 
 
 
 
Justice and Security Bill (House of Commons Committee Stage) 
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Justice and Security Bill (House of Lords Second Reading) 
 
 
 
Justice and Security Bill (House of Lords Committee Stage) 
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Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill (House of Commons Second Reading) 
 
 
 
Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill (House of Commons Committee Stage) 
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Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill (House of Lords Second Reading) 
 
 
 
Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill (House of Lords Committee Stage) 
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Query 2: The Adversarial Nature of Counter-Terrorism Efforts 
In light of the findings of Query 1, the purpose of Query 2 was to further analyse how the 
‘nature’ of counter-terrorism efforts were perceived and described. The text search tool 
within the Nvivo Query Wizard was used to analyse how often the notions of ‘battle’, 
‘campaign’, ‘conflict’, ‘fight’, ‘struggle’ and ‘war’, and stemmed words were used to describe 
the efforts to counter terrorism. When conducting the text search, the results were displayed 
in broad context so as to manually exclude irrelevant references, before transposing the 
results into a chart for the purpose of contrasting and comparing the results. Illustrative 
examples of these searches are included below and the results were transposed into Figure 
V in Chapter 4, section 4.4.3. 
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Prevention of Terrorism Bill (Second Readings and Committee Debates) 
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Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill (Second Readings and 
Committee Debates) 
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Justice and Security Bill (Second Readings and Committee Debates) 
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Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill (Second Readings and Committee 
Debates) 
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Query 3: The Notion of ‘Balance’ Between the Rights of an Individual and 
Society 
The purpose of Query 3 was to explore the perceived and often discussed conflicts between 
the rights of an individual and the rights of wider society. The text search tool within the 
Nvivo Query Wizard was used to identify instances in which the notions of a ‘balance’ or 
‘balancing’ were mentioned, and stems of each word. Each reference was then manually 
analysed to find examples of when the notions of ‘balance’ or ‘balancing’ were used to 
describe the perceived conflicts between rights of individuals and the rights of wider society. 
Illustrative examples are included below and the results were transposed into Figure VI in 
Chapter 4, section 4.4.3. 
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Prevention of Terrorism Bill (Second Readings and Committee Debates) 
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Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill (Second Readings and 
Committee Debates) 
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Justice and Security Bill (Second Readings and Committee Debates) 
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Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill (Second Readings and Committee 
Debates) 
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Query 4: The Nature of the Terrorist Threat 
The purpose of Query 4 was to consider the nature of the terrorist threat and how it was 
perceived and described by parliamentarians. The text search tool within the Nvivo Query 
Wizard was used to identify instances in which the notion of a terrorist ‘threat’ was 
mentioned, including stemmed words such as ‘threatens’ and ‘threatening’. Each reference 
was then individually considered to find examples of when the threat was described as being 
qualitatively different to previous threats (i.e. that the threat was evolving, different or 
unique), and how often the gravity of the terrorist threat was emphasised (i.e. that the threat 
was grave, serious or severe). Illustrative examples are included below and the results were 
transposed into Figure VII in Chapter 4, section 4.4.3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
308 
 
Prevention of Terrorism Bill (Second Readings and Committee Debates) 
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Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill (Second Readings and 
Committee Debates) 
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Justice and Security Bill (Second Readings and Committee Debates) 
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Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill (Second Readings and Committee 
Debates) 
 
 
 
